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My dissertation contains three chapters. Chapter one proposes a 
nonparametric method to evaluate the performance of a conditional factor 
model in explaining the cross section of stock returns. There are two tests: one 
is based on the individual pricing error of a conditional model and the other is 
based on the average pricing error. Empirical results show that for value-
weighted portfolios, the conditional CAPM explains none of the asset-pricing 
anomalies, while the conditional Fama-French three-factor model is able to 
account for the size effect, and it also helps to explain the value effect and the 
momentum effect. From a statistical point of view, a conditional model always 
beats a conditional one because it is closer to the true data-generating 
process.  
 
Chapter two proposes a general equilibrium model to study the implications of 
prospect theory for individual trading, security prices and trading volume.  Its 
main finding is that different components of prospect theory make different 
predictions. The concavity/convexity of the value function drives a disposition 
effect, which in turn leads to momentum in the cross-section of stock returns 
and a positive correlation between returns and volumes. On the other hand, 
loss aversion predicts exactly the opposite, namely a reversed disposition 
effect and reversal in the cross-section of stock returns, as well as a negative 
correlation between returns and volumes. In a calibrated economy, when 
 prospect theory preference parameters are set at the values estimated by the 
previous studies, our model can generate price momentum of up to 7% on an 
annual basis. 
 
Chapter three studies the role of aggregate dividend volatility in asset prices. 
In the model, narrow-framing investors are loss averse over fluctuations in the 
value of their financial wealth. Persistent dividend volatility indicates persistent 
fluctuation in their financial wealth and makes stocks undesirable. It helps to 
explain the salient feature of the stock market including the high mean, excess 
volatility, and predictability of stock returns while maintaining a low and stable 
risk-free rate. Consistent with the data, stock returns have a low correlation 
with consumption growth, and Sharpe ratios are time-varying.   
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CHAPTER 1 
A NEW TEST of TIME-VARYING FACTOR MODELS 1 
 
1.1 Introduction  
Tests of time-varying factor models have caught a lot of attention in recent 
literature. On the one hand, abundant empirical evidence have shown that 
betas from a factor model are time-varying (e.g., Fama and French, 1997; 
Lewellen and Nagel, 2006). On the other hand, tests of the unconditional 
CAPM, one of the most important factor models, fails to explain the cross 
section of stock returns (e.g., Fama and French, 1993). As a result, a lot of 
research efforts have been devoted to exploring the performance of a 
conditional factor model by allowing betas and expected returns to vary over 
time. A long-standing approach to testing a time-varying factor model is to 
allow factor loadings to depend on observable state variables (e.g., Shanken, 
1990; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001).2  
 
Recently, Lewellen and Nagel (2006; henceforth, LN) don’t use state variables 
but divide data into non-overlapping small windows such as months, quarters, 
half-years or years, and directly estimate the time series of alphas and betas 
from short-window regressions.3 If the conditional CAPM holds period-by-
                                                 
1This chapter is based on a joint paper with Liyan Yang. 
 
2Numerous studies rely on state variables in the estimation of CAPM and other 
asset pricing models. See, for example, Campbell (1987), Ferson, Kandel and 
Stambaugh (1987), Ferson and Harvey (1991, 1993), Cochrane (1996), Wang 
(2003), Petkova and Zhang (2005), and Santos and Veronesi (2006). 
 
3It is arguable whether dividing data into small windows is a right way to 
condition on information. In this paper, we don’t attempt to participate in this 
debate and follow Lewellen and Nagel (2006) by assuming that investors’ 
  2
period, then the average pricing errors from small window regressions should 
be equal to zero. Contrary to some other recent studies (e.g., Jagannathan 
and Wang, 1996; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Santos and Veronesi, 2006; 
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2005), LN find that conditioning doesn’t 
improve the performance of the simple and consumption CAPMs.  
 
The time-series test proposed by LN possesses a special advantage over 
traditional cross-sectional tests which ignore important restrictions on cross-
sectional slopes. However, it also has its own limitation. As argued in Boguth, 
Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2008; henceforth, BCFS), the procedures in LN 
can lead to potentially large biases in alphas, which arises when the division of 
windows is too fine. In other words, the test of LN is subject to a small sample 
bias. After correcting for this small sample bias with standard instruments, 
BCFS manage to obtain much smaller alphas for momentum portfolios, 
leading them to conclude that the conditional CAPM is superior to the 
unconditional CAPM in explaining momentum portfolios. 
 
In essence, the small sample bias in LN will eventually vanish as the window 
size increases. However, when estimated using data from a large window size, 
betas will generally not be stable. This makes the test subject to the 
underconditoning bias, which occurs when empirical tests of a conditional 
model fail to account for the investor's time-varying information set (e.g., 
Hansen and Richard, 1987; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996). Therefore, the 
ideal test would rely on an optimal window size which takes into account both 
                                                                                                                                            
information sets change gradually and thus betas are stable within certain time 
periods.  
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the underconditioning bias and the small sample bias.  
 
The first goal of this paper is to propose such a test.4 Following LN, we don't 
rely on state variables, but assume that the investor's information set is 
relatively stable within certain time periods. Rather than dividing the windows 
arbitrarily, we use a nonparametric method to find the data-driven window size, 
such that within the window (i) investors’ information sets don’t greatly change; 
(ii) there are sufficient observations to achieve estimation efficiency. In other 
words, our estimation aims to minimize both the underconditioning and the 
small sample biases. We find that the optimal window size varies greatly 
across different portfolios. For instance, in the test of the conditional CAPM, 
the optimal window size varies from as short as 47 days to as long as 333 
days for different value-weighted portfolios. To compare our results with those 
obtained by LN, we also estimate the model using their non-overlapping 
window approach. We find that the estimates from LN's method are very 
sensitive to the window size. When the window size changes from one month 
to three months, the monthly average pricing error can differ by as much as 
1%! More importantly, different window estimates can also lead to different 
inferences. Therefore, arbitrarily fixing the window size as three months or six 
months for all portfolios may lead to unreliable estimates and inconsistent 
inferences. 
 
The second goal of this paper is to consider a more general nonlinear 
relationship between asset returns and factor returns. Ang and Chen (2002), 
                                                 
4In a contemporaneously proposed paper, Ang and Kristensen proposed a 
similar test to ours.  
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Ang, Chen and Xing (2006), and Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007) show that many 
securities covary differently when the market goes down from when it goes up, 
providing evidence of payoff nonlinearity5. Our empirical studies are based on 
a nonparametric methodology that avoids the misspecification between asset 
returns and factor returns, and hence is immune from potential nonlinearity 
biases. In testing the conditional CAPM, Wang (2003) also uses a 
nonparametric method to avoid nonlinearity biases, but his focus is on the 
nonlinear relationship between betas (risk premia) and state variables that 
represent conditioning information. We, in contrast, don't rely on state 
variables; we are concerned with the nonlinear relationship between asset 
returns and factor returns. 
 
Our estimation method possesses further advantages. First, we use an 
overlapping window estimation, which allows a gradual change in betas rather 
than a drastic change through the non-overlapping window estimation as in 
Grundy and Martin (2001) and LN. Moreover, previous studies on time-varying 
betas by Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004), Fama and French (2006), and LN, 
among others, assume that betas are constant within subsamples, thereby 
ignoring the variations in the betas within each window. Our method estimates 
the conditional alphas and betas at every point in time, and hence directly 
captures the variations that are overlooked by these studies. Another 
advantage is that our estimation is conducted in the spirit of generalized least 
                                                 
5The nonlinear relationship considered in Ang and Chen (2002), Ang, Chen 
and Xing (2006), and Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007) depends on realized data, 
hence it is an ex-post relationship. Our nonlinear relationship is ex-ante 
because at time t  we don't observe the realization at 1+t .  
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squares, which puts more weight on recent data than on remote data, thus 
improving estimation efficiency. 
 
Our estimation method applies to any time-varying factor models. In this paper, 
we focus on two models: the conditional CAPM and the conditional Fama-
French three-factor model (1993; henceforth, the FF model). These two 
models have been widely used in empirical applications but whether they are 
able to explain the cross section of stock returns are in the spotlight of current 
research. After estimating these two models, we propose two tests to examine 
their performance in explaining asset-pricing anomalies. The null hypothesis is 
that if a conditional model holds at every point in time, then the pricing error 
should be zero at all time periods. Our first test focuses on individual pricing 
errors, i.e., we examine whether a conditional model holds at any given time. 
The unique advantage of this test is that it enables us to identify the exact time 
periods in which a conditional model holds or fails. Investigating the time 
periods when a model holds might sharpen our understanding of the 
conditions under which a model better applies, and examining the periods in 
which a model fails might help us identify the missing factors to further 
improve the model.  
 
Our second test looks at the average pricing error. That is, if a conditional 
model holds, then the average pricing error should be zero. Under a general 
assumption of heteroskadastic innovations, we derive the asymptotic 
distribution of the average pricing error, which turns out to follow a normal 
distribution. For value-weighted portfolios, our results show that the conditional 
CAPM fails to explain any of the asset-pricing anomalies. For these portfolios, 
  6
the conditional FF model explains the size and value effect quite well, thus 
standing in sharp contrast to the results in Ferson and Siegel (2003) among 
others; it also helps to explain the momentum portfolios, but unlike Wang 
(2003), we strongly reject the model. For equally-weighted portfolios, it's rather 
difficult for either the conditional CAPM or the conditional FF model to explain 
return variations. 
 
In addition to evaluating the conditional models from an economics point of 
view, i.e., whether they are able to explain asset-pricing anomalies, we also 
perform a statistical test to evaluate the goodness of fit for the conditional 
versus the unconditional models. We are interested in which model, the 
conditional or the unconditional, is closer to the true data-generating process. 
Our results show that the conditional models invariably outperform their 
unconditional counterparts for all portfolios, implying that the conditional 
models fit the data better.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the methodology used 
to estimate and test the conditional models. Section 1.3 describes the data 
and presents the empirical results for the conditional CAPM, the conditional FF 
model, and the test on goodness of fit. Section 1.4 concludes the paper. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
In this section, we introduce a nonparametric approach to estimating and 
testing a conditional factor pricing model, for which the conditional CAPM and 
the conditional FF model are special cases. We first define the econometric 
specification of a conditional factor pricing model. We then discuss how to 
  7
choose the optimal window for estimating it. Finally we propose two tests to 
evaluate its performance in explaining the cross section of stock returns. 
 
1.2.1 Econometric Framework 
If a conditional factor model holds, then we have the following relationship  
 
),()( 1,1, ++ = tttitit fERE β          (1) 
 
where 1, +tiR  is the excess return for portfolio i  at time 1+t , and 1+tf  stands for 
the factors at time 1+t  in the corresponding factor model. For the CAPM, the 
market excess return is the only factor, so 1,1 ++ = tmt Rf ; for the FF model, there 
are two additional factors SMB  and HML  other than the market factor, so 
( )′++++ = 111,1 ,, tttmt HMLSMBRf . The notation )(⋅tE  indicates the conditional 
expectation, given a common public information set tI  at time t . 
 
In order to estimate (1), econometricians must know the investor's information 
set tI , but a significant practical obstacle is that tI  is unobservable. Standard 
empirical methods use state variables observable to investors, such as the 
dividend yield or term spread, to proxy tI , and specify beta as a linear function 
of lagged instruments (e.g., Shanken, 1990). This method therefore requires 
that the state variables be the right ones in the investor's information set. It is 
rather difficult, however, to identify which state variables are the right ones. 
 
In recent literature, an alternative approach has been proposed for doing away 
with state variables and estimating factor loadings directly from short-windows. 
Grundy and Martin (2001) use monthly returns in the window from t  to 5+t  to 
  8
estimate the factor loading in month t . LN argue that (a)s long as betas are 
relatively stable within a month or quarter, simple CAPM regressions 
estimated over a short window---using no conditioning variables---provide 
direct estimates of assets' conditional alphas and betas. (P. 291) 
 
Like Grundy and Martin (2001) and LN, we also dispense with state variables. 
Since the investor's information set is time-varying, we can let time t  index her 
information set, and so the conditional alphas and betas change with time t . 
More specifically, 
 
,,...2,1,1,1,,1, TtfR tittititi =++= +++ εβα               (2) 
 
where ( ) 0| 11, =++ ttit fE ε . ti ,α  and ti ,β  are portfolio i 's alpha and beta at time t , 
respectively. 
 
Unlike Grundy and Martin (2001) and LN, we apply a data-driven method to 
obtain the optimal estimation window size. As will be seen from the empirical 
results later on, the estimates of a model from LN's method vary greatly as the 
window size enlarges or shrinks. The monthly average pricing error can differ 
by as much as 1.00% when the window size changes from one month to six 
months. Moreover, it is possible to arrive at totally different inferences based 
on different window estimates. Dividing data into arbitrary windows may 
therefore lead to inconsistent and unreliable conclusions. 
 
Another important difference from BCFS is that we allow a more general 
relationship between asset payoffs and factor payoffs. BCFS assume an 
  9
asymmetric nonlinear relationship between asset returns and factor returns, 
i.e., betas are different for up and down markets. They demonstrate that with 
this special structure, the beta estimated in any window can covary with 
contemporaneous market returns, generating large biases in LN. In general, 
however, the true relationship between asset returns and factor returns is 
more complicated than merely asymmetric. Adjustments based on a particular 
structure, as assumed by BCFS, could potentially lead to large biases as well. 
Our estimation of (2) doesn't impose any special structure between 1, +tiR  and 
1+tf , thereby avoiding the misspecification between asset returns and factor 
returns. 
 
Another advantage of our method is that we directly capture the variation of 
betas over time. In practice, new information keeps arriving, and the investor 
keeps adjusting her portfolio according to the changing information sets. Betas 
therefore keep changing. Campbell and Vulteennaho (2004), Franzoni (2004), 
Adrian and Franzoni (2005), Fama and French (2006), and LN, among others, 
consider the variation of betas only across different non-overlapping windows, 
but ignore the variation of betas within each window. Our estimation, on the 
other hand, utilizes overlapping windows, permitting continuous information 
updating and thus capturing the gradual changes in betas. 
 
1.2.2 Estimation of the Model 
To estimate (2), we first find an optimal window size, to be discussed in the 
next subsection. With the optimal window in hand, at every time t , we use the 
data within this window to obtain the conditional alpha and beta corresponding 
to time t . Our goal is to choose parameters to minimize the following local 
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sum of squared residuals:  
 
a 0, b 0, a 1, b 1
min ∑st−ThtTh Ri,s −  i,s − i,sf s 2k st
s.t.  i,s   sT   a0  a1  s−tT ,
i,s   sT   b0  b1  s−tT ,
k st  1h k s−tTh .  (3) 
 
Here, s  is a particular data point within the window, so siR ,  is the portfolio i 's 
excess return at time s , and sf  is the factor return at time s . T  is the total 
sample size, and h  is the optimal window size. Thus, after fixing a time point t , 
we use observations from ][Tht −  to +t  ][Th  to estimate ti,α  and ti,β , where 
][Th  denotes the integer part of Th . To simplify notation, we drop the portfolio 
index i  and the time index t  for )(⋅α  and )(⋅β . Note that )(⋅α  and )(⋅β  are 
functions of Tt  rather than t , because, as shown by Robinson (1989), it's 
necessary to let these functions depend on the sample size T  in order to 
achieve asymptotic consistency. 
 
In essence, we are approximating the unknown functions ( )⋅α  and ( )⋅β  with a 
first-order Taylor expansion within the window, thus introducing four unknown 
coefficients 0a , 0b , 1a  and 1b . There are two main approaches to estimating 
( )⋅α  and ( )⋅β  in the nonparametric literature: local constant smoothing and 
local linear smoothing. If 1a  and 1b  are zero, then )(⋅α  and )(⋅β  are constants 
within the estimation window, which corresponds to the local constant 
smoothing method; on the other hand, if 1a  and 1b  are not zero, then )(⋅α  and 
)(⋅β  are different even within each estimation window, which corresponds to 
  11
the local linear smoothing method. These two approaches yield qualitative 
similar results, so to save space, we report the estimation results of (2) based 
on the local constant smoothing method only. The time- t  conditional alpha ti,α  
and the conditional beta ti,β  are the estimates for 0a  and 0b , respectively.6 
 
)(⋅k  is a weighting function satisfying certain statistical properties.7 In our 
empirical work, we present results based on the following Epanechniov kernel 
 
,)1(1)1(
4
3)( 2 ≤−= uuuk  
 
which has been proven to achieve the highest estimation efficiency. This 
kernel function also gives higher weight to observations close to the point t  at 
which the conditional alpha and beta are estimated and discounts the 
observations far away from t , which is consistent with the idea that recent 
data contain more relevant information than remote data. We also try two 
other popular kernels in the nonparametric literature, the uniform kernel and 
the Daniel kernel. Our main results are robust to the choice of these 
alternative kernels. 
 
                                                 
6At a different time t , we use different data to estimate 0a  and 0b . Therefore, 
0a  and 0b  are time-varying. 
 
7The kernel function )(⋅k  is a pre-specified symmetric probability density 
function such that (i) 1)( =∫+∞∞− duuk , (ii) 0)( =∫+∞∞− uduuk , (iii) ∞<∫+∞∞− duuuk 2)( , and 
∞<∫+∞∞− duuk )(2 . 
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An important issue in the nonparametric literature is the boundary problem. 
Simply put, there are no symmetric data for estimating the models in the 
boundary areas. For instance, if we want to estimate the model at time 1=t , 
we have data only after 1=t  but lack data before 1=t . Following the literature, 
we use a reflection method to obtain pseudodata titi RR −= ,, , tt ff −=  for the 
left boundary when [ ] 2−≤≤− tTh , and tTiti RR −= 2,, , tTt ff −= 2 , for the right 
boundary when [ ]ThTtT +≤≤+1 .8 
 
In our empirical implementation, for each portfolio i , we first estimate its 
optimal window size and then, at every time t , we solve the minimization 
problem (3) to obtain the conditional alpha ti,α  and the conditional beta ti,β . 
Since the optimal window size serves to minimize the underconditioning and 
the small sample biases, let us now turn our discussion to how to find it. 
 
1.2.3 The Choice of Window Size 
When we dispense with state variables and assume the investor's information 
set to be relatively stable in adjacent periods, the optimal window size 
approximates the right amount of information to be used in the estimation. To 
reduce the underconditioning bias, we want the window size to be as small as 
possible. If h  chosen is too large, the information set may have already 
changed within the window. As a result, if we estimate the model according to 
this large window, we are more likely to miss the variations in risk and are 
                                                 
8For a robustnes check, we also estimate the model only for the interior points 
which have symmetric data. 
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therefore subject to the underconditioning bias.9 On the other hand, to mitigate 
the small sample bias, we would like the window size to be as large as 
possible. If h  chosen is too small, there will be too few observations within the 
window, so that the data are too noisy to yield reliable estimates. In this case, 
we run the risk of the small sample bias. Therefore, the optimal window size 
ought to minimize both the underconditioning and the small sample biases. 
This is exactly what the extensive nonparametric literature has been centering 
on. 
 
We obtain the optimal window size from a standard nonparametric method 
called the cross-validation method. Define the leave-one-out estimators 
ti ,0
ˆ
−α  
and 
ti ,0
ˆ
−β  from the following regression 
 
a 0, b 0, a 1, b 1
min ∑st−Th, s≠ttTh Ri,s −  i,s − i,sf s 2k st
s.t.  i,s   sT   a0  a1  s−tT ,
i,s   sT   b0  b1  s−tT ,
k st  1h k s−tTh ,
 
(4) 
 
with 
ti ,0
ˆ
−α  and ti ,0ˆ −β  being the estimates for 0a  and 0b  for portfolio i  at time t . 
The only difference between (4) and (3) is that when doing the minimization 
problem at time t , we exclude the data point at t  in (4). The optimal window 
size h  is then chosen to minimize 
                                                 
9An extreme example is a model estimated using all observations, which 
corresponds to the largest window size. In this case, we simply estimate the 
unconditional model, totally ignoring the predictable variations in risk. 
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CVh  ∑
t1
T
Ri,t − ̂0−i,t − ̂0−i,t f t 2 .
 
 
Intuitively, for any portfolio i , we first fix an arbitrary window size. At every 
time t , we use all data within this window except the data at time t  to do the 
minimization in (4), obtaining the predicted value and prediction error 
corresponding to t . Intuitively, since the data in the vicinity of time t  contain 
similar information to the data at time t , we can use them predict the time- t  
observation. We do this for all time periods ( Tt ,...2,1= ), and sum up all the 
prediction errors denoted by )(hCV . The optimal window is chosen to 
minimize )(hCV . 
 
For any given portfolio, the optimal window size obtained from the leave-one-
out cross-validation method is the same for all time periods. It is possible that 
betas might change faster in some periods than in others, thus a time-varying 
window size might seem to be needed. We leave this for future research. 
Since existing studies relying on the simple window approach use a uniform 
window size, in order to better compare our results with the literature, we stick 
to the uniform window size in this paper. 
 
1.2.4 Two Tests of a Conditional Factor Model 
Our null hypothesis is that a conditional factor model holds at each point in 
time. If factors themselves are excess returns, as is the case with the 
conditional CAPM and the conditional FF model, then testing this hypothesis is 
equivalent to testing 0)( =Ttα  for all t 10. First, we test if the individual pricing 
                                                 
10As has been mentioned, to achieve estimation consistency as proved by 
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errors are zero, i.e., 0)( =Ttα  for any t . Second, we test if the average pricing 
error is equal to zero, i.e., 0)(
1
1 =∑
= T
t
T
tT
α . 
 
1.2.4.1 Test on Individual Pricing Errors 
Under usual technical assumptions, Cai (2007) shows that the individual alpha 
obtained from (2) follows an asymptotic normal distribution. Let Tt=τ , under 
the null hypothesis that alphas are equal to zero at every point t , the interior 
alphas follow11 
 
( ) ( ),)(,0ˆ 0 τντα Σ→NTh d            (5) 
 
where T  is the sample size, and h  is the optimal bandwidth or the window 
size. Since the effective data used to estimate )(τα  is Th , )(ˆ τα  converges at 
the rate of Th . The details for the variance of ( )ταˆ  are provided in Appendix 
1.A. 
 
The asymptotic behavior of the estimated boundary alphas is different from 
that of the interior ones. But the boundary alphas are not particularly 
interesting in our context,12 and they also make up only a small proportion of 
                                                                                                                                            
Robinson (1989), the pricing errors are functions of Tt /  instead of t . 
 
11The interior alphas are those corresponding to the time periods which 
doesn't suffer the boundary problem. 
 
12One scenario in which the boundary alphas are particularly interesting is 
when the conditional alphas (also betas) are functions of, for example, the 
market return rather than time. In this case, the boundary alphas correspond 
to the pricing errors under extreme market conditions, such as market crashes 
or market frenzies. 
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the estimated time series of the conditional alphas. To save notation and 
space, we report the results only for interior alphas. Incorporating the 
boundary alphas won’t change our results dramatically.  
 
1.2.4.2 Test on Average Pricing Errors 
If two models are both rejected at, for example, 80% of the time periods, the 
test on individual pricing errors alone cannot tell us which model is relatively 
better. Thus we need to turn to the second test, which focuses on the 
implication that if a conditional factor model holds, then the average pricing 
error should be equal to zero. This measure is also adopted by LN. 
 
The average pricing error is  
 
.ˆ1ˆ
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
= T
t
T
T
t
αα  
 
In Appendix 1.B, we derive the asymptotic distribution of αˆ  when the random 
error process { }Ttt 1=ε  is heteroskedastic. We find it follows a normal distribution: 
 
( ),,0ˆ VNT d→α                 (6) 
 
where V  is the asymptotic variance and equals the (1,1) th  element of 
( ) 1010 −+′+∞−∞=− Ω∑Ω jttjttj XXE εε , with ( )′= tt fX ,1 , ( )′=Ω tt XXE0 , and j  denoting 
the lag order. Even though we use a nonparametric estimation method, the 
asymptotic variance V  resembles the standard Newey-West estimator. In 
implementation, we use the corresponding sample moments to estimate V . 
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1.3. Empirical Results 
1.3.1 Data 
Our data are obtained from Professor Kenneth French's website.13 From the 
25 size-B/M portfolios, we form six size and B/M portfolios. S is the average 
return of the five portfolios in the lowest size quintile, B is the average return of 
the five portfolios in the highest size quintile, and S-B is the difference. G is the 
average return of the five portfolios in the low-B/M quintile, V is the average 
return of the five portfolios in the high-B/M quintile, and V-G is the difference. 
The three momentum portfolios are directly obtained from Professor Kenneth 
French's website, where we let W stand for the return of the winner portfolio, L 
for the return of the loser portfolio, and W-L for their difference. 
 
To compare our findings with existing studies, we look at both the value-
weighted and the equally-weighted portfolios, using daily data from 1963 to 
2007.14 The long time series of daily data not only provide rich information 
about the underlying information structure, but also help improve estimation 
efficiency. Moreover, the debate on the small sample bias of LN’s procedure 
also focuses on daily data. For a robustness check, we also conduct tests 
using monthly data and obtain qualitatively similar results not reported here. 
 
                                                 
13http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
 
14LN examine the performance of the conditional CAPM using value-weighted 
portfolios, while BCFS focus on momentum portfolios which are equally-
weighted. 
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It is well known that nonsynchronous trading can have a great impact on short-
horizon betas (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Since we use high-frequency daily 
data, we need to consider the microstructure issues such as the bid-ask 
spread. To address these issues, when estimating the unconditional models, 
we use Dimson (1979) regressions with the structure suggested by LN: 
 
,
3 ,
4
2
3,
12,1,, tipt
p
i
titiiti fffR εβββα ++++= −
=
− ∑      (7) 
 
where p  denotes lag. The estimated pricing error for portfolio i  is iα , and the 
estimated beta is 3,2,1, iii βββ ++ . 
 
Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 present the summary statistics for the value-weighted 
and equally-weighted portfolios, respectively. The daily estimates are 
multiplied by 21, the average number of trading days per month, so that all 
estimates are expressed as monthly percentages. With respect to the value-
weighted portfolios, excess returns exhibit the usual cross section patterns. 
Overall, the small stocks outperform the big stocks (0.63% vs. 0.51%), the 
value stocks outperform the growth stocks (0.84% vs. 0.30%), and the winner 
stocks outperform the loser stocks (1.12% vs. -0.32%). Except for the size 
portfolios, the unconditional CAPM alphas are all significant, implying that the 
unconditional CAPM fails. In line with prior research (e.g., Fama and French, 
1993), the unconditional FF model improves upon the unconditional CAPM 
because the alphas for the size and B/M portfolios are much smaller. However, 
the alphas for the B/M portfolios are still significant. For the momentum 
portfolios, the unconditional FF alphas are highly significant, and they are also 
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of the same magnitude of the unconditional CAPM alphas, indicating that the 
unconditional FF model doesn't help to explain the momentum effect. 
 
Table 1.2 shows that the equally-weighted portfolios display some interesting 
patterns. First, the size effect is very pronounced. The equally-weighted S-B 
has an excess return of 1.05%, compared to only 0.13% for the value-
weighted S-B. The unconditional CAPM alpha is also much higher: 1.04% for 
equally-weighted S-B vs. 0.07% for value-weighted S-B. The unconditional FF 
alpha for equally-weighted S-B is 1.00%, which is close to the unconditional 
CAPM alpha, indicating that the unconditional FF fails to explain the size effect 
in the equally-weighted portfolios. This is not surprising because the equally-
weighted portfolios put more weight on small stocks, which, as shown in Fama 
and French (1996), the unconditional FF model doesn't explain quite well. 
Second, momentum portfolios have a very different pattern from the one 
usually observed in the monthly data. The loser portfolio actually earns a 
higher average return than the winner portfolio (2.08% vs. 1.71%), implying 
that the equally-weighted momentum strategy is not profitable at daily horizon. 
Neither the CAPM nor the FF model is able to account for the return variations 
in the momentum portfolios.  
 
We now allow the factor loadings to vary over time, and investigate whether 
the conditional versions of the CAPM and the FF model are able to account for 
the return variations in these portfolios. To correct for the impact of 
nonsynchronous trading, we also append two lags in the estimation of (2): 
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( )
.,...2,1,
3 ,
4
2
3
121, TtffT
tf
T
t
T
tR tipt
p
T
t
ttti =++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= −
=
− ∑ εβββα    (8) 
 
Thus, portfolio i 's pricing error at time t  is ( )Ttα , and its conditional beta at t  is 
( ) ( ) ( )TtTtTt 321 βββ ++ . 
 
1.3.2 Testing the Conditional CAPM 
In subsection 1.3.2.1, we report the data-driven window size for the conditional 
CAPM obtained from the cross-validation method described in subsection 
1.2.3. In subsections 1.3.2.2 and 1.3.2.3, we estimate the conditional CAPM 
and evaluate its performance through the two tests proposed in subsection 
1.2.4. 
 
1.3.2.1 Data-Driven Window Size  
If the investor optimally rebalances her portfolios according to changes in her 
information set, then the realized data structure should reflect changes in the 
underlying information structure and, as a result, the estimated window size 
serves as a proxy for the stability of the information structure. A larger window 
size implies that the relationship between asset returns and factor returns, or 
the underlying information structure, is generally more stable. Consequently, 
betas will change less frequently with a larger window than with a smaller 
window.  
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics for value-weighted size, B/M, and momentum 
portfolios, 1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average excess returns, the unconditional CAPM alphas 
and the unconditional FF alphas for value-weighted size, B/M, and momentum 
portfolios using daily data. The unconditional CAPM alphas are obtained from 
the regression in (7) by letting mRf = , and the unconditional FF alphas are 
obtained from the regression in (7) by letting ( )′= HMLSMBRf m   . Average 
returns and alphas are expressed in percentage monthly. Bold values denote 
estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Excess returns
Ave. 0.63 0.51 0.13 0.30 0.84 0.54 -0.32 1.12 1.44
Std. err 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.10 0.25 0.25 0.21
Panel B: Unconditional CAPM alphas
Est. 0.16 0.09 0.07 -0.28 0.42 0.69 -0.94 0.56 1.50
Std. err 0.09 0.05 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.21
Panel C: Unconditional FF alphas
Est. -0.05 -0.05 0.003 -0.11 -0.04 0.08 -0.92 0.60 1.52
Std. err. 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.21
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics for equally-weighted size, B/M, and momentum 
portfolios, 1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average excess returns, the unconditional CAPM alphas 
and the unconditional FF alphas for equally-weighted size, B/M, and 
momentum portfolios using daily data. The unconditional CAPM alphas are 
obtained from the regression in (7) by letting mRf = , and the unconditional FF 
alphas are obtained from the regression in (7) by letting ( )′= HMLSMBRf m   . 
Average returns and alphas are expressed in percentage monthly. Bold values 
denote estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Excess returns
Ave. 1.65 0.60 1.05 0.58 1.17 0.60 2.08 1.71 -0.37
Std. err 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.21 0.15 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.15
Panel B: Unconditional CAPM alphas
Est. 1.21 0.16 1.04 -0.01 0.75 0.76 1.53 1.16 -0.37
Std. err 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.14
Panel C: Unconditional FF alphas
Est. 0.99 -0.01 1.00 0.14 0.31 0.17 1.37 1.07 -0.31
Std. err. 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.14
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Table 1.3 presents the estimated window size for the conditional CAPM and 
the conditional FF model. For now, we focus only on the conditional CAPM, 
and discuss some notable patterns of the estimated window size. First, the 
window size is much larger for the big portfolio than for other portfolios, 333 if 
value-weighted and 285 if equally-weighted, indicating a less frequent change 
in betas of large stocks. This is consistent with Shanken (1990), in which the 
T-bill rate serves as the state variable, and betas of large stocks are far less 
sensitive to changes in the T-bill rate than betas of small stocks. 
 
Second, the window size is always larger for the value-weighted portfolios 
than for the equally-weighted portfolios. For example, we use 87  observations 
to estimate the value-weighted loser portfolio, while we use only 33  
observations for the equally-weighted one. This is mostly likely due to the fact 
that the value-weighted portfolios put more weight on large stocks, whose 
underlying information structure turns out to be less volatile. We caution that 
we are not attempting to map one-to-one the window size to the underlying 
information structure. But we do argue that the data-driven window size 
reveals important information about the unknown information structure. 
 
Our results in Table 1.3 show that the estimated window size ranges from as 
short as 31 days to as long as 333  days, varying widely from portfolio to 
portfolio. This suggests that fixing a window size as one month or three 
months for all portfolios may incur estimation biases, which generally become 
larger if the underlying relationship between asset returns and factor returns 
changes in a more complicated way. 
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Using the optimal window size, we estimate (8) with mRf =  to get the time 
series of the conditional CAPM alphas for every portfolio. In order to evaluate 
whether the conditional CAPM explains the return variations, we apply the two 
tests on the pricing errors proposed in subsection 1.2.4. 
 
1.3.2.2 Individual Pricing Errors  
Panel A of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 plot the conditional alphas for the value-
weighted and equally-weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L, respectively. The 
conditional alphas of all portfolios fluctuate greatly over time, but W-L displays 
the largest variation, with the daily alpha ranging from a minimum of -0.88% to 
a maximum of 1.38% if value-weighted, and from -2.11% to 0.97% if equally-
weighted. 
 
Unlike the existing studies, ours obtains the conditional alpha at every point in 
time, which enables us to investigate whether the conditional CAPM holds at 
any given time. Based on the distribution of the individual pricing error in (5), 
we can calculate the standard error tsd , for tα , the conditional alpha at time t . 
Define the difference between tα  and tsd96.1 , 1.96 times the corresponding 
time t  standard error, as follows: 
 
.96.1 ttt sdDiff α−=         (9) 
 
The sign of tDiff  indicates whether we should accept or reject the conditional 
CAPM at the 5% significant level. If tDiff  is positive, then we don't have the 
evidence for rejecting the conditional CAPM at time t ; if tDiff  is negative, then 
we find evidence that indicates the failure of the model at time t . The series of 
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tDiff  for S-B, V-G, and W-L are plotted in Panel B of Figures 1.1 and 1.2. 
These graphs show that for all portfolios, tDiff  tend to be negative most of the 
time, implying that the conditional CAPM may hold for only a small fraction of 
the time periods. 
 
To examine the persistence of the model's explanatory power, we plot the 
autocorrelation function of the Diff  measure for the value-weighted S-B, V-G 
and W-L in Panel A of Figure 1.3 and the corresponding equally-weighted 
ones in Panel A of Figure 1.4. These figures show that the autocorrelation of 
Diff  generally declines to zero in an AR(1) fashion, because the information 
structure is more stable within adjacent time periods. Today's information 
structure, for example, is most like yesterday's, so that if we reject (accept) the 
model today, it's most likely that we rejected (accepted) the model yesterday. 
As we move further away from today, the similarity in information structure 
typically declines, and it becomes less likely for us to reject (accept) the model, 
given that we reject (accept) it today. After certain periods, the information 
structure may have totally changed, sharing no commonality with today's 
information structure, which explains why the autocorrelation usually drops to 
zero after certain lags. 
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Table 1.3: Optimal data-driven window size 
 
This table reports the estimated window size using the cross-validation 
method described in subsection window size. The window size is measured in 
terms of days. For example, a window size of 60 days means that when 
estimating the model at day t , we use the 60-day data from 30−t  to 30+t . 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Value-weighted Portfolios
conditional CAPM 60 333 62 131 91 56 87 133 47
conditional FF 356 349 322 596 378 502 205 160 165
Panel B: Equally-weighted Portfolios
conditional CAPM 44 285 44 100 58 56 33 51 31
conditional FF 278 349 331 331 209 298 145 116 122
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To get a quantitative idea of the overall performance of the conditional CAPM, 
for each portfolio, we calculate the fraction of the time when the conditional 
CAPM holds, the results of which are shown in Table 1.4.15 Panel A shows 
that, for the value-weighted portfolios, the conditional CAPM performs best for  
L, holding 22.31% out of all time periods; it performs worst for S, holding 
15.89% out of all time periods. In other words, out of the 44 years of data we 
are considering, the conditional CAPM roughly holds 9.8 years for the loser 
portfolio and 7.0 years for the small portfolio. Interestingly, examining the 
performance of the conditional CAPM period-by-period reveals that it fails 
most often for size portfolios, rather than, as generally assumed, momentum 
portfolios. In fact, among all the portfolios, the conditional CAPM seems to 
perform best for momentum portfolios, yielding 22.31% for L, 22.21% for W, 
and 17.25% for W-L. 
 
Panel B of Table 1.4 shows that, for the equally-weighted portfolios, the 
conditional CAPM works best for G, holding 20.25% out of all time periods, 
and worst for S, holding only 12.76% out of all time periods. Therefore, the 
small portfolios, both value-weighted and equally-weighted, represent the 
greatest challenge to the conditional CAPM. Overall, the conditional CAPM 
holds for fewer periods for the equally-weighted portfolios than for the value-
weighted ones, which is especially true for momentum portfolios. For example, 
it holds 14.24% of the time for the equally-weighted L, much less than 22.31% 
for the value-weighted L. 
                                                 
15A statistical test needs to be constructed to rigorously evaluate the time 
periods in which a model holds. Here we propose this preliminary intuitive 
measure.  
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Figure 1.1: Conditional CAPM alphas and the Diff  measure for the value-
weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L. 
 
Panel A plots the series for the conditional alphas, which are obtained from the 
nonparametric estimation of (8) with mRf = . The conditional alphas are 
reported as daily percentages. Panel B plots the series of Diff  which are 
calculated from (9). Positive values of Diff  correspond to the periods in which 
the conditional CAPM is accepted while negative values indicate the failure of 
the model. 
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Figure 1.2: Conditional CAPM alphas and the Diff  measure for the equally-
weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L. 
 
Panel A plots the series for the conditional alphas, which are obtained from the 
nonparametric estimation of (8) with mRf = . The conditional alphas are 
reported as daily percentages. Panel B plots the series of Diff  which are 
calculated from (9). Positive values of Diff  correspond to the periods in which 
the conditional CAPM is accepted while negative values indicate the failure of 
the model. 
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Figure 1.3: Autocorrelation function of Diff  for value-weighted portfolios. 
 
The series of Diff  are calculated from (9). Panel A plots the autocorrelation of 
Diff  for the conditional CAPM, and Panel B plots the autocorrelation of Diff  
for the conditional FF model. 
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Figure 1.4: Autocorrelation function of Diff  for equally-weighted portfolios. 
 
The series of Diff  are calculated from (9). Panel A plots the autocorrelation of 
Diff  for the conditional CAPM, and Panel B plots the autocorrelation of Diff  
for the conditional FF model. 
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The tests on individual pricing errors thus show the inadequacy of the 
conditional CAPM to explain the dynamics of stock returns. For every portfolio, 
the conditional CAPM holds less than 1/4 of the time. More importantly, to 
claim success, a model has to be able to price all portfolios simultaneously. If 
we consider the time when the conditional CAPM holds for all three portfolios 
of the value-weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L, it will be even less than 4%! 
 
Compared to existing methods in the literature, these tests on individual 
pricing errors possess a unique advantage, i.e., they enable us to identify the 
exact time periods in which the conditional CAPM holds or fails. For instance, 
referring to Figures 1.1 and 1.2, we observe that the most extreme values of 
alphas for S-B, V-G, and W-L all appeared around March 2001, when the 
technology bubble burst, thus representing the greatest failure of the 
conditional CAPM. We can also identify the periods when the conditional 
CAPM holds, and by investigating these periods' important variables, such as 
the market conditions and the economic situations, we will be able to discover 
the conditions under which the market risk factor will determine investors' 
portfolio choice. This has important theoretical and empirical implications but 
hasn't yet been pursued in the literature. We leave this for future research. 
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Table 1.4: Test of individual pricing errors 
 
This table reports the proportion of time in which the conditional CAPM and 
the conditional FF model are accepted. At each time t , using the distribution in 
equation (5), we calculate the test statistic for the alpha at time t , and 
compare it with 1.65, the 5% critical value for the standard normal distribution. 
If the test statistic is less than 1.65, we accept the conditional model to hold at 
t . Summing up all the periods in which the model holds and dividing by the 
total number of periods gives the proportion, which is reported as the 
percentage. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Value-weighted Portfolios (%)
conditional CAPM 15.89 16.01 16.50 20.39 17.91 16.33 22.31 22.21 17.25
conditional FF 20.30 23.00 18.64 19.23 17.59 26.58 20.98 24.44 19.75
Panel B: Equally-weighted Portfolios (%)
conditional CAPM 12.76 17.74 12.84 20.25 15.02 17.08 14.24 14.46 15.42
conditional FF 9.74 20.44 9.06 18.91 13.78 19.75 14.06 12.48 17.79
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1.3.2.3 Average Pricing Errors 
Now let us examine how the conditional CAPM explains the nine portfolios 
based on tests of the average pricing errors. We first conduct our discussions 
for the value-weighted portfolios and then for the equally-weighted. Since 
BCFS challenge the results of LN through the momentum portfolios, we first 
look at the results of the momentum portfolios, and then analyze the results of 
the size and B/M portfolios. 
 
Value-weighted Portfolios 
The results from our nonparametric method are presented in Panel A of Table 
1.5. They show that for the momentum portfolios, the average conditional  
alphas are -0.88% (z-stat -6.77),16 0.54% (z-stat 5.40), and 1.72% (z-stat 
11.47) for L, W and W-L, respectively. The estimates for L and W are slightly 
smaller than the unconditional alphas of -0.94% and 0.56%, but the estimate 
for W-L is larger than its unconditional alpha of 1.50%. Therefore, the 
conditional CAPM performs even worse than the unconditional CAPM in 
explaining W-L. Moreover, all these estimates are highly significant, providing 
strong evidence that the conditional CAPM fails to explain the momentum 
portfolios. 
 
BCFS point out that the method in LN suffers potentially serious small sample 
biases. But how large are these biases? Are they as large as BCFS have 
                                                 
16We use "z-stat" to stand for the statistics calculated based on the normal 
distribution of (6). That is, αα  oferror  standard  of estimate=z . If 65.1>z , we reject the model at 
5% significant level. 
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claimed? To answer these questions, we also estimate the model using the 
method in LN by choosing the non-overlapping window as 6,3,1=N  months. 
Following Fama and Macbeth (1973), we obtain the standard error of the 
estimates from the time series variation of the conditional alphas. 
 
The results from LN's method are presented in Panel B of Table 1.5, which 
show that the average conditional alphas for W-L are 2.49% (t-stat 7.78) when 
1=N , 1.96% (t-stat 7.54) when 3=N , and 1.58% (t-stat 6.32) when 6=N . 
Therefore, the LN method provides estimates that are very sensitive to the 
window size, where the difference in average pricing errors is as large as 
0.91% (2.49%-1.58%) for W-L. This sensitivity to window size highlights the  
importance of using the data-driven window to estimate the model. 
 
An important feature of the momentum portfolios is that they are typically 
rebalanced every month, and the entering and exiting stocks may not have 
similar betas.17 Another shortcoming of the non-overlapping window 
estimation is that it fails to account for changing composition in the momentum 
portfolios, because by fixing 6=N , for instance, it assumes that betas are 
constant over periods of as long as six months. Our method can account for 
the high turnover in the momentum portfolios because we estimate the 
conditional alphas and betas continuously at each point in time. 
 
 
                                                 
17Grundy and Martin (2001) show that due to selection, betas of newly added 
winner and loser stocks vary with the market return in the formation period. 
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Table 1.5: Test of average conditional CAPM alphas for the value-weighted 
portfolios, 1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average conditional alphas for value-weighted size, B/M 
and momentum portfolios (% monthly). Panel A reports the nonparametric 
estimates from equation (8) with mRf =  using daily data. The standard error is 
obtained from equation (6). Panel B presents estimates using the non-
overlapping window estimation as in LN, with window size 3,1=N  and 6 . The 
standard error is calculated from the time series variation of the conditional 
alphas, in the spirit of Fama and Macbeth (1973). Bold values denote 
estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Nonparametric Conditional Alphas
Est. 0.42 0.05 0.39 -0.19 0.45 0.64 -0.88 0.54 1.72
Std. err 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.15
Panel B: Non-overlapping WindowEstimated Conditional Alphas
N  1
Est. 0.83 -0.05 0.88 0.15 0.63 0.48 -1.45 1.04 2.49
Std. err 0.17 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.23 0.17 0.32
N  3
Est. 0.35 -0.02 0.37 -0.05 0.45 0.49 -1.18 0.79 1.96
Std. err 0.17 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.26
N  6
Est 0.15 0.01 0.14 -0.16 0.33 0.49 -0.97 0.6 1.58
Std. err 0.17 0.06 0.2 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.25  
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Despite the shortcomings of LN's method, we agree with them on the ability of 
the conditional CAPM to explain the momentum portfolios. Our estimates of 
the conditional alphas are of similar magnitude to the unconditional alphas, 
indicating that the conditional CAPM is not superior to the unconditional CAPM. 
This is very different from the conclusion of BCFS, who estimate the 
conditional alphas to be 20-40% smaller than the unconditional estimates. The 
reason BCFS achieve these results is most likely their special payoff structure, 
i.e., betas tend to be smaller when the market goes up and larger when the 
market goes down. Imposing a specific payoff structure in the estimation, 
however, may lead to serious misspecification bias. In our estimation, we don't 
assume any specific payoff structure, thus avoiding the misspecification bias, 
and we obtain very different results from BCFS. 
 
The results for the size and B/M portfolios are also shown in Table 1.5, with 
the results from our nonparametric method in Panel A and those from LN's 
method in Panel B. Panel A shows that for the size portfolios, the S and S-B's 
average conditional alphas are 0.42% (z-stat 6.00) and 0.39% (z-stat 4.33), 
which are economically large and statistically significant. For the B/M portfolios, 
V's average conditional alpha is 0.45% (z-stat 7.50), G's average conditional 
alpha is -0.19% (z-stat -2.71), and V-G's average conditional alpha is 0.64% 
(z-stat 9.14). We therefore reject the conditional CAPM for all B/M portfolios. 
 
Panel B of Table 1.5 shows that the estimates of the size and B/M portfolios 
using LN's method display wide variations. More importantly, they provide 
inconsistent results. For instance, S-B's average alphas are 0.88% (z-stat 4.19) 
for 1=N , showing strong evidence for rejecting the conditional CAPM, but 
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when 6=N , the average alpha drops sharply to 0.14% (z-stat 0.70), providing 
no evidence for rejecting the model. 
 
To sum up, our method provides consistent and efficient estimates, which 
enable us to accurately evaluate the performance of the conditional CAPM. 
We find that after taking into account the underconditioning and small sample 
biases, the conditional CAPM fails miserably to explain either the momentum 
effect, the value effect, or the size effect. 
 
Equally-weighted Portfolios 
Panel A of Table 1.6 presents the results of the equally-weighted portfolios 
using our nonparametric estimation method. For the momentum portfolios, W-
L's average conditional alpha is 0.005% (z-stat 0.06), which is neither 
economically nor statistically significant. The average pricing error test 
therefore provides no evidence for the failure of the conditional CAPM.18 
However, the conditional alphas for L and W are 1.78% (z-stat 19.78) and 
1.57% (z-stat 19.63), which are very large and significant, indicating the failure 
of the conditional CAPM. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18A test that relies on average absolute pricing error or average squared 
pricing errors may reject the conditional CAPM in the equally-weighted W-L. 
But in this paper we choose the most conservative test, i.e., the test on 
average pricing errors. 
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Table 1.6: Test of average conditional CAPM alphas for equally-weighted 
portfolios, 1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average conditional alphas for equally-weighted size, 
B/M and momentum portfolios (% monthly). Panel A reports the nonparametric 
estimates from equation (8) with mRf =  using daily data. The standard error is 
obtained from equation (6). Panel B presents estimates using the non-
overlapping window estimation as in LN, with window size 3,1=N  and 6 . The 
standard error is calculated from the time series variation of the conditional 
alphas, in the spirit of Fama and Macbeth (1973). Bold values denote 
estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Nonparametric Conditional Alphas
Est. 1.57 0.15 1.43 0.16 0.86 0.68 1.78 1.57 0.00
Std. err 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09
Panel B: Fixed WindowConditional Alphas
N  1
Est. 1.82 0.09 1.72 0.4 0.93 0.54 1.68 2.22 0.53
Std. err 0.17 0.07 0.2 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.2 0.24
N  3
Est. 1.36 0.12 1.24 0.23 0.78 0.55 1.45 1.56 0.11
Std. err 0.2 0.06 0.21 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.3 0.18 0.25
N  6
Est 1.16 0.14 1.02 0.13 0.68 1.02 1.36 1.23 -0.13
Std. err 0.21 0.06 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.23 0.33 0.19 0.28
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For the B/M portfolios, V's average conditional alpha is 0.86% (z-stat 14.33), 
G's average conditional alpha is 0.16% (z-stat 2.29), and V-G's average 
conditional alpha is 0.68% (z-stat 9.71). We therefore reject the conditional 
CAPM for all B/M portfolios. Moreover, our rejection of the equally-weighted 
B/M portfolios is stronger than our rejection of the value-weighted ones. 
For the size portfolios, our nonparametric estimation provides strong evidence 
that the conditional CAPM is unable to explain S, B, or S-B. The conditional 
alphas are 1.57% (z-stat 22.43), 0.15% (z-stat 3.75), and 1.43% (z-stat 15.89), 
respectively, which are all large and significant. Our rejection of the conditional 
CAPM is again much stronger than that for the value-weighted size portfolios. 
Panel B of Table 1.6 presents the results using LN's non-overlapping window 
method. The conditional alphas vary greatly with the window size. V-G's 
average conditional alpha, for example, increases from 0.54% (t-stat 3.86) 
when 1=N  to 1.02% (t-stat 4.43) when 6=N . Based on different window 
estimates, we also draw inconsistent inferences for B, G, and W-L. 
Overall, these tests on average pricing errors provide strong evidence that the 
conditional CAPM fails to account for the size and value effect. The failure is 
more pronounced for the equally-weighted portfolios than for the value-
weighted ones. This is consistent with the results obtained from the tests on 
individual pricing errors. 
 
1.3.3 Testing the Conditional Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
The FF model has become the workhorse in empirical asset pricing. Fama and 
French (1993, 1996) have provided ample evidence that the unconditional 
version of the model captures much of the return variation in portfolios sorted 
by size and B/M. For these portfolios, by allowing the betas and risk premia to 
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vary, we would expect the conditional version of the model to perform even 
better. Surprisingly, empirical tests of the conditional FF model by He, Kan, Ng 
and Zhang (1996), Ferson and Harvey (1999), and Ferson and Siegel (2003) 
strongly reject the conditional model, providing strong evidence that the 
conditional FF model fails to explain the dynamics of asset returns. Wang 
(2003), in contrast, uses a nonparametric estimation method and finds that the 
conditional FF model performs well in explaining the size and B/M portfolios. 
Despite the different conclusions reached by these studies, they all rely 
heavily on state variables. Ferson and Harvey (1999), for example, specify the 
intercept in the conditional FF model to be linear in lagged state variables, and 
test the collective significance of the coefficients. Wang (2003) assumes a 
more flexible form, relating the stochastic discount factor to the state variables. 
 
The momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) has 
become one of the most serious challenges to existing asset pricing models. 
Many studies have shown that the unconditional FF model is unable to explain 
this return anomaly, but very few studies have explored the conditional version 
of this model to explain the momentum effect. Wang (2003) evaluates the 
nonparametric version of the conditional FF model for momentum portfolios 
and finds that the model can't be rejected. Since the results of Wang (2003) 
heavily depend on state variables, it is unknown how the conditional FF model 
will perform when we dispense with state variables. 
 
In this subsection, we will re-examine the performance of the conditional FF 
model in the size, B/M portfolios and momentum portfolios without using state 
variables. Similar to the conditional CAPM, we first use the cross-validation 
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method to find the optimal estimation window for each portfolio, and then 
obtain the conditional alphas and betas from (8) by letting mRf (=  
SMB )′HML . To examine how the model explains the various portfolios, we 
conduct the tests on individual pricing errors and average pricing errors. 
 
1.3.3.1 Data-Driven Window Size 
The estimated window size for the conditional FF model is provided in Table 
1.3. A couple of features deserve highlighting. Because the conditional FF 
model has more regressors, the optimal windows are now much larger than 
those for the conditional CAPM, ranging from a minimum of 116 days for the 
equally-weighted W to a maximum of 596 days for the value-weighted G. As in 
the conditional CAPM, the window size for the equally-weighted portfolios are 
smaller than those for the value-weighted ones, implying a less stable 
information structure for the equally-weighted portfolios. 
 
We notice that the difference between the window size for S and B is not as 
dramatic as it is for the conditional CAPM. For the conditional CAPM, B has a 
much larger window size than S: 333 vs. 60 if value-weighted, and 285 vs. 44 
if equally-weighted. For the conditional FF model, however, the estimation 
windows are comparable for S and B: 356 vs. 349 if value-weighted, and 278 
vs. 349 if equally-weighted. This is most likely because the conditional FF 
model has included the SMB factor, which attenuates the difference between 
S and B. 
 
Another notable pattern is that momentum portfolios have the smallest 
windows among all portfolios. This is to be expected, because momentum 
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portfolios typically involve high turnovers and, as a result, their information 
structure should be volatile and unstable. This pattern, however, is not obvious 
for the conditional CAPM, probably because in the one-factor model, the 
difference between S and B plays a larger role than the high turnover. The 
conditional FF model, on the other hand, introduces the additional factor SMB, 
which may help diminish this difference, so that the window size can reveal 
more about the information structure pattern unique to momentum portfolios. 
 
1.3.3.2 Individual Pricing Errors 
Panel A of Figures 1.5 and 1.6 plot the conditional alphas for S-B, V-G, and 
W-L associated with the conditional FF model. The individual pricing errors still 
fluctuate over time, but the magnitude is much smaller than in the conditional 
CAPM, especially for S-B and V-G. Our intuition is that the conditional FF 
model produces much smaller pricing errors than the conditional CAPM. 
Comparing Panel A of Figure 1.5 to Panel A of Figure 1.1, and Panel A of 
Figure 1.6 to Panel A of Figure 1.2, we find a striking difference between the 
conditional CAPM and the conditional FF model. That is, the explanatory 
power of the conditional FF model seems to be more persistent over time than 
that of the conditional CAPM. To confirm our intuition, we plot the 
autocorrelation function for the Diff  measure, defined in equation (9), with the 
value-weighted S-B, V-G and W-L in Panel B of Figure 1.3 and the 
corresponding equally-weighted ones in Panel B of Figure 1.4. These figures 
show that the autocorrelation of Diff  for the conditional FF model remains 
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Figure 1.5: Conditional FF alphas and the Diff  measure for the value-
weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L. 
 
Panel A plots the series for the conditional alphas, which are obtained from the 
nonparametric estimation of (8) with ( )′= HMLSMBRf m   . The conditional 
alphas are reported as daily percentages. Panel B plots the series of Diff  
which are calculated from (9). Positive values of Diff  correspond to the 
periods in which the conditional FF model is accepted while negative values 
indicate the failure of the model. 
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Figure 1.6: Conditional FF alphas and the Diff  measure for the equally-
weighted S-B, V-G, and W-L. 
 
Panel A plots the series for the conditional alphas, which are obtained from the 
nonparametric estimation of (8) with ( )′= HMLSMBRf m   . The conditional 
alphas are reported as daily percentages. Panel B plots the series of Diff  
which are calculated from (9). Positive values of Diff  correspond to the 
periods in which the conditional FF model is accepted while negative values 
indicate the failure of the model. 
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 very high for a long time before it gradually declines. For S-B and V-G, the 
autocorrelation of Diff  stays close to 1 for as long as 40 lags. For the 
conditional CAPM, however, the autocorrelation of Diff  declines much faster, 
generally declining almost zero within 60 lags. The persistence of the 
explanatory power for different portfolios is closely related to the optimal 
window size used to estimate these portfolios. In fact, it generally holds that 
the larger the window size, the longer it takes for the autocorrelation to 
approach zero. Consistent with the fact that the conditional FF model has a 
larger window size than does the conditional CAPM, it takes much longer for 
the autocorrelation to decline over time in the conditional FF model than in the 
conditional CAPM. Focusing on the conditional FF model, its explanatory 
power is least persistent for the momentum portfolios, which have the smallest 
windows and most volatile information structures. 
 
As in the conditional CAPM, we also obtain the fraction of the time that the 
conditional FF model holds, which is shown in Table 1.4. Panel A shows that 
for the value-weighted portfolios, on average, the conditional FF model holds 
for more periods than the conditional CAPM. For instance, for the value-
weighted V-G, the conditional FF model holds 26.58% of the time, which is 
much higher than the 16.33% in which the conditional CAPM holds. This 
implies that, as with the unconditional FF model, adding two additional risk 
factors helps explain the dynamics of most portfolios. 
 
Panel B of Table 1.4 indicates that for the equally-weighted portfolios, the 
performance of the conditional FF model is somewhat mixed. For some 
portfolios, such as W-L, the proportion in which the model holds increases, but 
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for other portfolios such as S-B, the explanatory power decreases. Examining 
the conditional FF model, we find that the time periods drop sharply if 
portfolios are switched from value-weighted to equally-weighted; in the case of 
W, the decrease is as large as 12%. We therefore come to the same 
conclusion as in the conditional CAPM that it is much more difficult for the 
conditional FF model to explain the equally-weighted portfolios than the value-
weighted ones. 
 
Since the conditional FF model tends to hold for consecutive periods, we can 
identify the block of time periods in which it holds, and investigate under which 
conditions the model will perform best. This can shed light on when to use the 
conditional FF model to evaluate the profitability of certain trading strategies, 
the performance of mutual fund managers, etc. Alternatively, we can identify 
the periods in which the conditional FF model will fail. By examining the 
corresponding market and macroeconomic conditions, we can discover the 
missing factors, which is essential to improving the model. For example, one 
prominent pattern for the equally-weighted S-B is that the conditional FF 
model consistently failed in recent years, somewhere from the middle of the 
1980s to 2003. Since the equally-weighted S-B puts more weight on small 
stocks, which are generally illiquid, investigating the behavior of small (illiquid) 
stocks during this period might help explain why the model fails. Moreover, as 
argued by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Acharya and Pedersen (2007), among 
others, liquidity should be priced. Therefore, it would be interesting to find out 
whether incorporating the additional liquidity factor would help improve the 
performance of the conditional FF model in the equally-weighted S-B. In fact, 
  48
because neither the conditional CAPM nor the conditional FF model is able to 
explain the small portfolios, it would be interesting to find out whether the 
inclusion of the liquidity factor would help improve both models to explain 
these portfolios. 
 
1.3.3.2 Average Pricing Errors 
Table 1.7 shows the results for the value-weighted size, B/M, and momentum 
portfolios, where Panel A presents the results based on our nonparametric 
estimation using the optimal window size, and Panel B presents the results 
based on the non-overlapping window estimation. 
 
Our results for the size and B/M portfolios in Panel A of Table 1.7 are similar to 
those obtained in Wang (2003), but stand in stark contrast to those in He, Kan, 
Ng and Zhang (1996), Ferson and Harvey (1999), and Ferson and Siegel 
(2003). Simply put, we find that the conditional FF model performs quite well 
for the size and B/M portfolios. For the size portfolios, S-B's average 
conditional alpha is -0.01% (z-stat -0.33), which is both economically and 
statistically insignificant. The average alphas for S and B are -0.07% (z-stat -
2.33), and -0.05% (z-stat -2.50), respectively, which are statistically significant 
but economically small. V's average conditional alpha is -0.01% (z-stat -0.33), 
which is indistinguishable from zero. G's and V-G's average conditional alphas 
are -0.14% (z-stat -4.67), and 0.11% (z-stat 3.67), which are comparable to 
their unconditional FF model alphas of -0.11% and 0.08%, even though they 
are significant. All this indicates that the conditional FF model explains the  
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Table 1.7: Test of average conditional FF alphas for value-weighted portfolios, 
1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average conditional alphas for value-weighted size, B/M 
and momentum portfolios (% monthly). Panel A reports the nonparametric 
estimates from equation (8) with mRf (=  SMB  )′HML  using daily data. The 
standard error is obtained from equation (6). Panel B presents estimates using 
the non-overlapping window estimation as in LN, with window size 3,1=N  and 
6 . The standard error is from the time series variation of the conditional 
alphas, in the spirit of Fama and Macbeth (1973). Bold values denote 
estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Nonparametric Conditional Alphas
Est. -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 0.11 -0.49 0.44 0.91
Std. err 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.16
Panel B: Non-Overlapping WindowConditional Alphas
N  1
Est. 0.30 -0.14 0.44 0.08 -0.06 -0.14 -1.60 0.91 2.50
Std. err 0.14 0.09 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.40 0.33 0.57
N  3
Est. -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 -0.10 -0.00 0.09 -1.05 0.68 1.73
Std. err 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.12 0.24
N  6
Est -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.12 -0.63 0.46 1.09
Std. err 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.34 0.11 0.23  
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return variation of the size and B/M almost as well as the unconditional FF  
model. 
 
Interestingly, the conditional FF model helps explain the momentum effect. 
Panel A of Table 1.7 shows that the average conditional alphas for L, W and 
W-L are -0.49% (z-stat -4.08), 0.44% (z-stat 5.50), and 0.91% (z-stat 5.69), 
respectively. Even though these pricing errors are still large and significant, 
they are much smaller than those from the unconditional FF model, which are 
-0.92% (t-stat -6.57), 0.60% (t-stat 5.45), and 1.52% (t-stat 7.24), respectively. 
This implies that the conditional FF model explains the momentum portfolios 
much better than the unconditional version, indicating that incorporating time-
varying betas and risk premia does help to explain the momentum anomaly. 
Moreover, the conditional FF model also produces much smaller average 
pricing errors than those from the conditional CAPM. For the conditional 
CAPM, the average pricing errors for L, W, and W-L are -0.88% (z-stat -6.77), 
0.54% (z-stat 5.40), and 1.72% (z-stat 11.47), which are 25% to 80% larger 
than those from the conditional FF model. Even though we find that the 
conditional FF model helps to explain the momentum portfolios, we still 
strongly reject the model, which is different from Wang (2003). 
 
Panel B of Table 1.7 shows the results from the non-overlapping window 
estimation. We observe that, like the conditional CAPM estimation, the results 
display great variations as the window size changes, especially for the 
momentum portfolios. The W-L's average conditional alpha, for example, 
decreases from 2.50% to 1.09% as the window increases from one month to 
three. Different window estimations moreover yield inconsistent results. The S-
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B's average alpha, for example, is 0.44% (t-stat 2.93) if 1=N , indicating the 
failure of the conditional FF model, whereas it becomes -0.01% (t-stat -0.20) if 
3=N , providing no evidence to reject the model. 
 
The results for the equally-weighted portfolios are presented in Table 1.8. 
Panel A shows that the conditional FF model is no longer able to explain the 
S-B, and the average pricing errors for S-B and V-G are also much larger than 
those for the value-weighted portfolios. The conditional FF model generally 
produces much smaller average pricing errors than does the conditional 
CAPM (except for W-L and G). For instance, V-G's average pricing error is 
0.18% (z-stat 4.50) using the conditional FF, and 0.68% (z-stat 9.71) using the 
conditional CAPM. However, the conditional FF model performs no better than 
the unconditional FF, with W-L's average pricing error being -0.40% using the 
conditional FF model and -0.31% using the unconditional FF model. 
 
In summary, with respect to the value-weighted portfolios, the average pricing 
errors from the conditional FF model are economically small for the size and 
B/M portfolios, providing evidence that the conditional model helps to explain 
the dynamics of the returns of these portfolios. For momentum portfolios, even 
though the conditional FF model still fails to capture their return variation, the 
average pricing errors are much smaller than those from the unconditional 
model, and they are also smaller than those from the conditional CAPM. As for 
the equally-weighted portfolios, their return variations are very difficult to 
capture by the conditional FF model. 
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Table 1.8: Test of average conditional FF alphas for equally-weighted 
portfolios, 1963-2007 
 
The table reports the average conditional alphas for equally-weighted size, 
B/M and momentum portfolios (% monthly). Panel A reports the nonparametric 
estimates from equation (8) with mRf (=  SMB  )′HML  using daily data. The 
standard error is obtained from equation (6). Panel B presents estimates using 
the non-overlapping window estimation as in LN, with window size 3,1=N  and 
6 . The standard error is from the time series variation of the conditional 
alphas, in the spirit of Fama and Macbeth (1973). Bold values denote 
estimates greater than two standard errors from zero. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Nonparametric Conditional Alphas
Est. 1.04 0.04 1.00 0.20 0.38 0.18 1.46 1.01 -0.40
Std. err 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.11
Panel B: Non-Overlapping WindowConditional Alphas
N  1
Est. 1.18 -0.07 1.25 0.22 0.20 -0.02 0.85 1.57 0.72
Std. err 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.31 0.21 0.36
N  3
Est. 0.97 0.06 0.90 0.14 0.36 0.22 1.09 1.13 0.05
Std. err 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.23
N  6
Est 0.95 0.11 0.84 0.20 0.41 0.21 1.27 0.93 -0.34
Std. err 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.27 0.10 0.26  
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1.3.4 Conditional Models or Unconditional Models? 
So far, our focus has been on the test of the pricing errors, or the conditional 
alphas. We find that the conditional CAPM is not superior to the unconditional 
CAPM in explaining asset-pricing anomalies, and that even though the 
conditional FF model is superior to the unconditional FF model, it still fails to 
account for the momentum effect. In this subsection, we evaluate the models 
from the statistical point of view by asking the following question: Which model 
fits the actual data better? Or, which is closer to the true data generating 
process, the conditional or the unconditional model? 
 
To answer this question, we need to directly compare the fit of an 
unconditional model to that of a conditional one. This is important because, 
even though a conditional model performs as badly as an unconditional one 
from the economic point of view, it may still fit the data better and thus 
represent a better model from the statistical point of view. In cases in which we 
have to rely on one model, it is better to choose the one which is closer to the 
true data generating process. 
 
In this subsection, we directly compare the goodness of fit of the conditional 
and unconditional models by using a nonparametric test statistic proposed by 
Chen (2008). The idea is to compare the sum squared residuals (SSR) 
estimated from an unconditional model with those estimated from a time-
varying conditional model. The test statistic is constructed in the spirit of F -
test and follows a convenient standard normal distribution: 
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where 0SSR  is the SSR from an unconditional model of (7), and 1SSR  is the 
SSR from a conditional model of (8). h  is the optimal window size, and A , B  
are centering and scaling factors. The details of A  and B  are provided in 
Appendix 1.C. 
 
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between a conditional model 
and an unconditional one in describing the true data generating process. This 
is a one-tail test. If the unconditional model is closer to the true data 
generating process than the conditional one, then we expect 0SSR  to be 
smaller than 1SSR . In this case, S  will be small and the null hypothesis won't 
be rejected. On the other hand, if the conditional model is closer to the truth, 
then 0SSR  will be larger than 1SSR , generating a large S  so that the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
 
We consider two pairs of models: the unconditional CAPM versus the 
conditional CAPM, and the unconditional FF model versus conditional FF 
model. For each portfolio, we calculate the test statistics from (10) associated 
with each model. The results are provided in Table 1.9. We see that for both 
pairs of models, the value of S  far exceeds the 5% critical value of 1.65 for 
every portfolio, whether value-weighted or equally-weighted. This provides 
strong evidence that the conditional models are closer to the true data-
generating process than the unconditional ones. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
We propose a nonparametric method to estimate and test a time-varying 
factor model. Our method does away with state variables, and it also takes 
into account the nonlinear relationship between asset returns and factor 
returns. Rather than dividing windows in an arbitrary way as in existing studies, 
we obtain the optimal data-driven window size, which serves to minimize both 
the underconditioning and the small sample biases.  
 
We then propose two tests to evaluate the performance of the conditional 
models. Our first test focuses on individual pricing errors and reveals whether 
or not a conditional model holds at a particular time period. In addition to the 
test on individual pricing errors, we derive the asymptotic distribution of 
average pricing errors under a very general distributional assumption, and test 
whether the average pricing errors are equal to zero. 
 
Based on different estimation methods, there have been some controversies 
as to whether either the conditional CAPM or the conditional FF model can 
explain the well-known asset-pricing anomalies. In this paper, we use the 
nonparametric method to estimate the time series of the alphas and betas 
associated with these two conditional models and evaluate their performance 
in explaining cross section of stock returns.  
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Table 1.9: Test on Goodness of Fit 
 
This table reports the test statistics calculated based on (10). The test statistic 
for the CAPM is calculated by comparing the sum squared residuals (SSR) 
estimated from equation (7) to the SSR estimated from equation (8), by letting 
mRf = . The test statistic for FF is calculated by SSR estimated from equation 
(7) to the SSR estimated from equation (8), by letting mRf (=   SMB   )′HML . 
If the test statistic is greater than 1.65, we reject the hypothesis that there is no 
difference between an unconditional and conditional model at 5% significant 
level. 
 
Size B/M Mom
S B S-B G V V-G L W W-L
Panel A: Value-weighted Portfolios
CAPM 122.8 200.7 109.8 68.7 141.2 116.8 94.4 135.7 130.4
FF 227.8 271.4 149.4 132.4 199.9 106.1 197.3 216.8 276.0
Panel B: Equally-weighted Portfolios
CAPM 134.9 148.9 128.5 81.7 129.3 123.7 124.3 139.7 162.6
FF 235.1 221.9 158.0 183.4 214.7 106.2 165.3 273.5 267.0
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 Our results show that the conditional CAPM holds at less than 1/4 of all the 
time periods for every portfolio. The conditional FF model holds at more time 
periods, and its explanatory power tends to be more persistent. The 
uniqueness of this test is that we are able to identify the exact time periods in 
which a conditional model holds, suggesting an interesting research direction 
for discovering the conditions in which a conditional model is better applied. 
 
For the value-weighted portfolios, we provide strong evidence that the 
conditional CAPM fails miserably to explain the size effect, the value effect, 
and the momentum effect. The conditional FF model explains the size and 
value effect quite well, and it also helps to explain the momentum effect. 
However, it's rather difficult for either conditional model to explain the return 
variations in the equally-weighted portfolios, so the small portfolios remain a 
serious challenge to existing factor pricing models. 
 
We also examine the goodness of fit for conditional versus unconditional 
models. Our results show that the conditional models are closer to the true 
data-generating process and are thus better models. 
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CHAPTER 2 
PROSPECT THEORY, THE DISPOSITION EFFECT AND ASSET PRICES19 
 
2.1 Introduction  
One of the mostly studied individual trading behaviors is the disposition effect: 
investors have a greater tendency to sell assets that have risen in value since 
purchase than those that have fallen.20 This effect has been observed in many 
markets, both for retail investors and for professional investors.21 It is puzzling 
because none of the most obvious rational explanations, such as portfolio 
rebalancing or information story, can entirely account for the disposition effect 
(Odean, 1998). As a result, an alternative view based on prospect theory has 
gained favor. 
                                                 
19This chapter is based on a joint paper with Liyan Yang.  
 
20Shefrin and Statman (1985) coined the term the disposition effect. This effect 
is puzzling because the purchase price of a stock should not matter much for 
an investor's decision to sell it. In addition, tax laws encourage investors to sell 
losers rather than winners to reduce taxes. In a careful further study, Odean 
(1998) finds that the most obvious explanations, namely those based on 
information, taxes, rebalancing, or transaction costs, fail to capture important 
features of the data. 
 
21Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Feng and Seasholes 
(2005) find disposition effects in the stock markets of the U.S., Finland, and 
China, respectively. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Shapira and Veneezia 
(2001), Werners (2003), Garvey and Murphy (2004), Coval and Shumway 
(2005), Locke and Mann (2005), Frazzini (2006), and Scherbina and Jin (2006) 
document the disposition effect in the trading of professionals who trade on 
behalf of their firms; Genesove and Mayor (2001) and Heath et al. (1999) 
document disposition effects in the housing market and in the exercise of 
executive stock options, respectively. Webber and Camerer (1998) and Oehler 
et al. (2002) uncover disposition effects with experimental data. See Feng and 
Seasholes' (2005) Appendix A for more empirical studies on the disposition 
effect. 
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The literature has produced both informal arguments (e.g., Odean, 1998) and 
formal models (Kyle et al., 2006; Hens and Vlcek, 2006; Barberis and Xiong, 
2009), relying on prospect theory to explain the disposition effect. As a 
prominent theory of decision-making under risk, prospect theory was first 
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and extended by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). A prospect theory investor evaluates gambles through 
gains and losses, not final wealth levels. The value function used by the 
investor to process gains and losses has a kink in the origin, indicating that 
investors are more sensitive to losses than to gains; this feature is referred to 
as loss aversion in the literature. Moreover, the value function is concave for 
gains and convex for losses, meaning that the investor is risk averse for gains 
and risk-loving for losses, which is known as diminishing sensitivity.22 
 
Aside from using prospect theory to study the underlying cause of the 
disposition effect, recent empirical studies suggest that the disposition effect 
has pricing and volume implications: it can generate momentum in stock 
returns (Grinblatt and Han, 2005; Shumway and Wu, 2007), induce post-
earnings announcement drift (Frazzini, 2006), and contribute to a positive 
correlation between returns and volumes (e.g., Statman et al., 2006). 
 
While existing studies have offered many insightful understandings on the link 
                                                 
22For a review of prospect theory, see Barberis and Thaler's (2003) Section 
3.2.1 or Barberis and Huang's (2008) Section 2. Another salient feature of 
prospect theory is probability weighting: the investor overweights small 
probabilities and underweights intermediate probabilities in computing the 
expectation. We don't incorporate this feature in our model due to the reasons 
discussed in Section 2.2. 
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from prospect theory to the disposition effect, and on the link from the 
disposition effect to return and volume patterns, they have almost always 
investigated these two links separately. On the one hand, the partial 
equilibrium models proposed by Kyle et al. (2006), Hens and Vlcek (2006) or 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) assume an exogenous stock return process, and 
are therefore silent about the pricing and volume implications of the disposition 
effect. On the other hand, Grinblatt and Han's (2005) theoretical model shows 
that the disposition effect can lead to price momentum, but it begins with a 
demand function featuring the disposition effect without exploring whether 
such a demand function can indeed be generated from prospect theory 
preferences. In particular, Barberis and Xiong (2009)'s partial equilibrium 
results suggest that when the expected stock return is high, the disposition 
effect leads to a reversed disposition effect, implying a reversal in stock 
returns and a negative correlation between returns and volumes. The literature 
thus lacks a theoretical foundation to support the intuition from prospect theory 
to the disposition effect and the intuition from the disposition effect to price 
momentum or volume patterns. 
 
Without such a general equilibrium model, the following questions are thus left 
unanswered: Whether the intuitions emphasized in existing studies are 
coherent in a unified framework? Does prospect theory predict the disposition 
effect when stock returns are endogenous? Which component of prospect 
theory drives the momentum, and which drives the reversal? In a calibrated 
economy, how much can prospect theory explain the data? The challenges of 
proposing such a general equilibrium model come from: (i) an investor's 
decision involves solving an optimal stopping time problem with a non-smooth 
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and partially convex objective function, and (ii) the state vector in the general 
equilibrium model is high-dimensional, including the distribution of stock 
holdings and purchase prices (i.e., the reference points) for all investors in 
every possible state of nature. 
 
In this paper, we develop an overlapping-generation (OLG) model to simplify 
an investor's optimal stopping time problem and to reduce the dimensions of 
the state vector, making it possible to simultaneously study the link between 
prospect theory and the disposition effect, as well as the impact of this effect 
on stock prices. In our model, over their lifetimes, investors can trade stocks 
and a risk-free asset in the financial market, and, at the end of their final 
periods, receive prospect theory utility based on their trading profits. The 
behavior of those investors who bought stocks in previous periods can 
potentially exhibit the disposition effect. Our model shows that different 
components of prospect theory make different predictions regarding trading 
behavior, return predictability and volume patterns. 
 
Specifically, the diminishing sensitivity component, which posits that investors 
are risk averse (risk-loving) for gains (losses), or that the value function is 
concave (convex) in the gain (loss) domain, predicts the disposition effect in 
equilibrium, which in turn drives price momentum and a positive correlation 
between returns and volumes (See Subsection 2.4.2).23 However, the loss 
                                                 
23Throughout this paper, we follow the literature in using the terms diminishing 
sensitivity and concavity/convexity interchangeably to refer to the S-shaped 
value function of prospect theory. 
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aversion component, which says that investors are more sensitive to losses 
than to gains, or that the value function has a kink at the origin, predicts 
exactly the opposite, namely, a reversed disposition effect in individual trading, 
reversal in the cross-section of stock returns and a negative correlation 
between returns and volumes (See Subsection 2.4.3). In a calibrated economy, 
when preference parameters are set at the values estimated by the previous 
studies, the concavity/convexity feature of prospect theory value function 
dominates, so that our model can generate an annual momentum of up to %7  
(See Subsection 2.4.4). 
 
The intuition for the implications of diminishing sensitivity is as follows. When a 
stock experiences good news and increases in value relative to the purchase 
price, these investors will be keen to sell it to lock in the paper gain, due to the 
concavity of the value function of prospect theory in the region of gains. Their 
selling increases volume. The selling pressure, moreover, depresses the stock 
price, generating subsequent higher returns. Similarly, when a stock 
experiences bad news and decreases in value relative to the purchase price, 
these investors are facing capital losses, and they are reluctant to sell, absent 
a premium, because of the convexity in the region of losses. In this case, the 
volume dries up, and the price is inflated, giving rise to subsequent lower 
returns. In this way, our model proves the internal consistency of the existing 
informal arguments which link prospect theory to the disposition effect (e.g., 
Odean, 1998) and which rely on the disposition effect to explain the 
momentum effect (e.g., Grinblatt and Han, 2005) and the positive relationship 
between price changes and volume (e.g., Odean, 1998; Statman et al., 2006). 
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What's the intuition for the implications of loss aversion? Loss aversion means 
that prospect theory value function has a kink at the origin, and investors are 
afraid of holding stocks if they are close to the kink. It is well understood in the 
literature that loss aversion can raise equity premiums in equilibrium (e.g., 
Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al., 2001). So in equilibrium, good (bad) 
news will push investors far from (close to) the kink, making them more likely 
to hold (sell) stocks when facing gains (losses). This resulting reversed 
disposition effect, in turn, leads to a negative correlation between returns and 
volumes, as well as reversal in the cross-section of returns: when a stock 
experiences good (bad) news and increases (decreases) in value relative to 
the purchase price, investors, according to the reversed disposition effect, 
want to hold (sell) stocks, which reduces (raises) the trading volume and 
inflates (depresses) the stock price; from that higher (lower) base, subsequent 
stock returns will also be lower (higher). 
 
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to comprehensively study 
the implications of prospect theory for individual trading behavior, asset prices 
and trading volume in a dynamic setting. Previous research on the effect of 
prospect theory in the asset pricing literature has focused primarily on the loss 
aversion component and shown that it can increase the equity premium, i.e., 
the mean of stock returns in excess of the risk free rate (e.g., Barberis et al., 
2001).24 Our model demonstrates that loss aversion also has implications for 
                                                 
24Recently, in a one period (two dates) model, Barberis and Huang (2008) 
show that the probability weighting feature of prospect theory can cause a 
security's individual skewness to be priced in equilibrium. 
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return predictability and the correlation between returns and volumes. In 
addition, our paper shows that the S-shaped value function of prospect theory 
helps explain the disposition effect, the momentum effect and the comovement 
between stock returns and turnovers. Over and above these results, in 
Subsection 2.4.2, we argue that diminishing sensitivity alone, in the absence 
of loss aversion, can raise equity premiums. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model, 
and Section 2.3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 2.4 solves the price-
dividend ratios and uses simulated data to analyze the implications of 
diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion for individual trading behavior, asset 
prices and trading volumes. In particular, Subsection 2.4.4 conducts a 
quantitative analysis to evaluate how well our model matches the historical 
data. Section 2.5 concludes the paper. The appendix discusses the 
robustness of our results to certain modeling assumptions. 
 
2.2. The Model 
Let us consider an OLG model with one consumption good. Time is discrete 
and indexed by t . In each period, there are 3 generations (age-1, age-2 and 
age-3), each with a unitary mass. We adopt an OLG setup simply to reduce 
the dimension of the state vector. In the context of the disposition effect, the 
reference points usually relate to the purchase prices, which enter the state of 
the economy via the disposition effect, making the state history dependent. In 
an OLG setup, investors live for a finite period of time, so their purchase prices 
involve only a finite number of periods, effectively reducing the dimension of 
the state vector. The OLG setup should therefore not be interpreted literally. 
  69
Generations should be understood as generations of transactions, not 
generations of people. Since the average holding periods of stocks are six 
months to one year, one generation corresponds to six months to one year. 
Why are there three generations in each period? First, in order to study the 
disposition effect, which concerns selling decisions, we need at least three 
generations. In the standard two generation models, old investors always sell 
stocks whether facing good news or bad, thereby automatically ruling out the 
disposition effect. On the other hand, one model with more than two 
generations allows some investors to decide when to liquidate stocks which 
they bought in previous periods. Second, if there were more than three 
generations, the state vector would be highly dimensional, making the model 
intractable. In Appendix 2.A.2, we intuitively argue that our results might still 
hold in a setup with more than three generations. 
 
2.2.1 Financial Assets 
There are two traded assets: a risk-free bond and a risky stock. The bond is in 
perfectly elastic supply at a constant gross interest rate 1>fR . The stock pays 
a random dividend 0>tD  in period t . The dividend growth rate ttDDt 11 +=+θ  is 
i.i.d. over time, and follows a distribution given by 
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The stock is in limited supply (normalized as 1) and is traded in a competitive 
market at price tP . Let 1+tR  be the gross return on the stock between time  t   
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Investors can buy or short bonds at any level, but they can not short stocks, 
and if they buy stocks, they can hold exactly 1 unit in each period. We assume 
that people hold either zero or one unit of stock for several reasons. First, this 
specification is realistic in the sense that the lower (upper) bound of the 
holding position captures the shorting (borrowing) constraints in stock trading. 
Second, the assumption that people buy at most one unit of stock at one time 
captures the idea that they tend to form different mental accounts for the same 
stock bought at different prices. Third, a binary choice in stock holdings 
simplifies an investor's decisions, because otherwise it is very difficult to 
characterize the investor's demand function due to the convexity of the 
Kahneman and Tversky (1992) value function in the loss domain. Finally, a 
binary choice and an OLG setup combine to reduce the complicated optimal 
stopping problem of an age-2 investor owning a stock to a simple problem of 
choosing between an early liquidation and a late liquidation. 
 
2.2.2 Beliefs 
In order to study the impact of the disposition effect on trading volumes, we 
make two assumptions on investors' beliefs. First, investors hold 
heterogeneous beliefs about the dividend growth rate within one period. Due 
to this cross-sectional heterogeneity in beliefs, investors, in particular young 
investors, will make different investment decisions: more optimistic investors 
will purchase a stock, while more pessimistic investors will not. Second, an 
investor's one-period-ahead dividend forecast changes during his lifetime. The 
time-variation in an investor's belief will motivate the selling of a middle-aged 
investor who purchased the stock when he was young. With these two 
assumptions, we ensure that in each period, there is always a group of middle-
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aged investors who bought stocks last period and want to sell them this period. 
It is this group of investors that can potentially exhibit a disposition effect. Of 
course, these two assumptions are just a modelling device, and any other 
trading motives, such as liquidity shocks (e.g., Kaustia, 2008), can also serve 
the same purpose. 
 
As a matter of fact, in the informal arguments that have been used to link 
prospect theory and the disposition effect, investors are often assumed to 
experience belief changes, i.e., time-variation in an investor's beliefs is often 
maintained as the following quotation from Odean (1998, p. 1777) illustrates. 
 
(S)uppose an investor purchases a stock that she believes to have an 
expected return high enough to justify its risk. If the stock appreciates and the 
investor continues to use the purchase price as a reference point, the stock 
price will then be in a more concave, more risk-averse, part of the investor's 
value function. It may be that the stock's expected return continues to justify its 
risk. However, if the investor somewhat lowers her expectation of the stock's 
return, she will be likely to sell the stock. What if, instead of appreciating, the 
stock declines? Then its price is in the convex, risk-seeking, part of the value 
function. Here the investor will continue to hold the stock even if its expected 
return falls lower than would have been necessary for her to justify its original 
purchase. Thus the investor's belief about expected return must fall further to 
motivate the sale of a stock that has already declined than one that has 
appreciated. [Emphasis added as italics] 
 
Formally, in period t , investor i  believes that the dividend growth rate 1+tθ  
  72
follows a distribution given by 
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where tiq ,  is a random variable with uniform distribution on [ ]1,0  and tiq ,  is i.i.d. 
across investors (index i ) and over time (index t ).25 On average, investors 
have the correct beliefs, since the mean of tiq ,  is equal to 21 .  Investors are 
forward looking, so that we can apply the standard dynamic programming 
techniques to solve their optimal decision problems. 
 
2.2.3 Preference 
An investor derives prospect theory utility from trading assets in the spirit of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992).26 When investor i is born, he is 
endowed with iW ,1  units of consumption good. He can trade when he is young 
and middle-aged, leaving his final wealth as iW ,3  and his capital gains/losses 
as iX ,3 . Let 
i
tE  denote the investor's expectation operator at time t . His time t  
utility, itU , is then given by 
                                                 
25In reality, an investor's one-period-ahead dividend forecasts might be 
correlated. As a robustness check, we also try the following specification to 
capture this correlation: ( ) 1,,1, 1 ++ −+= tititi qq ερρ  with )1,0(∈ρ , where tiq ,  
follows a beta distribution and 1, +tiε  follows a uniform distribution. If 0=ρ ,  
then we return to the specification in the main text in which his forecasts are 
independent over time; if 1=ρ , then an investor's forecasts about dividend 
growth rate are constant over time. 
 
26We also considered a model, similar to Barberis et al. (2001), in which an 
investor derives two kinds of utilities --- the standard consumption utility and 
prospect theory utility --- and obtained similar results. 
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with 10 ≤< α  and 1≥λ . 
 
Here, the function ( )⋅v  is the standard value function of prospect theory 
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The argument of ( )⋅v  is the 
capital gain/loss, iX ,3 , not the final period wealth, iW ,3 . Function ( )⋅v  is 
concave for gains and convex for losses, meaning that investors are risk 
averse in the domain of gains and risk-seeking in the domain of losses; it has 
a kink at the origin, implying a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains of the 
same magnitude. Parameter α  governs its concavity/convexity and parameter 
λ  controls loss aversion. For simplicity, we don't explore prospect theory's 
probability weighting feature in the above preference specification and just 
apply the standard expectation operator itE . The primary effect of probability 
weighting is to overweight small probabilities; it therefore has its biggest 
impact on securities with highly skewed returns. Since most stocks are not 
highly skewed, we do not expect probability weighting to be central to the link 
between prospect theory and the disposition effect. Indeed, Hens and Vlcek 
(2006) find that probability weighting only plays a minor role in determining 
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whether prospect theory predicts the disposition effect. 
 
In equation (4), we follow the literature (e.g., Gomes, 2005; Barberis and 
Huang, 2008; Barberis and Xiong, 2009) and define the capital gain/loss as 
ifii WRWX ,1
2
,3,3 −= .27 That is, we take a reference point as an investor's final 
wealth which he could have earned by investing in bonds when he was young 
and middle-aged.28 The gain/loss from a particular stock sale is calculated as 
the difference between the reference point and the investor's final wealth 
resulting from buying and selling this stock. For example, if investor  i  buys a 
stock at price BP  at age 1, sells it at price SP  and collects a dividend iD ,2  at 
age 2 , and he then reinvests i
S DP ,2+  in bonds, getting back ifSf DRPR ,2+  
at age 3 . If he had not bought the stock at age 1, but had invested BP  in 
bonds and held them till age 3 , then he would have collected Bf PR
2  at age 3 . 
Therefore, the gain/loss from this stock sale is Bfif
S
fi PRDRPRX
2
,2,3 −+= . 
This definition reflects the idea that an investor usually starts considering the 
stock investment as a loss if he could have earned more from investing in the 
riskless bond. 
                                                 
27Two implementations of propect theory have been proposed in the literature. 
The first implementation defines propect theory over annual gains/losses 
(Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis et al., 2001; Barberis and Huang, 2008). 
Another implementation is to define prospect theoy over "realized gains/losses 
as in Barberis and Xiong (2008, 2009). The two implementations will be 
identical in our setup, because investors are allowed to hold only one unit of 
stock over their lifetimes. 
 
28In Appendix 2.A.1, we further show that our results are robust to taking 
purchase prices as reference points. 
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2.2.4 Timeline 
To summarize, in the model, the exogenous random variables are tθ  and tiq , , 
and the exogenous parameters of the model are 0>Hθ , 0>Lθ , 1>fR , 
10 ≤< α  and 1≥λ . The order of events in each period t  is shown in Figure 
2.1. At the beginning of period t  , age-1 investors are born and receive 
consumption good endowments. The dividend growth rate tθ  is realized, and 
all investors observe tθ . The idiosyncratic belief shock tiq ,  is realized, and 
investor i  observes tiq , . All investors trade in the stock and bond market; age-
2 and age-3 investors carry stocks to the market; after trading, age-1 and age-
2 investors hold stocks. At the end of period t , age-3 investors receive 
prospect theory utility and exit the economy. 
 
Our OLG setup can be understood as a stylized way of describing how 
different types of investors existing in real markets interact with each other. 
Our model economy can be linked to reality as follows. The potential buyers, 
namely an age-1 investor and an age-2 investor without a stock, correspond 
respectively to a new participant and to a wait-and-seer who has been sitting 
in the market for some time. The potential sellers, namely an age-3 investor 
and an age-2 investor owning a stock, correspond respectively to a pure noise 
investor, one who has no discretion with regard to the timing of his trade, and  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  76
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Period t
Dividend
News 
Age-1 
enter the 
economy
Belief 
shocks qi,t
Investors 
trade: 
age-1&age-
2 buy; 
age-2&age-
3 sell
Age-3 
derive 
utility and 
exit the 
economytθ
Time
 
 
Figure 2.1 Timeline 
 
Figure 2.1 plots the order of events in period  t  . 
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to a discretionary liquidity investor, one who can determine when to trade.29 
 
2.2.5 Extension: A Multi-Stock Setting 
So far, we have assumed just one risky asset, but our analysis has 
implications for the cross-section property of stock returns, so long as the 
investor engages in mental accounting or narrow framing (Thaler, 1980, 1985), 
thus deriving prospect theory utility separately from the trading profit on each 
distinct stock. This assumption is always present in the literature relating 
prospect theory to the disposition effect (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barberis and 
Xiong, 2009). Kumar and Lim (2008) also document that narrow framers 
indeed exhibit more of a disposition effect. Formally, we can consider an 
economy with N  stocks, in which each stock has i.i.d. dividend processes with 
distribution given by equation (1), investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about 
the dividend growth rates and experience belief changes in their lifetimes, and 
these investors derive prospect theory utility from accumulative trading profits 
at the level of individual stocks. Then we can still use the conditions that 
characterize the equilibrium in the single stock setting --- more precisely, 
equations (6) through (23) --- to define an equilibrium, stock by stock, in this 
mutli-stock setting. In Section 2.4, we conduct such an analysis and calculate 
the average returns to the winners-minus-losers portfolio to examine whether 
price momentum exists in our model economies. 
 
                                                 
29The importance of differentiating a pure noise investor from a discretionary 
liquidity investor has been emphasized in the microstructure literature, for 
example, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
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2.3 Equilibrium 
We now derive equilibrium asset prices. Let 
t
t
D
P
tf =  denote the price-dividend 
ratio in period t . To ease exposition, the investors of age 2 who have (don't 
have) a stock when they enter the market are referred to as age-2-1 investors 
(age-2-0 investors). Let tz  be the mass of age-2-1 investors in period t , i.e., zt  
captures the distribution of stocks. Then in period t , the state of the economy 
is ( )tttt zfS ,, 1−= θ . In equilibrium, the stock price-dividend ratios will be a 
function of the state vector, ( )tt Sff = . The three variables tθ , 1−tf  and tz  
affect stock prices because (i) tθ  and 1−tf  affect age-2-1's investment 
decisions through the disposition effect, and (ii) tz  relates to aggregate effect 
on prices of age-2-1 investors as a whole. We construct the price-dividend 
function f  by solving investors' optimal decisions backwards and using the 
market clearing condition. 
 
2.3.1 Age-3 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i  of age 3  faces a state vector ( )tit qS ,, . His decision is 
simple: if he has a stock, he sells it and derives prospect theory utility from his 
trading profit; if he does not have a stock, he just waits until the end of the 
period and receives prospect theory utility. In sum, age-3 investors will sell 
1 − zt  stocks as a whole. 
 
2.3.2 Age-2 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i of age 2  faces a state vector ( )1,, ,, −titit hqS , where 11, =−tih  if 
he belongs to age-2-1 and 01, =−tih  if he belongs to age-2-0. An age-2-1 
investor decides whether to sell the stock, and an age-2-0 investor decides 
whether to buy a stock. 
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Let us first look at the age-2-1 investors. If an age-2-1 investor continues to 
hold the stock, what is his expected prospect theory utility? In the next period, 
he will sell the stock at price 1+tP , resulting in a gain/loss 
 
( ) .1with 
,
1
2
11
1
11
1
1
111
2
11
−++
+
→
−
+
→−++
−++=
=−++
tftfttt
t
t
t
tftftt
fRRfG
DGPRDRDP
θθθ  (6) 
 
As a result, his expected utility is 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ,, 1111,11 α−+→→ = ttittit DGvEqSU                                            (7) 
 
where itE  is the subjective expectation operator conditional on investor i 's 
period t  information set { }titit qS ,,=F . Here, investor i  takes expectation over 
the random variables 1+tθ  and 1+tf  according to his subjective belief [equation 
(2)] and the transition law of the state vector [equation (22)]. 
 
If he sells the stock, what is his expected prospect theory utility? Since he sells 
at price tP , then his gain/loss is  
 
( ) .1with 
,
1
2
01
1011
2
−→
−→−
−+=
=−+
tftft
t
t
t
tftftf
fRRfG
DGPRDRPR
θ      (8) 
 
Therefore, his expected utility is 
 
( ) ( ) .10101 α−→→ = ttt DGvSU                                       (9) 
 
If ( ) ( )ttit SUqSU 01,11 , →→ ≥ , then investor i  will continue to hold the stock. That is, 
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those with sufficiently large belief shocks tiq ,  will not sell their stocks. 
To sum up, the optimal decision of an age-2-1 investor is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ).111,, 0111101,11 ,, ttitttit GvGvESUqSUtit qSh →+→→→ ≥≥ ==   (10) 
 
The corresponding indirect value function is30 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ).1,,11,,1,,ˆwith 
,1,,ˆ1,,
01,
1
11,,
1,,
t
tit
ti
ttittit
ttittit
GvqShGvEqShqSV
DqSVqSV
→
+
→
−
−+=
= α
  (11) 
 
After trading, the fraction of those age-2-1 investors who continue to hold on to 
their stocks is 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ],|1,,1,,1, ,,02 ttitttitzt SqShEzdiqShSH t == ∫   (12) 
 
where the second equality follows from the law of large numbers and the 
expectation is taken over the random variable tiq , , which follows a uniform 
distribution over [ ]1,0 . 
 
Next, let us check the age-2-0 investors. If an age-2-0 investor decides to buy 
a stock, then he will have a gain/loss 
                                                 
30Note that the indirect value function, ( )1,, , tit qSV , is different from the value 
function of prospect theory ( )⋅v . Function ( )⋅v  corresponds to a standard 
Bernoulli utility function in the choice theory under uncertainty, but function ( )1,, , tit qSV  is the indirect utility function which has taken into account the 
investor's optimal decisions. 
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( ) ,1with 
,
11
1
10
1
1
1011
ttfttt
t
t
t
tftt
fRfG
DGPRDP
θθθ −+=
=−+
++
+
→
−
+
→++  (13) 
 
and have expected prospect theory utility 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ., 1110,10 α−+→→ = ttittit DGvEqSU                     (14) 
 
If he decides not to buy a stock, then his utility is 0 . So an age-2-0 investor's 
optimal decision is 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ,110,, 00,, 110,10 ≥≥ +→→ == tittit GvEqSUtit qSh    (15) 
 
and the corresponding indirect value function is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].0,,0,,ˆwith ,0,,ˆ0,, 110,,1,, +→− == tittittitttittit GvEqShqSVDqSVqSV α    (16) 
 
After trading, the aggregate stock holding of age-2-0 investors is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].|0,,10,,0, ,,102 ttitttitzt SqShEzdiqShSH t −== ∫ −    (17) 
 
2.3.3 Age-1 Investors' Decisions 
A typical investor i  of age 1 faces a state vector ( )tit qS ,, . If he decides to buy 
a stock, then his expected prospect theory utility is  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ],1,,ˆ,ˆwith 
,,ˆ1,,,
1,1,1
,11,1,1
++
++
=
==
tit
i
ttit
ttittit
i
ttit
qSVEqSU
DqSUqSVEqSU α
      (18) 
 
  82
and if he decides not to buy a stock, then his expected utility is  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )[ ].0,,ˆ,ˆwith 
,,ˆ0,,,
1,1,0
,01,1,0
++
++
=
==
tit
i
ttit
ttittit
i
ttit
qSVEqSU
DqSUqSVEqSU α
     (19) 
 
Therefore, his optimal decision is 
 ( ) ( ) ( ).1, ,0,1 ,ˆ,ˆ, tittit qSUqSUtit qSh ≥=                                              (20) 
 
So after trade, age 1 as a whole will hold 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ].|,, ,,101 ttittitt SqShEdiqShSH == ∫                           (21) 
 
2.3.4 Evolution of State Variables 
The state vector tS  evolves according to the following equation 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ),,,,, 11111 ttttttt SHSfzfS ++++ == θθ                           (22) 
 
where functions ( )tSH1  [given by (21)] and ( )tSf  are both endogenously 
determined. The random process { }∞=+ 11 ttθ  is i.i.d. with distribution 
( ) ( ) 2111 PrPr ==== ++ LtHt θθθθ  [i.e., equation (1)]. When investors make 
decisions, however, they believe that  t1  evolves according to 
( ) tiHtit q ,1Pr ==+ θθ  [i.e., equation (2)]. Since tS  is in the investors' information 
set, they know the other two variables in 1+tS , i.e., tf  and 1+tz . 
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2.3.5 Market Clearing Condition 
The market clearing condition is 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ,11,0, 221 =++ ttt SHSHSH              (23) 
 
which states that the stock holdings from age-1, age-2-0, and age-2-1 add up 
to the total stock supply 1. An equilibrium price-dividend function f  is 
implicitly determined by equations (6) through (23). 
 
We adopt the equilibrium concept of Radner (1972), known as equilibrium of 
plans, prices, and price expectations. An equilibrium is formally defined as 
follows. 
 
 Definition An equilibrium consists of decision rules, ( )tit qSh ,, , ( )0,, , tit qSh  and 
( )1,, , tit qSh , and a law of motion ( ) ( ) ( )( )ttttttt SHSfzfS 11111 ,,,, ++++ == θθ  such 
that 
(1) the decision rules maximize investors' expected prospect theory utility 
conditional on their information; 
(2) markets clear: ( ) ( ) ( ) 11,0, 221 =++ ttt SHSHSH  for almost every realization of 
tS ; and 
(3) the law of motion is generated by decision rules. 
Note that the above definition of equilibrium has implicitly incorporated prices 
into the price-dividend ratio function in the law of motion. 
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2.3.6 Benchmark Case: Standard Risk Neutral Utility 
Suppose 1== λα . Concavity/convexity and loss aversion, two distinctive 
features of prospect theory, will vanish, reducing the preferences to a standard 
risk neutral utility representation. This works as a benchmark economy to 
illustrate that all our results are driven by prospect theory preferences. We 
don't use a standard, risk averse preference, such as power utility functions, 
as the benchmark, because risk aversion per se can qualitatively generate a 
disposition effect through portfolio rebalancing, although Odean (1998) argues 
that portfolio rebalancing cannot quantitatively account for the disposition 
effect.31 Risk neutrality removes this contamination and therefore gives 
cleaner results. 
 
When investors are risk neutral, i.e., when 1== λα , both the price-dividend 
ratio and the mass of age 2-1 investors are constant: 
( )( ) ( )LHf LHtf t RER
E
t ff θθ
θθ
θ
θ
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
+−
+
− ==≡ ++  and 21=tz . This result can be obtained by 
examining equations (6) to (23). 
In fact, the constant price-dividend ratio is consistent with the simple Gordon 
rule: ( )( )11 ++−= tf ttER DEtP θθ . Intuitively, the potential buyers of stocks are those age-1 
and age-2 investors who hold optimistic views about next period's dividend 
realization; the marginal buyer's subjective belief, coinciding with the true 
                                                 
31If investors sell winners due to portfolio rebalancing, then they will partially 
reduce their position in a winning stock, rather than sell the entire position of 
the stock. Odean (1998) shows that the disposition effect still remains strong, 
even when the sample is restricted to transactions of investors' entire holdings 
of a stock, i.e., to those transactions not motivated by portfolio rebalancing. 
This suggests that portfolio rebalancing cannot entirely account for the 
disposition effect. 
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distribution of the dividend process, brings the stock price equal to the sum of 
the discounted expected dividends. In this special case, we have an i.i.d. 
return process, 
 
,1 1111 ++++
+=+= t
t
tt
t f
f
P
DPR θ  
 
with mean equal to fR . The age-2-1 investors no longer exhibit a disposition 
effect, because half of them, those who have received pessimistic belief 
shocks (i.e., 2/1, <tiq ), will always liquidate stocks no matter whether they 
face gains or losses. 
 
For the general cases of 1<α  or 1>λ , we have to numerically solve the 
price-dividend function ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and age-1 investors' stock demand function 
( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,1H . The basic methodology is as follows: starting from an initial conjecture 
of ( ) ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,0f  and ( ) ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,01H , solve ( ) ( )tSf 1  and ( ) ( )tSH 11  on a grid of tS  from 
equations (6)-(23), and continue this process until ( ) ( ) ( )⋅⋅⋅→⋅⋅⋅ ,,,, ff n  and 
( ) ( ) ( )⋅⋅⋅→⋅⋅⋅ ,,,, 11 HH n . 
 
2.4 Numerical Results and Intuitions 
In this section we solve equations (6) through (23) for the two endogenous 
functions in the law of motion: the price-dividend ratio function, ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f , and the 
aggregate demand function of age-1 investors, ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,1H . We then use 
simulations to show that the two components of prospect theory, diminishing 
sensitivity and loss aversion, make exactly opposite predictions regarding 
individual trading behavior, return predictability, and the correlation between 
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returns and volume. Specifically, Subsection 2.4.2 demonstrates that 
diminishing sensitivity drives a disposition effect, which in turn leads to 
momentum in the cross-section of stock returns and a positive correlation 
between returns and volume. Subsection 2.4.3 shows, on the other hand, that 
loss aversion predicts a reversed disposition effect and reversal in the cross-
section of stock returns, as well as a negative correlation between returns and 
volume. Subsection 2.4.4 conducts further quantitative analysis to examine 
how successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum, and 
suggests testable empirical predictions. 
 
2.4.1 Calibrating Technology Parameters 
There are five exogenous parameters in our model: two preference 
parameters (λ  andα ) and three technology parameters ( Hθ  , Lθ  and fR ). 
Since we are interested in the implications of preferences, we allow the 
preference parameters to vary over a certain range. But we calibrate the 
technology parameters as follows. We take one period to be one year, and 
thus set the net risk-free rate to 86.31=−fR  percent, a choice adopted by 
Barberis and Huang (2001). Since the disposition effect refers to the behavior 
of individual stocks, we choose dividend parameters to match the mean and 
standard deviation of the dividend growth rate of a typical individual stock. 
Barberis and Huang (2001) estimate the moments of individual stock dividend 
growth using the COMPUSTAT database, and based on their results, we set 
28.1=Hθ  and 76.0=Lθ , such that the mean and volatility of the net growth 
rate of the dividend are %24.2  and %97.25 , respectively. Table 2.1 
summarizes our choice of technology parameters. 
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2.4.2 Implications of Diminishing Sensitivity  
We obtain the implications of diminishing sensitivity through comparative static 
analysis with respect to parameterλ , which governs the curvature of the value 
function. To ensure that our results are completely driven by the 
concavity/convexity component of prospect theory, in this subsection we also 
set parameterλ  at 1 to remove the loss aversion feature of the preference. 
Table 2.2 presents the main results for a range of values of α : 2.0 , 5.0 , 88.0  
and 1. In particular, when 1=α , the investor is risk neutral, which provides a 
benchmark for highlighting the fact that our results stem from prospect theory 
preferences. The value of 88.0  is the number estimated by Tversky and 
Kehneman (1992). Our results demonstrate that, in a general equilibrium 
setting, diminishing sensitivity drives the disposition effect, the momentum 
effect and the comovement between returns and volume. We also find that 
diminishing sensitivity alone, in the absence of loss aversion, raises equity 
premiums. 
 
2.4.2.1 Disposition Effects 
We use the following measure to test whether our model can generate a 
disposition effect, 
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Table 2.1   Technology Parameter Values 
 
We take one period to be one year. Dividend parameters ( Hθ  and Lθ ) are 
calibrated to generate a dividend growth rate with the mean and standard 
deviation equal to %24.2  and %97.25 , respectively. 
 
Parameter Values
Risk-free rate
Rf 1.0386
Dividend parameters
H 1.2821
L 0.7628  
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Table 2.2   Implications of Diminishing Sensitivity 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect =  , and if 1>DispEffect , then a 
disposition effect exists. ( ) ( )LREHREMomEffect tttt θθθθ =−== ++ || 11 . WML  is the 
simulated average momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. If 
0>MomEffect  and 0>WML , then a momentum effect exists. ( )121 ,tSHtQ −=  is 
the turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values 
are fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1=Hθ , 7628.0=Lθ  and 0386.1=fR . 
The preference parameter 1≥λ  determines loss aversion; in this table, we 
deliberately set λ  as 1 , so that the investor is not averse to loss. 
 
  0.2   0.5   0.88   1
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.49 0.56 0.53 0.50
PLR 0.29 0.36 0.47 0.50
DispEffect 1.73 1.56 1.12 1.00
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.1295 1.0934 1.0516 1.0386
ERt1 | t  L  1.0158 1.0439 1.0410 1.0386
MomEffect 11.37% 4.95% 1.06% 0.00%
WML 10.91% 4.67% 1.06% 0.00%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.52 0.83 0.92 0.00
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  3.43% 3.01% 0.82% 0.00%
EH1St  0.43 0.46 0.49 0.50  
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If 1>DispEffect , then we conclude that investors exhibit the disposition effect 
in our model. The numerator of DispEffect  is the average fraction of age-2-1 
investors who close their positions facing a capital gain. This term is the 
theoretical analog to Odean's (1998) proportion of gains realized (PGR), i.e., 
the number of gains that are realized as a fraction of the total number of gains 
that could have been realized. Similarly, the denominator of DispEffect  is the 
average fraction of age-2-1 investors who realize losses and corresponds to 
Odean's proportion of losses realized (PLR). Odean uses the difference 
between PGR and PLR to measure the disposition effect. In equation (24), we 
instead adopt a ratio of PGR to PLR to remove the effect of equity premiums 
on the magnitudes of PGR or PLR.32 
 
To obtain the two conditional moments in equation (24), we simulate a long 
time series { }∞=1ttθ  of 500,000 independent draws from the distribution 
described in equation (1). Then we use the solved functions ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,f  and ( )⋅⋅⋅ ,,1H  
to calculate tf  and 1+tz  and get the time series { }∞=1ttS . When we do this, we 
also compute ( ){ }∞=12 1, ttSH  and { }∞=→ 101 ttG  along the way, using equations (H21) 
and (G10). We compute sample moments from these simulated data to serve 
as approximations of population moments. 
 
Table 2.2 reports the results for different values of α . The case of 1=α  
corresponds to a linear value function, when investors don't exhibit a 
disposition effect, so that 1=DispEffect . As we gradually decrease α  from 1 
                                                 
32Brown et al. (2006) also use the ratio of PGR to PLR to measure the 
disposition effect when examining Australian stock trading data. 
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to 2.0 , the value function becomes more curved along the way, and the value 
of DispEffect  increases monotonically from 1 to 73.1 , giving rise to an even 
stronger disposition effect. The mechanism behind this result is exactly 
Odean's (1998) intuition: risk aversion (risk-seeking) for gains (losses) causes 
an age-2-1 investor more (less) likely to sell the stock. 
 
Figure 2.2 graphs this intuition for the case of 5.0=α . Here, from the 
simulated time series of state vectors, we randomly choose a realization of 
( ) ( )50.0,01.20,1 =− tt zf , and then graph the possible gains/losses together with 
the associated prospect theory utilities faced by an age-2-1 investor in periods 
t  and 1+t .33 The period t  gains/losses as well as prospect theory utilities 
from liquidating the stock [i.e., ( )( )tt GvG 0101 , →→ ] are marked with dots, while the 
period 1+t  gains/losses and prospect theory utilities from keeping the stock 
[i.e., ( )( )111111 , +→+→ tt GvG ] are marked with circles. 
 
Good dividend news ( Ht θθ = ) will bring an age-2-1 investor to the point of 
choosing a sure medium gain ( 5.6 , Point H in the figure) versus a gamble 
which offers either a smaller gain ( 18.1 , Point HL) or a larger gain ( 45.14 , Point 
HH) with some probabilities. Whether an age-2-1 investor will continue to hold 
the stock depends on his one-period-ahead dividend forecast. In this example, 
those age-2-1 investors who believe, with probability higher than 54.0  (i.e., 
( ) ( )( ) ( )18.145.14 18.15.6 vv vv −− ), that the next period dividend growth rate ( 1+tθ ) will take a high 
value ( Hθ ) will continue to hold the risky stock. 
 
                                                 
33The result is robust to the choice of ( )tt zf ,1− . 
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Figure 2.2 Diminishing Sensitivity Drives the Disposition Effect 
 
Figure 2.2 graphs the possible capital gains/losses, as well as prospect theory 
utilities, faced by an age-2-1 investor. If this investor liquidates his stock, his 
capital gains/losses, together with his prospect theory utilities, are marked with 
dots; if he keeps the stock, then his possible future capital gains/losses and 
his prospect theory utilities are marked with circles. The two endogenous state 
variables are  01.201 =−tf   and  50.0=tz  . The parameter values are  
2821.1=Hθ  ,  7628.0=Lθ  ,  0386.1=fR  ,  1=λ   and  5.0=α  . 
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What will happen if the dividend news is negative ( Lt θθ = ) at period t ? If an 
age-2-1 investor sells the stock, he experiences a sure loss ( 23.4− , Point L); if 
he continues to hold the stock, he faces the gamble of a smaller loss (−0.28 , 
Point LH) or an even larger loss ( 18.8− , Point LL). In this example, those age-
2-1 investors who believe that Ht θθ =+1  with probability lower than 35.0  (i.e., 
( ) ( )( ) ( )18.828.0 18.823.4 −−− −−− vv vv ), will liquidate their stocks. Note that the cutoff probability in the 
low dividend realization case, 35.0 , is lower than that in the high dividend 
realization, 54.0 . This precisely supports the informal argument, which relies 
on prospect theory to explain the disposition effect: the investor's belief about 
expected return must fall further to motivate the sale of a stock that has 
already declined than one that has appreciated (Odean, 1998, p. 1777). 
 
Table 2.2 suggests that PGR and PLR respond to a change in α  differently: 
as α  falls from 1 to 2.0 , PGR first goes up from 50.0  to 56.0  and then goes 
down to 49.0 , while PLR continuously decreases from 50.0  to 29.0 . There are 
two forces at work here. As α  becomes smaller, the value function is more 
concave for gains and more convex for losses, causing the investor to be 
more likely to sell winners and hold losers, and hence generating a higher 
PGR and a lower PLR. However, as α  falls, the expected stock return rises 
and the stock becomes more attractive to the investor, which will be discussed 
shortly; this decreases the investor's propensity to sell the stock no matter 
whether he is facing gains or losses, and therefore leads to both a lower PGR 
and a lower PLR. In sum, as α  decreases, both forces tend to lower PLR, 
while the first force tends to raise PGR and the second to lower PGR. As α  
falls slightly below 1, the first force dominates, and we observe a higher PGR, 
but once α  falls sufficiently, the second force catches up and we obtain a 
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lower PGR. 
 
2.4.2.2 Momentum  
Following Barberis et al. (1998), who also rely on a model with one risky asset 
to explain the cross-section of stock returns, we measure momentum as  
 
( ) ( ),|| 11 LttHtt REREMomEffect θθθθ =−== ++  (25) 
 
i.e., the difference in the expected return following a positive shock and 
following a negative shock. If 0>MomEffect , then we claim that there is 
momentum in the stock returns. The two moments in equation (25) are 
obtained using simulations. The results are also reported in Table 2.2. Since 
0>MomEffect  for 1<α , our model shows that the concavity/convexity feature 
of prospect theory preferences generates momentum in stock returns. 
Moreover, the momentum effect becomes stronger as we increase the 
curvature of the value function, i.e., decrease the value of α . For example, 
MomEffect  increases from %06.1  to %37.11  as α  decreases from 88.0  to 2.0 . 
The underlying reason for this momentum effect is simple. Following a positive 
shock ( Ht θθ = ), stock prices will rise, moving age-2-1 investors into their 
capital gain domain. Due to the concavity of the value function of prospect 
theory in the gain region, age-2-1 investors tend to close their stock positions, 
which depresses the stock price, generating higher subsequent returns. On 
the other hand, a negative shock ( Lt θθ = ) will decrease the stock price, driving 
age-2-1 investors into their capital loss domain. Convexity in the region of 
losses means that they are less likely to sell the stock absent a price premium; 
the stock price is therefore initially inflated, generating lower subsequent 
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returns. 
 
We also conduct a cross-section analysis and replicate the momentum effect 
in the empirical literature (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Liu and Zhang, 
2008). As discussed in the end of Section 2.2, we can extend our model to an 
economy with N  stocks. We simulate dividend data on 000,2=N  
independent stocks over 000,10=T  time periods, and then compute the 
resulting equilibrium return sequence for each stock. We create the winners-
minus-losers zero cost portfolios as follows. In each period, we sort stocks into 
two equal-sized groups based on their last period returns and record the 
equal-weighted return of each group over the next period; in particular, winnertR  
( losertR ) is the return on the portfolio containing stocks with better (worse) 
performance. Repeating this each period produces long time series of returns 
on the winner and loser portfolios, namely { }TtwinnertR 1=  and { }TtlosertR 1= . Our second 
measure of momentum is the difference in the average returns on these two 
portfolios: 
 
( ).1 1 losertwinnertTt RRTWML −∑= =    (26) 
 
Table 2.2 also reports the results for this alternative measure. We find that the 
two measures for momentum are almost identical, so that they behave in 
precisely the same way: both MomEffect  and WML are greater than 0  for 
1<α , and both decrease with α .  
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2.4.2.3 Turnover 
Empirical studies show that there is more trading in rising markets than in 
falling markets (Statman et al., 2006; Griffin et al., 2007). In our model, the 
age-2-1 investors have a much greater propensity to sell stocks facing good 
news ( Ht θθ = ) than facing bad news ( Lt θθ = ). This will contribute to a positive 
correlation between turnover and stock returns. Let ( )1,1 2 tt SHQ −=  be the 
turnover or aggregate selling in period t . In Table 2.2, we report the simulated 
correlations between stock returns and turnovers, ( )tt QRCorr , . Indeed, we 
have ( ) 0, >tt QRCorr  so long as 1<α . This demonstrates that diminishing 
sensitivity drives a positive correlation between returns and volume. 
 
As we gradually decrease α  from 88.0  to 2.0 , ( )tt QRCorr ,  decreases from 
92.0  to 52.0 . The stock distributions ( tz ) and price-dividend ratios ( 1−tf ) 
combine to contribute to this relationship, but they work in different ways when 
α  varies. When α  is close to 1, both tz  and 1−tf  are almost constant at their 
values in the benchmark economy (i.e., 1=α ), so that the state of the 
economy is captured only by dividend growth rates ( tθ ). Since the disposition 
effect causes returns and turnovers to vary with tθ  in the same direction, there 
is an almost perfect correlation between returns and volume. On the other 
hand, as α  gets close to 0 , both tz  and 1−tf  will change over time and 
influence trading behavior. However, returns and volumes respond to the 
variation in tz  and 1−tf  in opposite ways. For example, a larger tz  implies that 
more stocks are held by age-2-1 investors and fewer by age-3 investors; after 
trading, all age-3 investors will have to close their positions, even though this 
is not the case for age-2-1 investors; as a result, stock selling (i.e., trading 
volumes tQ ) will decrease with tz , but at the same time, the decreasing selling 
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pressure causes stock returns tR  to rise with tz . The variation in tz  and 1−tf  
will therefore attenuate the positive correlation between returns and volume 
generated by tθ . As a result, for 10 <<α , a lower α  implies a lower 
( )tt QRCorr , . 
 
2.4.2.4 Equity Premiums 
Our model also demonstrates that the S-shaped value function of prospect 
theory can help explain the equity premium puzzle. Table 2.2 reports the 
simulated equity premiums, ( )ft RRE − , as well as average stock purchases by 
young people, ( )[ ]tSHE 1 . As α  gets smaller, the curvature of the value 
function becomes larger, and equity premiums become higher. Note that the 
positive equity premium is not due to loss aversion, since we have set 1=λ  in 
this section. Notably, a low α  is also associated with a low ( )[ ]tSHE 1 , 
suggesting that equity premiums are driven by the behavior of young people. 
The young investor makes investment decisions by comparing the expected 
utility from buying the stock to that from not buying. These utility levels are 
determined by his belief tiq ,  (current belief about 1+tθ ), and by how he 
evaluates his future reactions to 1, +tiq  (future belief about 2+tθ ). Those who are 
extremely optimistic (pessimistic), i.e., those with extremely high (low) values 
of tiq , , always buy (not buy) the stock. It is those who have intermediate 
values of tiq ,  that care more about their future reactions to 1, +tiq . It turns out 
that only high realizations of 1, +tiq  will matter, because there will be no extra 
benefit of holding a stock from middle-aged till old when 1, +tiq  is low. Only 
when 1, +tiq  is high will holding the stock from middle-aged till old bring an extra 
benefit: a young investor who buys a stock now will enjoy a further gain if he 
keeps the stock, and one who doesn't buy now will enjoy a new gain if he buys 
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the stock when middle-aged. 
 
How does this extra gain associated with high 1, +tiq  relate to the current 
purchasing decision and the value function's curvature α ? Not buying now 
means that when evaluating this gain, the young investor will stay in the origin 
of the value function, where the marginal utility is the highest; the more curved 
the value function, the higher is this marginal utility. In contrast, if he buys now, 
he will be pushed away from the origin because this gain has to be appended 
to an existing gain or loss, namely the one generated by holding the stock 
from young until middle-aged. In this case, the marginal utility is much smaller 
compared to that in the origin; the more curved the value function, the smaller 
is this marginal utility. 
 
To summarize, the higher the curvature of the value function, the less a young 
investor will value the potential gain associated with high realizations of 1, +tiq , 
and the less they want to buy now, thereby depressing stock prices and 
raising equity premiums. 
 
2.4.3 Implications of Loss Aversion 
To obtain the implications of loss aversion, we conduct comparative static 
analysis with respect to the parameter λ . In Table 2.3, we present the results 
for a variety of values of :λ  1, 25.2 , 3  and 4 . In particular, 1=λ  is still our 
benchmark economy when the investor is risk neutral. The value of =λ  25.2  
is the number estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). To guarantee that 
our results are solely due to the loss aversion component, we always set 
parameter 1=α  to remove the curvature feature of the prospect theory value 
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function. Table 2.3 demonstrates that loss aversion drives a reversed 
disposition effect and reversal in the cross-section of stock returns, as well as 
a negative correlation between returns and volume. In addition, Table 2.3 
produces a well-known result in the asset pricing literature: loss aversion can 
raise equity premiums, such as Benartzi and Thaler (1995) and Barberis et al. 
(2001). 
 
2.4.3.1 Reversed Disposition Effects 
Again, when investors are risk neutral, i.e., when 1=λ , they don't exhibit a 
disposition effect, so that 1=DispEffect . When investors are loss averse, i.e., 
when 1>λ , we obtain a reversed disposition effect, since 1<DispEffect . 
Moreover, as we gradually increase λ  from 1 to 4 , investors become more 
loss averse, and the value of DispEffect  decreases monotonically from 1 
to 83.0 , giving rise to an even stronger reversed disposition effect. 
 
What's the intuition behind this result? The mechanism works through a 
combination of two forces: one is the kink at the origin of the value function, 
which is a direct implication of loss aversion; the other is the positive equity 
premium, which is an indirect equilibrium implication of loss aversion 
preferences. Roughly speaking, when investors are close to (far from) the kink, 
they are reluctant (inclined) to take risk, and want to sell (keep) the stock; 
when the average stock returns are higher than the risk free rate, bad (good) 
dividend news will bring investors relatively close to (far from) the kink, so that 
they are more (less) likely to liquidate the stock. 
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Table 2.3   Implications of Loss Aversion 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect = , and if 1<DispEffect , then a reversed 
disposition effect exists. ( ) ( )LREHREMomEffect tttt θθθθ =−== ++ || 11 . WML  is the 
simulated average momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. If 
0<MomEffect  and 0<WML , then there is reversal in the cross-section of stock 
returns.  Qt 1 −H2St , 1  is the turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . 
Technology parameter values are fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1=Hθ , 
7628.0=Lθ   and 0386.1=fR . Preference parameter α controls the curvature of 
the value function. In this table, we deliberately set α  to be1 , so that the value 
function is piecewise linear. 
 
  1   2.25   3   4
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.50 0.39 0.35 0.31
PLR 0.50 0.41 0.39 0.38
DispEffect 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.83
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.0386 1.1000 1.1255 1.1519
ERt1 | t  L  1.0386 1.1006 1.1311 1.1632
MomEffect 0.00% −0.06% −0.56% −1.13%
WML 0.00% −0.23% −0.85% −1.48%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.00 −0.70 −0.91 −0.94
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  0.00% 6.17% 8.97% 11.89%
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Figure 2.3 conducts an exercise to confirm this intuition for the case of 4=λ . 
Now that we assumed 1=α  to remove the curvature, the investor's value 
function becomes piecewise linear with a kink at the origin due to loss 
aversion. Similar to the exercise in Figure 2.2, we randomly choose a 
realization of ( )tt zf ,1− , which is ( )48.0,75.7  in this case, from the simulated time 
series of state vectors. We then graph an age-2-1 investor's period t  
gains/losses as well as prospect theory utilities from liquidating the stock [i.e. 
( )( )tt GvG 0101 , →→ ] with dots, and the period 1+t  gains/losses and prospect theory 
utilities from keeping the stock [i.e. ( )( )111111 , +→+→ tt GvG ] with circles. 
 
Good dividend news ( Ht θθ = ) will bring the investor to Point H. Bad dividend 
news ( Lt θθ = ) will bring him to Point L, which is closer to the kink relative to 
Point H. That is, the investor is more cautious in holding stocks at Point L than 
at Point H. Specifically, at Point H, if the investor liquidates the stock, he will 
lock in a medium gain of 29.3 ; if he keeps the stock, when he becomes old he 
will arrive either at Point HH, enjoying a large gain of 35.7 , or at Point HL, 
enjoying a small gain of 46.1 . Since both Point HH and Point HL are in the 
gain domain, the investor's behavior at Point H can be described as risk 
neutral. Of course, whether an age-2-1 investor will indeed continue to hold 
the stock depends on his one-period-ahead dividend forecast. In this example, 
those age-2-1 investors who believe that Ht θθ =+1  with probability higher than 
31.0  (i.e., ( ) ( )( ) ( )46.135.7 46.129.3 vv vv −− ), will continue to hold the risky stock. 
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Figure 2.3 Loss Aversion Drives the Reversed Disposition Effect 
 
Figure 2.3 graphs the possible capital gains/losses, as well as prospect theory 
utilities, faced by an age-2-1 investor. If this investor liquidates his stock, his 
capital gains/losses, together with his prospect theory utilities, are marked with 
dots; if he keeps the stock, then his possible future capital gains/losses and 
his prospect theory utilities are marked with circles. The two endogenous state 
variables are 75.71 =−tf  and 48.0=tz . The parameter values 
are 2821.1=Hθ , 7628.0=Lθ , 0386.1=fR , 4=λ  and 1=α . 
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At Point L, if the investor sells the stock, he will realize a loss of 48.1 . If he 
keeps the stock, then he will arrive either at Point LH, enjoying a small gain of 
01.1 , or at Point LL, facing a large loss of 52.2 . Because Point LH and Point 
LL straddle over the kink, the investor is reluctant to take a risk at Point L 
relative to Point H, at which point his behavior resembles risk neutrality. In this 
example, those age-2-1 investors who believe that Ht θθ =+1  with probability 
lower than 37.0  (i.e., ( ) ( )( ) ( )52.201.1 52.248.1 −− −−− vv vv ), will liquidate their stocks. 
 
In Table 2.3, we also observe that both PGR and PLR decrease with λ . This 
is because loss aversion raises equity premiums, making the investor less 
likely to sell stocks, whether facing good news or bad news. We also observe 
PGR decreases at a faster rate than PLR due to the reversed disposition 
effect. 
 
2.4.3.2 Reversal 
As discussed above, when 1=λ , the investor is risk neutral, and there is no 
momentum effect in the cross-section of stock returns, because both 
measures capturing momentum, MomEffect  and WML , are equal to zero. But 
as long as 1>λ , i.e., as long as the investor is loss averse, we obtain reversal 
in the cross-section of stock returns, since both MomEffect  and WML  are 
negative. In particular, as we increase λ  from 1 to 4 , reversal gets stronger. 
This result demonstrates that the loss aversion feature of prospect theory has 
implications for return predictability. 
 
The underlying reason for this result is similar to Grinblatt and Han's (2005). 
For example, facing good dividend news, age-2-1 investors are more likely to 
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hold stocks according to the reversed disposition effect. This generates extra 
buying pressure, which will inflate stock prices and lead to lower stock returns 
later. Similarly, facing bad dividend news, those investors are likely to sell 
stocks and depress prices, generating higher subsequent returns. 
 
2.4.3.3 Turnover 
Table 2.3 also shows that loss aversion can generate a negative correlation 
between returns and volumes: ( ) 0, <tt QRCorr  as long as 1>λ . This result is 
also driven by trading by age-2-1 investors, who, due to the reversed 
disposition effect, have a much greater propensity to sell stocks in down 
markets ( Lt θθ = ) than in up markets ( Ht θθ = ), contributing to a negative 
correlation between turnover and stock returns. 
 
As we gradually increase λ  from 1 to 4 , ( )tt QRCorr ,  monotonically decreases 
from 0  to 94.0− . This pattern is different from the relationship between 
( )tt QRCorr ,  and α  in Table 2.2 and can be understood as follows. In Table 
2.2, when we vary α  while fixing λ , dividend news tθ  contributes to a positive 
( )tt QRCorr ,  via the disposition effect, while the other endogenous state 
variables, stock distributions ( tz ) and price-dividend ratios ( 1−tf ), tend to 
generate a negative ( )tt QRCorr , . These two forces are counteracting. On the 
other hand, in Table 2.3, when we vary λ  and fix α , dividend news tθ  also 
leads to a negative ( )tt QRCorr ,  through the reversed disposition effect, which 
strengthens the impact of the two endogenous state variables on ( )tt QRCorr , . 
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2.4.3.4 Equity Premiums 
Table 2.3 also reproduces the well-known result that loss aversion can raise 
equity premiums (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler,1995; Barberis et al.,2001). As we 
increase λ  from 1 to 4 , equity premiums rise from 0  to %12 . This result is 
intuitive: loss aversion means that investors are more sensitive to losses than 
to gains, and since stocks often perform poorly and investors often face losses, 
a large premium is required to convince them to hold stocks. The asset pricing 
literature studying loss aversion has focused primarily on its implications for 
the equity premium, that is, the average level of stock returns. Our model, on 
the other hand, shows that loss aversion can lead to reversal in the cross-
section of stock returns, suggesting, in turn, that loss aversion may also be a 
useful ingredient for equilibrium models trying to understand return 
predictability. 
 
2.4.4 Quantitative Analysis and Testable Predictions  
In this Subsection, we conduct further quantitative analysis to examine how 
successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum and derive 
testable empirical predictions which are either unique to our model or 
consistent with the existing empirical studies. 
 
2.3.4.1 Quantitative Analysis: How Successful is Prospect Theory? 
So far, we have shown that there are two counteracting forces in equilibrium --
- diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion --- driving the disposition effect, the 
momentum effect and the correlation between returns and volumes. In order to 
understand how successful prospect theory is in explaining price momentum, 
we set preference parameters at certain empirical values and examine which 
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force will dominate, and to what extent. 
 
What are the empirical values of preference parameters, λ  and α ? The 
existing evidence concerning parameter λ  is relatively rich and remarkably 
consistent: both experimental data (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1991, 1992; Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005) and real data (e.g., 
Putler, 1992; Hardie et al., 1993) suggest a number close to 2 . This is true 
even for monkeys (Chen et al., 2006). So in the following analysis, we fix λ  at 
25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). 
 
But there is not much evidence as to the value of α . As far as we know, only 
two studies have estimated this parameter, and the results differ markedly in 
the data sets used. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimate 88.0=α  by 
offering subjects isolated gambles in experimental settings. Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) use a different experimental data set and estimate 52.0=α , but when 
they apply Camerer and Ho's (1994) data, they find 37.0=α . Due to the small 
sample size in the experiments, none of those studies can estimate α  with 
great precision. So our strategy is to report results for all these three possible 
values of α  in Table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4  Quantitative Analysis 
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect =  and ( ) ( )LREHREMomEffect tttt θθθθ =−== ++ || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. ( )121 ,tSHtQ −=  is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values are 
fixed at the values in Table 2.1: 2821.1=Hθ , 7628.0=Lθ  and 0386.1=fR . Loss 
aversion parameter λ is set at 25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992).The empirical values of PGR/PLR and momentum are 
taken from Dhar and Zhu (2006) and Jegagdeesh and Titman (1993), 
respectively. The empirical values of ( )tt QRCorr ,  and ( )ft RRE −  are based on 
AMEX/NYSE data from 1926-2006. 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88 Empirical Value
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.38
PLR 0.18 0.23 0.37 0.17
DispEffect 2.25 1.75 1.10 2.24
(ii) Momentum Effect
ERt1 | t  H  1.1575 1.1431 1.1091 —
ERt1 | t  L  1.0822 1.0927 1.1004 —
MomEffect 7.54% 5.04% 0.87% —
WML 7.20% 4.76% 0.76% 8.60%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.84 0.88 0.91 0.28
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  8.14% 7.94% 6.62% 7.84%
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Table 2.4 also presents the historical values for the disposition effect, the 
momentum effect and the correlation between returns and volumes. Unlike 
Odean (1998), who studies the disposition effect by aggregating across 
investors, Dhar and Zhu (2006) examine the disposition effect at the level of 
the individual. They report, in their Table 2.2, that the means of PGR and PLR 
for all individuals are 38.0  and 17.0 , respectively. We adopt these numbers as 
the empirical values of PGR and PLR. Regarding the momentum effect, we 
use Jegagdeesh and Titman's (1993) estimate, that is, %60.8 , on an annual 
basis. Using AMEX/NYSE data from 1926-2006 from CRSP, we find that the 
correlation between returns and volumes, ( )tt QRCorr , , and the equity 
premium, ( )ft RRE − , for a typical firm, are 28.0  and %84.7 , respectively.34 
Those historical values help us to evaluate how well our model matches the 
data. Even though, because we are not confident of the actual value of α  
among real investors, this evaluation should be interpreted with caution, our 
quantitative analysis makes a methodological contribution: a general 
equilibrium model, such as the one provided in the present paper, is the only 
way to link prospect theory preference to momentum, thereby explaining how 
much prospect theory preference can contribute to price momentum. 
 
Table 2.4 demonstrates that, for all the three possible values of α , the 
diminishing sensitivity component of prospect theory dominates the loss 
aversion component. In particular, when 37.0=α , our model matches the 
                                                 
34More precisely, we take all stocks in the CRSP database for which at least 
11 consecutive years of return and volume data are recorded, compute the 
correlation between real returns and volume as well as the mean returns in 
excess of the 30-day T-bill rate for each, and then calculate the medians. 
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historical data well, except for the dimension of the correlation between returns 
and volumes. To be specific, for 37.0=α , our model predicts that 
25.2=DispEffect , %20.7=WML  and ( ) %14.8=− ft RRE , while the historical 
counterparts for these variables are 24.2 , %60.8  and %84.7 , respectively. The 
model predicts too high a correlation between returns and volumes, i.e., 
( ) 84.0, =tt QRCorr , but the empirical value is 28.0 . 
 
2.4.4.2 Testable Predictions 
One testable prediction emerges from Table 2.4, which suggests that prospect 
theory simultaneously predicts momentum and a positive correlation between 
returns and volumes. So we expect the momentum effect to be stronger 
among those stocks whose returns are positively correlated with their own 
trading volumes.35 This empirical prediction is unique to our mechanism and is 
easy to test. We can rely on this prediction to differentiate our story from other 
explanations of price momentum, such as the belief-based models proposed 
by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) or Hong and Stein (1999). Note 
that our prediction is different from that of Lee and Swaminathan (2000), who 
show that price momentum is more pronounced among those stocks with 
higher levels of trading volumes, while our predictions relates momentum to 
the sensitivity of returns to volumes. 
 
Besides the above new prediction, our model also makes certain predictions 
which are consistent with the existing studies. For example, we do not expect 
                                                 
35Note that we don't claim that momentum profits are monotonically increasing 
in  CorrRt,Qt   . Actually, Table 4 suggests that the opposite is true. 
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prospect theory utility to be equally important for all investors, expecting it to 
matter more for individual investors than for institutional investors. Indeed, 
some empirical studies find that mutual fund managers are less prone to the 
disposition effect than individual investors: the difference between PGR and 
PLR is %3  for managers, and %5  for retail investors (c.f. Shefrin, 2008). Since 
our results on momentum are completely driven by prospect theory, one 
prediction of our model is that a stronger momentum effect will exist among 
stocks with greater individual investor ownership. Hur et al. (2008) test 
precisely this prediction with a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks 
between 1981 and 2005 and find strong evidence for this hypothesis. Further 
evidence comes from Hong et al. (2000) and Fama and French (2008), who 
find that the profitability of momentum strategies declines sharply with market 
capitalization; since small firms are traded more heavily by individuals, this 
finding is consistent with our prediction. 
 
Our model can also relate momentum to the volatility of cash flow. Table 2.5 
examines the effect of varying the volatility of the dividend growth rate. For a 
binary distribution given by equation (1), the dividend growth rate has a mean 
equal to ( ) 21 LHtE θθθ ++ = , and a volatility equal to ( ) 21 LHt θθθσ −+ = . In Table 2.5, we 
maintain ( ) 11 −+tE θ  at %24.2  and change ( )1+tθσ  from %21  to %26  to %31 .36 
The preference parameters are set at 52.0=α  and 25.2=λ . Table 2.5 
suggests that increasing ( )1+tθσ  generates stronger momentum effects and  
 
                                                 
36Barberis and Huang (2001) use COMPUSTAT data to estimate the 
dispersion in firm-level dividend growth volatilities to be  5   percent. So, we 
choose  5%  as a step. 
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Table 2.5   Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t Dividend Growth Rate Volatility   t1   
 
PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and proportion of 
losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect =  and ( ) ( )LREHREMomEffect tttt θθθθ =−== ++ || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. ( )121 ,tSHtQ −=  is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . The risk-free rate is set at 
0386.1=fR . The preference parameters are 52.0=α  and 25.2=λ . 
 
L  0.81586
H  1.2289
L  0.7628
H  1.2821
L  0.70865
H  1.3362
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.41 0.41 0.41
PLR 0.24 0.23 0.23
DispEffect 1.71 1.75 1.79
(ii) Momentum Effect
MomEffect 3.83% 5.04% 6.28%
WML 3.62% 4.76% 5.94%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.88 0.88 0.88
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  6.13% 7.94% 9.96%
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higher equity premiums. Since a higher ( )1+tθσ  is also associated with a higher 
return volatility, the momentum effect is expected to be stronger among stocks 
both with higher dividend volatility and with higher return volatility. This 
observation is in fact consistent with Zhang's (2006) finding that momentum 
profits are higher among firms with higher cash flow volatility or return volatility. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
In this paper, we propose a general equilibrium model to study the implications 
of prospect theory for individual trading, security prices and trading volume. 
We show that, in a general equilibrium setting, different components of 
prospect theory make very different predictions. The diminishing sensitivity 
component drives a disposition effect, which in turn leads to momentum in the 
cross-section of stock returns and a positive correlation between returns and 
volumes. On the other hand, the loss aversion component predicts exactly the 
opposite, namely a reversed disposition effect and reversal in the cross-
section of stock returns, as well as a negative correlation between returns and 
volume. In a calibrated economy, when prospect theory preference 
parameters are set at the values estimated by the previous studies, our model 
can generate price momentum of up to %7  on an annual basis. One testable 
empirical prediction unique to our model is that the momentum strategy is 
most profitable, all else equal, among stocks whose returns are positively 
correlated with their trading volumes. 
 
 
  113
REFERENCES 
 
Admati, Anat, and Paul Pfleiderer. 1988. A Theory of Intraday Patterns: 
Volume and Price Variability. Review of Financial Studies 1(1): 3--40. 
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2001. Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, 
and Individual Stock Returns. Journal of Finance, 56(4): 1247-1292. 
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2007. The Loss Aversion / Narrow 
Framing Approach to the Equity Premium Puzzle. In Handbook of 
Investments: Equity Risk Premium, ed. Rajnish Mehra, 199-236. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier Academic Press. 
Barberis, Nicholas, and Ming Huang. 2008. Stocks as Lotteries: The 
Implications of Probability Weighting for Security Prices. American 
Economic Review, 98(5): 2066--2100. 
Barberis, Nicholas, Ming Huang, and Tano Santos. 2001. Prospect Theory 
and Asset Prices. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1): 1-53. 
Barberis, Nicholas, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1998. A Model of 
Investor Sentiment. Journal of Financial Economics, 49(3): 307-343. 
Barberis, Nicholas, and Richard Thaler. 2003. A Survey of Behavioral Finance. 
In Handbook of the Economics of Finance, ed. George Constantinides, 
Milton Harris and René Stulz, 1053-1128. Amsterdam: Elsevier Academic 
Press. 
Barberis, Nicholas and Wei Xiong. 2008. Realization Utility. 
http://badger.som.yale.edu/faculty/ncb25/rg29b.pdf. 
Barberis, Nicholas and Wei Xiong. 2009. What Drives the Disposition Effect? 
An Analysis of a Long-standing Preference-based Explanation. Journal of 
Finance, 64(2): 751-784. 
  114
Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard Thaler. 1995. Myopic Loss Aversion and the 
Equity Premium Puzzle. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(1): 73-92. 
Brown, Philip, Nick Chappel, Ray Da Silva Rosa and Terry Walter. 2006. The 
Reach of the Disposition Effect: Large Sample Evidence Across Investor 
Classes. International Review of Finance, 6(1-2): 43-78. 
Camerer, Colin, and Teck-Hua Ho. 1994. Violations of the Betweenness 
Axiom and Nonlinearity in Probability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8(2): 
167--196. 
Chen, Keith, Venkat Lakshminarayanan, and Laurie Santos. 2006. How Basic 
Are Behavioral Biases? Evidence from Capuchin Monkey Trading Behavior. 
Journal of Political Economy, 114(3):517-537. 
Coval, Joshua, and Tyler Shumway. 2005. Do Behavioral Biases Affect Prices? 
Journal of Finance, 60(1): 1--34. 
Daniel, Kent, David Hirshleifer, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam. 1998. Investor 
Psychology and Security Market Under- and Overreactions. Journal of 
Finance, 53(6): 1839-1885. 
Dhar, Ravi, and Ning Zhu. 2006. Up Close and Personal: Investor 
Sophistication and the Disposition Effect. Management Science, 52(5): 
726-740. 
Fama, Eugene, and Kenneth French. 2008. Dissecting Anomalies. Journal of 
Finance, 63(4): 1653-1678. 
Feng, Lei, and Mark Seasholes. 2005. Do Investor Sophistication and Trading 
Experience Eliminate Behavioral Biases in Finance Markets? Review of 
Finance, 9(3): 305-351. 
Frazzini, Andrea. 2006. The Disposition Effect and Underreaction to News. 
Journal of Finance, 61(4): 2017-2046. 
  115
Garvey, Ryan, and Anthony Murphy. 2004. Are Professional Traders too Slow 
to Realize Their Losses? Financial Analysts Journal, 60(4): 35--43. 
Genesove, David, and Christopher Mayer. 2001. Loss Aversion and Seller 
Behavior: Evidence from the Housing Market. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 116(4): 1233-1260. 
Gomes, Francisco. 2005. Portfolio Choice and Trading Volume with Loss 
Averse Investors. Journal of Business, 78(2): 675-706. 
Griffin, John, Federico Nardari, and René Stulz. 2007. Do Investors Trade 
More When Stocks Have Performed Well? Evidence from 46 Countries. 
Review of Financial Studies, 20(3): 905-951. 
Grinblatt, Mark, and Bing Han. 2005. Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, 
and the Disposition Effect. Journal of Financial Economics, 78(2): 311-339. 
Grinblatt, Mark, and Matti Keloharju. 2001. What Makes Investors Trade? 
Journal of Finance, 56(2): 589-616. 
Hardie, Bruce, Eric Johnson, and Peter Fader. 1993. Modeling Loss Aversion 
and Reference Dependence Effects on Brand Choice. Marketing Science, 
12(4): 378-394. 
Heath, Chip, Steven Huddart, and Mark Lang. 1999. Psychological Factors 
and Stock Option Exercise. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): 601-
627. 
Hens, Thorsten, and Martin Vlcek. 2006. Does Prospect Theory Explain the 
Disposition Effect? http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/iewwp262.pdf.  
Hong, Harrison, Terence Lim, and Jeremy Stein. 2000. Bad News Travels 
Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, and the Profitability of Momentum 
Strategies. Journal of Finance, 55(1): 265-295. 
Hong, Harrison, and Jeremy Stein. 1999. A Unified Theory of Underreaction, 
  116
Momentum Trading, and Overreaction in Asset Markets. Journal of 
Finance, 54(6):2143-2184. 
Hur, Jungshik, Mahesh Pritamani, and Vivek Sharma. 2008. Momentum and 
the Disposition Effect: The Role of Individual Investors. 
http://www.fma.org/Texas/Papers/Disp_Investor_Momentum_FMA.pdf. 
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman. 1993. Returns to Buying 
Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. 
Journal of Finance, 48(1): 65-91. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler. 1990. Experimental 
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of 
Political Economy, 98(6): 1325-1348. 
Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk. Econometrica, 47(2): 263-291. 
Kaustia, Markku. Forthcoming. Prospect Theory and the Disposition Effect. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 
Kumar, Alok, and Sonya Lim. 2008. How Do Decision Frames Influence the 
Stock Investment Decisions of Individual Investors? Management Science, 
54: 1052-1064. 
Kyle, Albert, Hui Ou-Yang, and Wei Xiong. 2006. Prospect Theory and 
Liquidation Decisions. Journal of Economic Theory, 129(1): 273-285. 
Lee, Charles, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan. 2000. Price Momentum and 
Trading Volume. Journal of Finance, 55(5): 2017-2069. 
Liu, Xiaolei, and Lu Zhang. 2008, Momentum Profits, Factor Pricing, and 
Macroeconomic Risk. Review of Financial Studies, 21(6):2417-2448. 
Locke, Peter, and Steven Mann. 2005. Professional Trade Discipline and 
Trade Disposition. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(2): 401--444. 
  117
Novemsky, Nathan, and Daniel Kahneman. 2005. The Boundaries of Loss 
Aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 42(2): 119-128. 
Odean, Terrance. 1998. Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses? 
Journal of Finance, 53(5): 1775-1798. 
Oehler, Andreas, Klaus Heilmann, Volker Lager, and Michael Oberlander. 
2002. Michael, Dying Out Or Dying Hard? Disposition Investors In Stock 
Markets. http://ssrn.com/abstract=314139. 
Putler, Daniel. 1992. Incorporating Reference Price Effects into a Theory of 
Consumer Choice. Marketing Science, 11(3): 287-309. 
Radner, Roy. 1972. Existence of Equilibrium of Plans, Prices, and Price 
Expectations in a Sequence of Markets. Econometrica, 40(2): 289-303. 
Scherbina, Anna, and Li Jin. 2006. Inheriting Losers. 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/ascherbina/dispositionJune22006.pdf. 
Shapira, Zur, and Itzhak Venezia. 2001. Patterns of Behavior of Professionally 
Managed and Independent Investors. Journal of Banking and Finance, 
25(8): 1573-1587. 
Shefrin, Hersh. 2008. A Behavioral Approach to Asset Pricing. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier Academic Press. 
Shefrin, Hersh, and Meir Statman. 1985. The Disposition to Sell Winners Too 
Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance, 
40(3): 777-790. 
Shumway, Tyler, and Guojun Wu. 2007. Does Disposition Drive Momentum. 
http://www.bauer.uh.edu/wu/Papers/Disposition.pdf. 
Statman, Meir, Steven Thorley, and Keith Vorkink. 2006. Investor 
Overconfidence and Trading Volume. Review of Financial Studies, 19(4):, 
1531-1565. 
  118
Thaler, Richard. 1980. Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1(1): 39-60. 
Thaler, Richard. 1985. Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice. Marketing 
Science, 4(3): 199-214. 
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1991. Loss Aversion and Riskless 
Choice: A Reference Dependent Model. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
106(4): 1039-1061.  
Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
5(4): 297-323. 
Weber, Martin, and Colin Camerer. 1998. The Disposition Effect in Securities 
Trading: An Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 33(2): 167-184. 
Wermers, Russell. 2003. Is Money Really `Smart'? New Evidence on the 
Relation Between Mutual Fund Flows, Manager Behavior, and 
Performance Persistence. http://ssrn.com/abstract=414420. 
Wu, George, and Richard Gonzalez. 1996, Curvature of the Probability 
Weighting Function. Management Science, 42(12): 1676--1690. 
Zhang, Frank. 2006. Information Uncertainty and Stock Returns. Journal of 
Finance, 61(1): 105-137. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  119
CHAPTER 3 
DIVIDEND VOLATILITY and ASSET PRICING37 
 
3.1 Introduction  
How does aggregate dividend volatility affect asset prices?38 Until now the 
literature has largely disregarded this question. To the best of our knowledge, 
the only exception is Longstaff and Piazzesi (2004), who demonstrate that 
volatile and procyclical dividends can raise equity premiums in a 
representative agent model with power utility. However, their model explains 
less than half as large as historical equity premiums, and they don't explore 
whether dividend volatility can help explain other puzzling facts in the 
aggregate stock market, such as return predictability and time-varying Sharpe 
ratios. More importantly, their consumption-based model will inevitably predict 
a high correlation between consumption and stock returns, contradicting our 
observation. In this paper, we turn to a narrow-framing approach to 
comprehensively study the pricing implications of dividend volatility, and find 
that our model can explain key asset markets phenomena. 
 
Narrow-framing means that, when people evaluate risk, they often appear to 
pay attention to narrowly defined gains and losses. This behavior is uncovered 
by experimental work on decision-making under risk (e.g., Kahneman and 
                                                 
37This chapter is based on a joint paper with Liyan Yang.  
 
38Throughout the paper, the term dividend volatility refers to the standard 
deviation of the growth rate of (not the level of) the aggregate dividends paid 
to all stocks. See equation (4) for a technical definition. 
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Lovallo, 1993; Kahneman, 2003). In the context of financial investment, 
narrow-framing states that investors tend to separate their financial wealth 
from their overall wealth, and are inclined to get utility directly from fluctuations 
in the value of their overall portfolio of stocks (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; 
Barberis and Huang, 2001; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001, henceforth 
BHS; Barberis and Huang, 2007).39 Under this assumption, investors may 
perceive aggregate dividend volatility, which drives fluctuations in the value of 
their financial wealth, as a more appropriate metric to represent risk than 
consumption volatility, a commonly used measure in the literature. This 
immediately implies that dividend volatility has significant implications for asset 
prices. 
 
In this paper, we first provide strong empirical evidence that (i) dividend 
volatility exhibits strong persistence, usually called volatility clustering, 
indicating the tendency of a big (small) change today to be followed by a big 
(small) change tomorrow, (ii) dividend volatility has declined dramatically in the 
postwar period.40 The aggregate dividend time series we use is backed out 
from CRSP stock return data.41 This imputed dividend series has accounted 
for stock repurchases as an increasingly significant component of dividends 
                                                 
39In the literature, narrow-framing is sometimes applied to individual stocks 
that investors own (e.g., Barberis and Huang, 2001). For a deep discussion on 
narrow-framing, see Barberis and Huang (2007). 
 
40Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2008) also mention that the volatility of 
dividend growth has declined since 1990s. But their model assumes that this 
decline affects stock prices through consumption. 
 
41This constructed dividend index is identical to Campbell (2000). The detailed 
data construction is given in the appendix. 
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since 1980. One may argue that the declining trend in dividend volatility is 
partly due to corporate managers' intention to smooth dividend. Whatever the 
reason is, however, an investor in our theoretical model takes the dividend 
process as exogenously given when making her investment decisions, which 
is a standard assumption in the asset pricing literature. 
 
We further propose a theoretical model in which dividend volatility is persistent 
and investors exhibit loss aversion: they dislike fluctuations in their financial 
wealth; and the more persistent the dividend volatility, the more they dislike 
stocks. Loss aversion is a central feature of the prospect theory of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979), which is based on a variety of experimental evidence and 
has been extensively used in behavioral finance literature (e.g., Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; BHS, 2001). 
 
Our model is able to account for many of the stylized facts of asset prices, 
including the high mean and excess volatility of stock prices, predictability of 
stock returns, time-varying Sharpe ratios, a low and stable risk-free rate, and 
the low correlation between consumption and stock returns. Our model shows, 
moreover, the substantial decline in dividend volatility since the 1950s, signals 
a much more stable investment environment, which loss averse investors 
prefer; they therefore require a much lower return on holding stocks, resulting 
in lower equity premiums. This is consistent with Blanchard (1993), Fama and 
French (2002), and Buranavityawut, Freeman and Freeman (2006), who find 
that ex-ante equity premiums have declined in the past fifty years. 
Dividend volatility plays an essential role in explaining the intuitions of our 
model. As the state variable, it completely determines equilibrium price-
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dividend ratios and helps explain the high mean and excess volatility of stock 
returns. In equilibrium, a rise (drop) in dividend volatility lowers (raises) asset 
prices, and hence price-dividend ratios fluctuate with the dividend volatility 
process, generating excess volatility in market returns. The high volatility of 
returns, in turn, means that stocks often perform poorly, causing loss averse 
investors considerable discomfort and leading to low stock prices or high risk 
premiums. Furthermore, dividend volatility tends to be higher in market 
troughs than in booms, which leads to the countercyclical expected excess 
returns observed in financial markets. 
 
The persistence of dividend volatility leads to the persistence of the price-
dividend ratio, producing predictability in stock returns, where the forecasting 
power increases with the forecast horizon. The conditional mean and 
conditional standard deviation of expected returns are driven differently by 
dividend volatility, hence the Sharpe ratio as a measure of the price of risk 
changes over time. Moreover, the model-generated stock returns correlate 
only weakly with consumption, because stock returns are ultimately driven by 
dividend news, which has a low correlation with consumption news. 
 
Many studies have been devoted to explaining these puzzling facts in the 
literature. Our work is closely related to two prominent approaches,42 but also 
differs in a variety of ways. The first approach, including Campbell and 
                                                 
42Besides the two approaches mentioned here, another line of research relies 
on modifying the market and asset structure (e.g., Constantinides and Duffie, 
1996; Heaton and Lucas, 1996). 
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Cochrane (1999) and BHS (2001), relies on stochastic changing risk aversion, 
whereas the second, including Bansal and Yaron (2004, henceforth BY), relies 
on the changing economic environment. 
 
With respect to the first approach, we share with BHS (2001) the use of loss 
aversion to describe investors' preferences. However, we depart from them in 
two ways: we use loss aversion as the only psychological assumption, and our 
result isn't driven by the changing risk aversion of investors. BHS's result 
depends crucially on another psychological assumption, usually labelled the 
house money effect, which refers to the experimental finding that people are 
more (less) willing to bear risks when they have had prior gains (losses). The 
house effect together with loss aversion generates their model's results. 
In terms of the mechanism, our model is similar to BY (2004) in that we all 
require a persistent component in the underlying processes. However, our 
model specification is less stringent than theirs. In BY's model, it's critical to 
model the growth rates of both consumption and dividends as containing a 
long-run predictable component, as well as containing persistent volatility to 
stand for fluctuating economic uncertainty. In conjunction with Epstein and 
Zin's (1989) preferences, they succeed in explaining the financial market 
phenomena. However, as BY have pointed out, since it's econometrically 
difficult to distinguish an i.i.d. process from a process containing a small 
persistent component, it's rather difficult to justify the forecastable persistent 
component in the consumption and dividend growth rates. In our model, we 
need the persistent component only in the volatility of the dividend growth rate, 
which is supported by strong econometric evidence; we don't rely on the 
persistent component in the growth rates per se, which lacks empirical 
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evidence. The consumption growth rate is still maintained to be a white noise 
process in our model. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides extensive 
econometric evidence to show that (i) dividend volatility is persistent over time 
and (ii) it changes with the business cycle and experiences significant declines 
in the postwar period. Section 3.3 presents the model and characterizes the 
equilibrium asset prices. Section 3.4 calibrates the model and solves the price-
dividend ratios, then analyzes model simulation results. Section 3.5 concludes 
the paper. 
 
3.2. Key Features of Historical Dividend Volatility 
3.2.1 Dividend Volatility Clustering 
In this subsection, we provide evidence that dividend volatility displays the 
property of clustering, which, as we will see more clearly later, plays an 
important role in explaining the high mean, excess volatility, as well as the 
predictability of stock returns. We perform a variety of standard econometrics 
tests: first identify whether volatility clustering in dividend in fact exists and, if 
so, run a unit-root test to check how strong this persistence is. 
 
Volatility clustering, which characterizes the persistence in volatility, has been 
documented as a standard feature of many financial series. For instance, 
Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) show that conditional variance of 
market return fluctuates across time and is very persistent. For high-frequency 
return data, the ARCH literature finds a very high coefficient in the correlation 
of conditional standard deviations of returns. In our model, we consider 
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volatility clustering in the dividend growth rate and examine its impact on 
equilibrium asset prices. Even though our data are at a low-frequency, the 
estimated coefficient is very similar to those found in high-frequncy data. 
Before running the ARCH type tests, we first run two diagnostic tests to see if 
there is volatility clustering in the dividend growth rate, which is constructed 
from the value weighted NYSE/AMEX return data from CRSP. More 
specifically, we use two standard tests in the econometric literature, the Box-
Pierce-Ljung test and ARCH test, to check whether there are strong 
correlations in the second moment of the dividend growth rate. Both tests have 
as the null hypothesis that there's no volatility clustering in the dividend growth 
rate, and under the null, both tests asymptotically follow a Chi square 
distribution. Panel A of Table 3.1 presents the test results. The statistics from 
both tests significantly reject the null hypothesis, indicating strong persistence 
in the volatility of the dividend growth rate. 
 
The preliminary tests make us comfortable using the exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) model to identify the persistent component in dividend volatility. 
We use EAGRCH for two reasons: first, it matches best with our theoretical 
dividend volatility specification in section 3.3; second, it can capture the 
asymmetric behaviors in volatility, i.e., larger (smaller) volatility is associated 
with negative (positive) news. Specifically, we consider the following 
regression: 
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Table 3.1   Dividend Volatility Estimates 
 
Panel A reports the test statistics for Box-Pierce-Ljung test and ARCH test for 
lag=4, 8 and 12 on quarterly dividend growth rate from 1926.Q3 to 2006.Q3. 
Panel B models the dividend growth rate, 1, +tDg , as AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1), 
1,101, ++ ++= tttDtD Zgg σββ , [ ] ttttt ZZEZ 112 112 loglog LAG +−++= −σσ κ , where 
2
tσ  is conditional variance of 1, +tDg , and ( )1,0...1 NdiiZt ∼+ . Panel C reports an 
augmented Dicky-Fuller test on the log of the conditional volatility series 
estimated by an AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1). Panel D models the dividend growth 
rate as a regime-switching process: 11, ++ += tsstD vg tt σμ , ( )1,01 N∼+tv , where 
},{ 21 μμμ ∈ts  and },{ 21 σσσ ∈ts  depend on the underlying state ts , which 
follows a Markov chain characterized by transitional probabilities 11p  and 22p . 
In Panels B and D, the standard errors of the estimated parameters are 
reported in parentheses. ∗∗  and  ∗  mean that the estimates are significantly 
different from zero at  %1  and  %5  levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dividend Volatility Clustering Tests
Lag 4 8 12
Box-Pierce-Ljung Test 32. 57∗∗ 93.29∗∗ 101. 37∗∗
ARCH Test 24. 96∗∗ 66.72∗∗ 73.58∗∗
Panel B: AR(1)-EAGRCH(1,1) Estimation
Parameters ̂0 ̂1 ̂ Ĝ1 Â1 L̂1
Values
0.001 
0. 002∗
0.0618 
0.451∗∗
0.109 
−0.224∗
0.014 
0. 968∗∗
0.077 
0.423∗∗
0.034 
0. 037
Panel C: Augmented Dicky-Fuller Test
Critical Values
Test Statistic 1% 5% 10%
−11.8 −20. 3 −14.0 −11.2
Panel D: Regime-switching Estimation
Parameters ̂1 ̂1 ̂2 ̂2 p̂11 p̂22
Values
0.001 
0. 007∗∗
0.001 
0. 018∗∗
0.013 
−0.013
0.007 
0. 078∗∗
0.007 
0.969∗∗
0.046 
0.797∗∗
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where 1, +tDg  is the dividend growth rate, 
2
tσ  is the conditional variance of 
1, +tDg , and 1110 ,,,, AGκββ  and 1L   are coefficients.43 Panel B of Table 3.1 
reports the estimation result. In addition to this EGARCH specification, we also 
try the specifications in Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005) and get similar 
results not reported here. 
 
The coefficient for dividend volatility is ,968.0ˆ 1 =G   indicating that persistent 
dividend volatility indeed exists, which is consistent with the standard findings 
in the ARCH literature. However, the coefficient that measures the persistence 
in the dividend growth rate per se is much smaller ( 451.0ˆ 1 =β ). In the long-run 
risk literature (e.g., BY, 2004; Bansal, Kiku and Yaron, 2007), it is crucial to 
have the persistence in both the mean and the volatility of the dividend growth 
rate to explain the high equity premium, in other words, both 1Gˆ  and 1βˆ  are 
assumed to be close to one. In contrast, our model requires persistence only 
in the volatility, but not in the mean of the dividend growth rate process. The 
current estimation result shows that the econometric evidence is weak for the 
persistence in the dividend growth rate, but that the persistence in dividend 
volatility is strong, providing strong econometric evidence for our model. 
 
                                                 
43In what follows, we report results based on this AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) 
specification. We also tried AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) and other specifications, and 
the main results remain unchanged. 
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To further confirm that the persistence of dividend volatility is indeed very high, 
we resort to the augmented Dicky-Fuller unit root test by running the following 
regression:44 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) tttt e+Δ++= −− 12110 ˆlogˆlogˆlog σσσ ααα  
 
where tσˆ  is conditional dividend volatility obtained from the EGARCH 
estimation (equation [1]), and 10 ,αα and 2α  are coefficients. Panel C of Table 
3.1 reports the test statistics together with the critical values at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. We can hardly reject the null hypothesis of 11 =α  at the 10% 
critical level, which implies that dividend volatility is indeed very persistent.45 
For comparison, we also run the unit root test in the dividend growth rate, and 
the unreported result strongly rejects the unit root hypothesis at any critical 
level, which is not surprising given that 1βˆ  is only 451.0  in Panel B of Table 3.1. 
 
Given the strong econometric evidence, we believe that dividend volatility 
clustering is an important feature of the actual dividend data. Our theoretical 
model incorporates this feature when we specify the dividend growth rate 
                                                 
44An IGARCH (integrated GARCH) model will be able to nest the EGARCH 
estimation and the unit root estimation. However, we don't use IGARCH for 
two reasons: first, IGARCH is not stationary because it assumes a unit root in 
the volatility process; second, EGARCH fits more with our theoretical dividend 
volatility specification. We dispense with long memory GARCH models for 
similar reasons. 
 
45The persistence of dividend volatility is going to generate important model 
results. Therefore, α  has to be sufficiently high although it need not be close 
to 1.  
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process.46 
 
3.2.2 Time-Varying Dividend Volatility 
In this subsection, we examine the evolution of dividend volatility by asking 
two questions. How does dividend volatility vary with the business cycle? Is 
there any remarkable change in dividend volatility over the years? Since 
dividend volatility is the state variable in our model, the answer to the first 
question will enable us to analyze the procyclical stock prices through the 
model. The answer to the second question can relate our measure of 
macroeconomic risk to the measures in other papers, and provide empirical 
support for our model to explain the dynamics of equity premiums. 
 
To see how dividend volatility varies with the business cycle, Figure 3.1 plots 
dividend volatility, the real GDP growth rate, and the recession periods 
identified using NBER's business cycle chronology. In this figure, dividend 
volatility is the conditional standard deviation estimated from the EGARCH 
model (equation [1]); the real GDP growth rates are obtained from the website 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis and start from the second quarter of 1947; 
and the shaded areas correspond to the economic recession periods 
according to NBER's business cycle chronology. 
 
We see that dividend volatility changes over time, with the highest values 
appearing in the 1930's. Comparing dividend volatility with GDP growth rates, 
                                                 
46That is, we require a high φ  in equation (5). 
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we see roughly a negative relationship: high dividend volatility usually 
coincides with lower GDP growth rates. This pattern makes sense, because 
it's usually the case that more uncertainty is present when the economy is in a 
trough. Further comparing it with NBER identified recessions, we find that 
dividend volatility tends to be very high during most recessions. The evidence 
suggests that dividend volatility evolves in a counter-cyclical way, which can 
potentially generate procyclical stock prices as well as counter-cyclical equity 
premiums and Sharpe ratios. Although this direction is promising, this 
evidence is weak. We thus take a conservative view in next section, assuming 
that the dividend volatility process is uncorrelated with the consumption growth 
process.47 
 
Observing the data through time, Figure 3.1 also shows that dividend volatility 
was relatively high before 1952 and became much smoother thereafter, except 
for a spike around 1989. Therefore, dividend volatility seems to have 
undergone a significant decline in the postwar years, which suggests that 
investors' perceived48 financial risk, as an inseparable part of macroeconomic 
risk, has experienced a significant decline since the 1950s. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47That is we assume ( ) 0, =tt uCov η  in equation (6). 
 
48Here, perceived is used to emphasize the notion that investors treat the 
dividend process as exogenous, although firms tend to smooth dividends in 
reality. 
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Figure 3.1 Dividend Volatility, GDP Growth and Recessions 
 
Figure 3.1 plots quarterly consumption growth rates for period 1947.Q1-
2006.Q3, and conditional dividend volatility for period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. The 
dividend volatility tσ  is estimated from an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) regression. 
The shaded bars indicate the recessions according to NBER's website data. 
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To characterize the decline in dividend volatility more formally, we follow 
Hamilton (1989) to estimate a regime-switching model. The basic idea is to 
model the dividend growth rate as deriving from one of two regimes, a regime 
with a high dividend volatility or one with a low dividend volatility. The 
parameter values in each regime, together with the transitional probability can 
be obtained through maximum likelihood estimation. These parameter 
estimates can then be used to infer which regime the process was in at any 
historical date. Specifically, the dividend growth rate, 1, +tDg , is generated 
according to: 
 
( ),1,0, 111, N∼+= +++ ttsstD vvg tt σμ  
 
where },{ 21 μμμ ∈ts  is the mean, and },{ 21 σσσ ∈ts  is the volatility in state ts  . 
Thus, when 1=ts , the observed dividend growth rate, 1, +tDg , is presumed to 
have been drawn from a ( )11,σμN  distribution, whereas when 2=ts , 1, +tDg , is 
drawn from another distribution ( )22 ,σμN . The state evolves according to a 
Markov process, and we denote the transitional probability of the Markov 
chains 
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The parameter values and their standard deviations are reported in Panel D of 
Table 3.1. The estimated two regimes are characterized as follows: the high-
mean, low-volatility regime has an average growth rate of %65.0  per quarter, 
with a low standard deviation of 018.0 ; the low-mean, high-volatility regime 
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has an average growth rate of %3.1−  per quarter, with a very high standard 
deviation 078.0 . In addition, the high-mean, low-volatility regime seems more 
persistent, because its transitional probability is higher, 969.0ˆ11 =p . 
 
Figure 3.2 plots the smoothed posterior probability of the dividend growth rate 
being in a low-mean, high-volatility state. The probability is very high in prewar 
data, but exhibits sharp declines after the 1950s. In much of the postwar 
period, the posterior probability of being in a high-mean, low-volatility regime is 
close to one. 
 
The reported evidence clearly shows that dividend volatility has been declining 
since 1950s. This is broadly consistent with the findings in Kim, Morley and 
Nelson (2004), who document a similar pattern in stock returns. In Section 
3.4.3.5, we incorporate this finding into our theoretical framework by doing 
comparative statics with respect to the exogenous parameters governing the 
dividend process, and find that the declining dividend volatility helps to explain 
the decreasing equity premiums after WWII. 
 
3.3 The Model 
3.3.1 Setup 
Consider an economy populated with a continuum of identical, infinitely lived, 
narrow-framing and loss averse agents. Two assets are available to trade: a 
risk-free asset in zero net supply, paying a gross interest rate tfR , , and one 
unit of risky asset, paying a gross return 1+tR , between time t  and 1+t . 
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Figure 3.2 Smoothed Probability of a High Volatility Regime and Historical 
Dividend Growth Rate 
 
In Figure 3.2, the dividend growth rate is assumed to be generated from a 
regime switching model. The estimation results in Panel D of Table 1 suggests 
that one regime features a positive mean and a low volatility, while the other 
one has a negative mean and a high volatility. The top panel plots the 
posterior probability of dividend growth being in the high volatility regime given 
the observed data process. The bottom panel plots the dividend growth rate 
for period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. 
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The loss averse investor chooses consumption tC  and risky asset holdings  St   
to maximize the utility function  
 
                        ( ) ,
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The first term in the objective function is the standard utility over consumption, 
where ( )1,0∈ρ  is the time discount factor; 0>γ  measures the curvature of the 
investor's utility over consumption;49 and tC  is the aggregate per capita 
consumption at time t , which is exogenous to the investor. The exogenous 
scalor tC  is introduced to ensure that consumption utility and prospect utility 
are of the same order as aggregate wealth increases over time.50 
 
The second term deserves more attention, as it captures the direct utility the 
investor derives from fluctuations in the value of her financial wealth. 
Depending on the return of the risky asset, her total portfolio excess return 1+tX   
                                                 
49For 1=γ , we replace ( )γγ −− 1/1tC with ( )tClog . 
 
50Another tractable preference specification that incorporates narrow-framing 
but doesn't rely on a scaling to ensure stationarity can be found in Barberis 
and Huang (2007). 
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can be either positive or negative, a positive one indicating a financial gain, 
and a negative one a financial loss. The function ( )1+tXv  describes how she 
feels about her investment performance. Since she is loss averse, the pain 
she receives from financial losses outweighs the happiness from financial 
gains. Therefore, ( )1+tXv  takes different functional form with respect to the 
values of 1+tX : when 1+tX  is positive showing that she makes money, ( )1+tXv  is 
linear in 1+tX  with slope one; in contrast, when 1+tX  is negative meaning that 
she loses money, ( )1+tXv  amplifies her utility loss by a magnitude of ,λ  with λ   
being greater than one. Figure 3.3 plots the function ( )1+tXv . 
 
The dynamics of the economy crucially depends on the value of 0b , which tells 
how much the second utility counts in her total utility. If 00 =b , loss aversion 
doesn't play a role in the overall utility, and the model is reduced to a 
traditional asset pricing setting studied by Hansen and Singleton (1983). In this 
case, higher dividend volatility leads to a higher dividend growth rate, resulting 
in a higher price-dividend ratio and a lower equity premium. However, as the 
value of 0b  increases, the investor suffers more utility loss from her financial 
loss and demands a higher risk premium in holding stocks. As will be clearer 
later, the balance of these two utility forces generates the pattern actually 
observed in financial markets. 
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Figure 3.3 Gain and Loss Function 
 
Figure 3.3 plots the gain and loss function ( )
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Both consumption and dividend growth follow lognormal processes, 
 
                        ( ) ,/log 111, +++ +== tCCtttC gCCg ησ                                              (3)  
                        ( ) ,/log 111, +++ +== ttDtttD gDDg εσ                                             (4)  
                        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 11 loglogloglog ++ +−=− tutt uσσσφσσ                             (5)  
 
Here 1, +tCg  is the growth rate of aggregate consumption tC .  Cg  and  Cσ   are 
the mean and standard deviation of consumption growth. tD  is dividend: its 
growth rate is denoted as ,1, +tDg   with mean Dg  and standard deviation tσ . 
We draw special attention to equation (5), which characterizes the evolution of 
dividend volatility. To ensure the positiveness of tσ , we model ( )1log +tσ  
instead of tσ  as an )1(AR  process. In this sense, the dividend volatility 
equation (5) is very similar to an EGARCH specification (equation [1]). uσ  
captures the magnitude of the innovation to the conditional volatility tσ  : a big 
uσ  will increase dividend volatility. A particular interesting parameter is the 
coefficient ,φ   which controls the strength of dependence on past volatilities. A 
larger φ  implies that the impact of a shock to dividend volatility is very 
persistent. As has been shown in Section 3.2, this persistence parameter φ  is 
very high in actual dividend data. 
 
The innovations to the consumption growth tη , the dividend growth tε , and the 
dividend volatility tu  are jointly normally distributed as  
 
 
                                 ,
10
1
01
,
0
0
0
 i.i.d.
⎥⎥
⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢
⎣
⎡
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
∼
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
θ
θω
ω
ε
η
N
t
t
t
u
                                       (6) 
 
  139
where ω  is the correlation between consumption shocks and dividend shocks. 
Note that when allowing for persistence in dividend volatility, the unconditional 
correlation between 1, +tCg  and 1, +tDg  is 
( ) ωω φσ <−− 22 1/5.0 ue . As discussed in 
Section 3.2.2, we assume consumption growth shocks are independent of 
dividend volatility shocks, i.e., ( ) 0, =tt uCov η , although data suggests a weak 
negative correlation between tη  and tu , which has important implications for 
the time-variation pattern of the equity premiums. We allow for the interaction 
between shocks to the dividend growth rate tε  and shocks to the dividend 
volatility tu , and the interaction of these two shocks are denoted by θ . As will 
be shown later, θ  also plays a role in generating certain model results. 
 
3.3.2 Equilibrium Prices 
This subsection derives the equilibrium asset prices. We first construct a one-
factor Markov equilibrium, in which the risk-free rate is a constant and the 
state variable tσ  (dividend volatility) determines the distribution of future stock 
returns. Assume that the price-dividend ratio is a function of tσ : 
 
.)(/ tttt fDPf σ=≡  
 
We are going to verify that there is indeed an equilibrium satisfying this 
assumption. 
 
Given the one-factor assumption, the stock returns 1+tR  can be determined as 
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Intuitively, the change in stock returns can be attributed to either the news 
about dividend growth ,1+tε  or the financial market uncertainty ,tσ   or changes 
in the price-dividend ratio .f  Since the dividend process is exogenously given, 
the key to solving 1+tR  is to solve the price-dividend ratio .f   
 
In equilibrium, the Euler equations fully capture the dynamics of the 
economy51  
 
                             ( )[ ],/1 1 γρ −+= tttf CCER                             (8) 
 
                  ( )[ ] ( )[ ],ˆ/1 1011 +−++ += tttttt RvEbCCRE ρρ γ                (9) 
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Equation (8) and the i.i.d. assumption on the consumption growth together 
imply a constant risk free rate, 
 
                                  .2/1
22
CCg
f eR
σγγρ −−=                                 (10) 
 
After substituting in the respective consumption and dividend processes, 
equation (9) boils down to 
                                                 
51The Euler equations are both necessary and sufficient to characterize the 
equilibrium. Refer to BHS (2001) for a proof. 
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In equilibrium, the function f must evolve according to equation (11), which 
also verifies the conjectured one-factor Markov equilibrium price function. 
 
3.3.3 Methodology of Numerical Computation 
We solve f numerically on a grid search of the state variable tσ . We start out 
by guessing a solution to (11), ( )0f  say. According to (5), the distribution of 
1+tσ  is completely determined by tσ  and 1+tu . Then we get a new candidate 
solution ( )1f  by the following recursion 
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We continue this process until ( ) ff i → . 
 
3.4 Model Results 
3.4.1 Calibrating Parameter Values 
We calibrate the model at quarterly frequency, such that the model implied 
moments match those of the observed annual data. In reality, many 
companies issue their dividend policies and earning reports at quarterly 
frequency, hence it is reasonable for the investors to re-evaluate their 
investment performance at a quarterly basis. We also calibrate the model at 
monthly and annual frequency, in which cases investors re-evaluate their 
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performance more frequently or less frequently. We get qualitatively similar 
results, so we only report the results based on quarterly decision making 
throughout our analysis. 
 
Table 3.2 summarizes our choice of parameter values. We choose similar 
values as BHS for the consumption growth parameters and the preference 
parameters. For Cg  and Cσ , the mean and standard deviation of log 
consumption growth, we follow Cecchetti, Lam and Mark (1990) and set 
%46.0=Cg  and %90.1=Cσ , which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 
%84.1  with volatility of %79.3 . The curvature γ  of utility over consumption and 
the time discount factor ρ  are set as 0.1  and 995.0  respectively, bringing the 
net annual risk free rate close to 86.3  percent by equation (10) and the values 
of Cg  and Cσ . The loss aversion parameter λ  is equal to ,25.2  since many 
independent experimental studies have estimated it as being around this level. 
Similar to BHS, the parameter 0b  does not have an empirical counterpart, and 
we present results for a range of values of 0b . 
 
Using NYSE/AMEX data and Fama risk-free rate data from 1926.Q3 to 
2006.Q4 from CRSP, we calibrate the unconditional mean of quarterly 
dividend growth rate as its empirical mean, %39.0=Dg . By matching the first 
moment of Equation (4), ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]11, logloglog ++ +=− tDtD EggE εσ , we calibrate 
( )σlog  as 91.3− . The parameter φ , who governs the persistence of dividend 
volatility, takes the value 99.0 , close to the estimated value from an EGARCH 
model in Section 3.2. 
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Table 3.2   Calibrated Parameters 
 
This table reports the calibration values for the preference parameters and 
technology parameters in the theoretical model. γ  is the curvature of utility 
over consumption, ρ  is the time discount factor, λ  is the loss aversion 
parameter, and 0b  controls the importance of the loss aversion relative to the 
consumption in the utility function. Cg  and Dg  are the means of the 
consumption and dividend growth rate, respectively. Cσ  is the volatility of 
consumption growth. ( )σlog  is the mean of the log of conditional volatility of 
dividend growth. φ  measures the persistence of dividend volatility, while uσ  
controls the variation in dividend volatility. ω  is the correlation between 
consumption news and dividend news, and θ  is the correlation between 
dividend level news and volatility news. The calibration for the dividend 
parameters is based on the dividend sample 1926.Q3-2006.Q3 constructed 
from the value weighted NYSE/AMEX returns from CRSP. 
 
Parameters Calibration Values
Preference
 1.0
 0.995
b0 range
 2.25
Technology
gC 0.46%
gD 0.39%
C 1.90%
log̄ −3.91
 0.15
 0.99
 −0.67
u 0.14  
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The parameter uσ  is very important since it measures the magnitude of 
dividend volatility. We calibrate this parameter as 14.0 , such that the model 
implied annual dividend growth rate has a volatility equal to its empirical 
counterpart. Compared to BY (2004), the value of uσ  appears large. However, 
this is an artifact of our specification of the volatility process in equation (5), 
where the logarithm of dividend volatility rather than its square follows an AR(1) 
process. Indeed, given 1≈φ , taking a first order approximation of (5), we have 
1
22
1 ++ +≈ twtt uσσσ , where ( ) 42 102.82 −×== utw E σσσ , close to the value in BY 
(2004). 
 
Two more model parameters remain to be calibrated: θ , which captures the 
interaction between innovations in dividend growth rate and dividend volatility; 
and ω , the correlation between consumption and dividend. By equations (4) 
and (5), we calibrate θ  at 67.0− . Following Campbell (2000), we set 15.0=ω , 
which implies an unconditional correlation of 1.0  between consumption and 
dividend growth processes. 
 
3.4.2 Price-dividend Ratio Function f   
Figure 3.4 plots the price-dividend ratio f  as a function of ( )tσlog  for 7.00 =b , 
20 =b  and 60 =b . We also try a variety of other values for 0b , for example, 
1.00 =b  , 200 =b , 2000 =b , etc. The essential pattern, however, is fully 
depicted by Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4 Price-Dividend Functions f 
 
Figure 3.4 plots the equilibrium price-dividend ratios against the log of the 
conditional dividend volatility,  log( tσ ),  for b0 = 0.7, 2 and 6. 
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Investors in our model care not only about consumption, the standard 
expected log utility term in (2), but also about fluctuations in the value of their 
investments, the additional prospect utility term in (2). These two forces jointly 
determine the shape of the function f . Without loss aversion, a higher 
dividend volatility implies a higher dividend growth rate in the future, and thus 
higher expected cash flows from holding stocks. Since the stochastic discount 
factor depends on the consumption process, which is weakly correlated with 
dividend, it is relatively unchanged. Therefore, stocks are more attractive and 
their prices are higher. The standard consumption utility contributes to a 
positive relationship between tσ  and the price-dividend ratio ( )tf σ . 
 
The presence of loss aversion, in contrast, contributes to a negative 
relationship between dividend volatility tσ  and the price-dividend ratio ( )tf σ . 
For a fixed 0b , the more volatile the dividend process, the more volatile the 
returns, therefore, the more likely investors are to suffer financial losses. This 
causes loss averse investors great pains, and makes stocks less desirable. As 
a result, they require more compensations when faced with more volatile 
dividend processes, causing lower stock prices or higher equity premiums. 
 
The negative slope of f function is consistent with BY (2004) and Bansal, 
Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005), who find that asset prices drop as economic 
uncertainty rises, although their measure of economic uncertainty is 
conditional consumption volatility rather than dividend volatility. It is rather 
difficult to justify this negative relationship within the standard power utility 
framework, where, as we have discussed before, a higher dividend volatility is 
associated with higher expected dividend growth, hence price-dividend ratios 
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always vary positively with dividend volatility. However, it can be easily 
understood with the introduction of loss aversion preferences. 
 
The overall shape of f  can now be summarized as follows. For low values of 
tσ , the impact of loss aversion is dominant, hence the function f  is downward 
sloping. As tσ  becomes larger, the impact of log utility catches up, and the 
function f eventually becomes upward sloping. That is, f  is U-shaped, as 
shown in Figure 3.4. The smaller is 0b , the earlier f  achieves its minimum. 
Moreover, larger values of 0b  say that investors care more about their wealth 
fluctuations, in which case the risk premiums for holding stocks are higher. 
Therefore, as 0b  increases, the function f  will move downward. 
 
How does f  look like in the data? According to our calibration, ( )tσlog  is 
normally distributed with mean 91.3−  and standard deviation 99.0 . Therefore, 
just reading from Figure 3.4, we will expect to see a negative relationship 
between price-dividend ratios and dividend volatility for most of the time. To 
see this more formally, we run an AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) estimation on the 
quarterly dividend growth for 1926.Q3-2006.Q4 and plot the price-dividend 
ratios against the estimated conditional dividend volatilities tσˆ  in Figure 3.5. 
Indeed, more than 80 percent of the observed data display a negative 
relationship. In addition, we also notice an interesting positive relationship 
between price-dividend ratios and dividend volatility, which occurs for some 
extremely high realizations of tσˆ . For instance, when the logarithm of dividend 
volatility is larger than 05.0 , price-dividend ratios actually rise with dividend 
volatility. Therefore, the data display a similar U-shaped pattern as predicted 
by our model. 
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Figure 3.5 Historical Price-Dividend Ratios v.s. 
Conditional Dividend Volatility 
 
Figure 3.5 plots the historical price-dividend ratios against the conditional 
dividend volatility estimated from an AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) regression for 
period 1926.Q3-2006.Q3. 
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3.4.3 Simulation Results 
In this subsection, we generate artificial data under the parameter 
configuration in Table 3.2, and show that the model-simulated data replicate 
the interesting patterns found in actual data. 
 
In order to facilitate a comparison with historical data, we simulate the model 
at a quarterly frequency and time-aggregate them to get annual data. We do 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations. We then calculate 
the interested statistics and report their sample moments. Given that the 
simulation number is large enough, the sample moments should serve as 
good approximations to population moments. 
 
3.4.3.1 Stock Returns and Stock Volatility 
Table 3.3 reports a variety of statistics calculated from model simulated data 
and the corresponding statistics from historical data. It is noteworthy that the 
model can match the mean and standard deviations of excess stock returns 
pretty well. When ,60 =b  the model generates a sizable premium of %75.6  per 
annum, which is slightly higher than the empirical value %90.5 ; the model also 
generates a standard deviation of %49.19 , which is almost equal to the 
corresponding value of %17.19  in the data. 
 
We notice that as 0b  grows, both the mean and standard deviations from 
model simulated excess returns increase. This is because when 0b  increases, 
loss aversion becomes a more important feature of investors' preference, so 
investors become more and more fearful of risky assets, pushing down stock 
prices. 
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We also report the mean and standard deviation of the simulated annual price-
dividend ratios, ( )atat DPE /  and ( )atat DP /σ .52 The empirical value 
( ) %43.12/ =atat DPσ  is relatively high to those found in other papers (BHS, 
2001; BY, 2004; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999). This is due to the relatively 
high price-dividend ratios from 1996 to 2006, which includes the high-tech 
bubble period. 
 
We are able to match stock returns volatility even though the volatility of price-
dividend ratios is lower than their empirical counterparts, a common problem 
with one factor models. The reason to achieve excess volatility in stock returns 
is due to the positive relationship between price-dividend ratios and dividend 
innovations. To see this more clearly, consider the following approximate 
relationship (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997): 
 
( ) ( )[ ] ,/log 111 +++ ++≈ ttttt ffAr εσσσ  
 
where A  is a constant. The excess volatility of market return relative to that of 
the dividend growth (or the fundamental), ( ) ( )11 ++ − ttt VarrVar εσ , comes from 
two sources: the volatility of price-dividend ratios, ( )
t
t
f
fVar 1log + , and the 
covariance between the price-dividend ratios and the news to the dividends, 
( )1,log 1 ++ ttff ttCov εσ . In actual data, since 0<θ  in (6), good dividend news 
(positive 1+tε ) tends to be associated with negative dividend volatility shock 
(negative 1+tu ), implying that next period price-dividend ratios will increase 
(see Figure 3.4). Therefore, the covariance term ( )1,log 1 ++ ttff ttCov εσ  is positive. 
 
                                                 
52The superscript a indicates annualized variables. 
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Table 3.3 Asset Prices and Annual Returns (1926-2006) 
 
This table provides information regarding stock returns for the simulated data 
and historical data. The historical data correspond to the period 1926-2006. 
The entries for the model are based on 10,000 simulations each with 320 
quarterly observations that are time-aggregated to an annual frequency. The 
parameter configuration in simulation follows that in table 3.2. The expressions ( )a tfat rrE ,1 −+  and ( )a tfat rr ,1 −+σ  are, respectively, the mean and volatility of the 
annualized continuously compounded returns. ( )a tCat grCorr 1,1, ++  is the correlation 
between the annual stock return and annual growth rate. ( )atat DPE /  and ( )atat DP /σ  are the mean and volatility of the annualized price-dividend ratios. 
 
Empirical Value Model
Variables (1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
Annual Excess Stock Return
E rt1a − rf,ta 5.90 2.68 4.98 6.75
 rt1a − rf,ta 19. 17 16.18 18.44 19.49
E rt1a − rf,ta / rt1a − rf,ta 0.31 0.16 0.27 0.35
Corrrt1a ,gC,t1a  0. 1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Annual Price-Dividend Ratio
EPta /Dta  29. 08 19.01 13.47 11.06
Pta /Dta  12. 43 2.56 2.62 2.47
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The model is also able to generate the low correlation between stock returns 
and consumption growth, ( ) 1.0, 1,1 =++ a tCat grCorr . This happens because the 
variation in stock returns is completely driven by the innovations in the 
dividend process, which is only weakly correlated with the consumption 
process. 
 
3.4.3.2 Autocorrelations of Returns and Price-Dividend Ratios 
Table 3.4 presents autocorrelations in returns and price-dividend ratios. Our 
model predicts negative autocorrelations in stock returns, as documented by 
Poterba and Summers (1988) and Fama and French (1988a). This negative 
correlation comes from the fact that returns and price-dividend ratios depend 
solely on a persistent AR(1) dividend volatility process. Moreover, our model 
closely matches the highly positively correlated price-dividend ratios in the 
data. 
 
3.4.3.3 Return Predictability 
To analyze the predictability pattern of returns, we run the following regression 
on both simulated and historical data: 
 
( ) ,/... ,21 tjatatjja jtatat PDrrr εβα ++=+++ +++  
 
where a jtr +  refers to the annual cumulative log returns from year 1−+ jt  to 
jt +  . Table 3.5 presents the regression result for different values of 0b . This 
estimation result from model-simulated data resembles the classic pattern 
documented by Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988b). 
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The coefficients are significant and negative, indicating that high prices tend to 
predict low expected returns. Moreover, the forecasting power increases with 
forecasting horizons, as reflected by the increasing coefficients and 2R 's. 
 
The pattern of return predictability generated by our model can be understood 
through the volatility test in Cochrane (1992). Starting from the accounting 
identity 1
1
11 +
−
+= tt RR  with tttt PDPR /)( 111 +++ += , the log-linearization around the 
average price-dividend ratios, DP / , implies that, in the absence of rational 
asset price bubbles, 
 
),(),()(
1
,
1
jttt
j
jtDtt
j
tt rdpCovhgdpCovhdpVar jj +
∞
=
+
∞
=
−−−≈− ∑∑  
 
where lower case indicates log values and )/1/(/ DPDPh += . This suggests 
that the variation in the price-dividend ratio will forecast either the change in 
expected dividend growth rate, or the discount rate, or both. 
 
In our model, even though dividend volatility is time varying, the dividend 
growth rate per se is still a white noise, meaning 0),( , =− + jtDtt gdpCov . Given 
that the risk-free rate is maintained as a constant, the only thing remaining for 
the price-dividend ratio to predict is the excess return. A high price-dividend 
ratio is associated with a decline in dividend volatility, so the required expected 
return will be lower. Therefore, our model implies an extreme version of the 
volatility test results. 
 
 
 
  154
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4 Autocorrelations of Returns and Price-Dividend Ratios 
 
This table reports the autocorrelations of annualized stock returns and price-
dividend ratios for the simulated data and historical data. The historical data 
correspond to the period 1926-2006. The entries for the model are based on 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations that are time-
aggregated to an annual frequency. The parameter configuration in simulation 
follows that in table 3.2. The expressions ( )a jtat rrCorr −,  and ( )a jta jtatat DPDPCorr −− /,/  are, respectively, the autocorrelations of the annualized 
compound equity returns and P/D ratios. 
 
Empirical Value Model
(1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
Corr rta , rt−ja
j  1 0.09 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
j  2 −0.17 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  3 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  4 −0.12 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
j  5 −0.06 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
Corr Pta /Dta ,Pt−ja /Dt−ja
j  1 0.90 0.68 0.79 0.82
j  2 0.81 0.61 0.71 0.74
j  3 0.75 0.56 0.64 0.66
j  4 0.68 0.50 0.58 0.60
j  5 0.60 0.45 0.51 0.53
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Table 3.5 Return Predictability Regressions (1926-2006) 
 
This table provides evidence of predictability of future excess returns by price-
dividend ratios. The entries correspond to regressing ( ) tjatatjja jtatat PDrrr ,21 /... εβα ++=+++ +++ , where a jtr +  refers to the annual 
cumulative log returns from year 1−+ jt  to jt + . The historical data 
correspond to the period 1926-2006. The entries for the model are based on 
10,000 simulations each with 320 quarterly observations that are time-
aggregated to an annual frequency. The parameter configuration in simulation 
follows that in table 3.2. 
 
Empirical Value Model
(1926-2006) b0  0.7 b0  2 b0  6
1 2.55 2.42 2.08 1.83
2 5.99 4.90 4.08 3.58
3 8.28 7.23 5.95 5.20
4 11.26 9.44 7.71 6.69
R21 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06
R22 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.11
R23 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.16
R24 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.20
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It's worth noting that a central fact driving predictability of returns is the 
persistence of dividend volatility. As shown in Cochrane (2005), both the 
estimated coefficients and  R2′s   increase with the persistence of the price-
dividend ratio, which depends on dividend volatility. 
 
3.4.3.4 Time-varying Sharpe Ratios 
Empirical evidence suggests that estimates of both conditional means and 
conditional standard deviations of returns change through time, but they do 
not move one for one. Hence Sharpe ratios are time-varying. Figure 3.6 
presents the conditional means and conditional standard deviations as 
functions of the state variable )log( tσ . Overall, as tσ  increases, the dividend 
growth becomes more volatile; thus both the means and the standard 
deviations of expected returns increase. 
 
Comparing the conditional means, ( )1+tt RE , and conditional standard 
deviations, ( )1+tt Rσ , of expected returns, we see that they are different 
functions of dividend volatility. Most noticeably, for those values of 
( )tσlog smaller than ( ) 91.3log −=σ , the conditional standard deviation is 
almost a constant, whereas the conditional mean has more variations and 
increases with ( )tσlog . Therefore, the Sharpe ratio of conditional mean to 
conditional standard deviation varies over time, with its variation due to the 
difference between ( )1+tt RE  and ( )1+tt Rσ . 
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Figure 3.6 Conditional Moments of Stock Returns 
 
Panel (a) and (b) plot the conditional expected stock return ( )1+tt RE  and 
conditional volatility of return ( )1+tt Rσ  for the case b0=6. 
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More formally, according to (4)-(7), the conditional mean and conditional 
variance of 1+tR  are respectively, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) .
1
1
,1
2
112
2
2
1122
1
11
1
1
22
1
22
1
22
2
1
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
+
+
+
+−+
+−+
+
+−+
+
tttD
tttD
tttD
u
t
t
t
g
u
t
t
t
g
tt
u
t
t
t
g
tt
e
f
fEe
e
f
fEeRVar
e
f
fEeRE
θσσθ
θσσθ
θσσθ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
 
 
To get a clearer picture of the distribution of Sharpe ratios, we numerically 
calculate the conditional Sharpe ratios from the above formula. Specifically, 
we make 160,000 random draws of 1+tε  and 1+tu , calculate the conditional 
mean and conditional standard deviation of expected returns by numerical 
integration, and then obtain the conditional Sharpe ratios as a function of 
)log( tσ  when 60 =b . Figure 3.7 presents the histogram of the simulated 
conditional Sharpe ratios, showing that the price of risk is changing over time. 
The unconditional mean and standard deviation of simulated Sharpe ratios are 
0.14 and 0.05, matching their empirical values. 
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of the Conditional Sharpe Ratios 
 
The distribution is based on a simulation for the case b0=6. 
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3.4.3.5 Structural Break and Equity Premiums 
Recent empirical evidence shows that the macroeconomic risk has declined 
over the past fifty years. It still remains an open question how this reduced risk 
affects ex-ante equity premiums, which are identified to have declined since 
WWII, by Blanchard (1993), Fama and French (2002), Freeman (2004), and 
Buranavityawut, Freeman and Freeman (2006). We use dividend volatility to 
stand for risk and study how this risk is priced in financial markets. 
 
The econometric evidence in Section 3.2 suggests that dividend volatility has 
decreased dramatically since the 1950s. According to our model, lower 
dividend volatility means that stocks are less likely to perform poorly; thus loss 
averse investors are less worried about fluctuations in their financial wealth. 
As a result, they are more willing to hold risky stocks, pushing up stock prices 
and driving down expected returns. To test our model performance in the 
postwar period with declined dividend volatility, we re-calibrate the model 
according to the data for 1954-2006. The new parameter values are provided 
in Table 3.6. Comparing the new values with those calibrated from all data, we 
find that the mean dividend growth rate doesn't change a lot, however, the 
standard deviation of ( )tσlog  decreased from 14.0  to 10.0 , a decline of 
roughly %30 . Consistent with our intuition, the model-simulated data match 
the actual data very well in excess returns, in the standard deviation of excess 
returns, as well as in Sharpe ratios. 
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Table 3.6 Structural Break and Asset Prices 
 
This table reports the mean and volatility of stock returns for the simulated 
data for two sets of dividend parameter configurations. Calibration I is based 
on the dividend sample 1926.Q3-2006.Q3; Calibration II is based on the 
dividend sample 1954.Q3-2006.Q3. The preference parameters and 
consumption parameters are the same as table 3.2 for both configurations. 
The expressions ( )a tfat rrE ,1 −+  and ( )a tfat rr ,1 −+σ  are, respectively, the mean and 
volatility of the annualized continuously compounded returns. 
 
Dividend Parameter Configuration
Parameters u gD log̄ 
Calibration I 0.14 0.39% −3.91 −0.67
Calibration II 0.10 0.35% −4.16 −0.34
Annual Excess Returns
Variables E rt1a − rf,ta  rt1a − rf,ta
E rt1
a −rf,ta
 rt1a −rf,ta
Empirical Value
1926–2006 5.90 19.17 0.31
1954–2006 4.87 15.35 0.32
Model (b0  6)
Calibration I 6.75 19.49 0.35
Calibration II 4.71 16.54 0.28
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Our model suggests that the decline in equity premiums is a direct result of 
declining macroeconomic risk, which is characterized by dividend volatility. 
The existing literature has focused on other measures of macroeconomic risk. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) and Kim, Morley and Nelson (2004, 2005) have 
examined structural changes in market volatility and argue that, if the market 
price of risk does not vary greatly, then falls in market volatility should be 
associated with a decline in the required rate of return for equity. Lettau, 
Ludvigson and Wachter (2008) use consumption volatility to measure 
economic risk, and argue that this reduced macroeconomic risk contributed to 
the recent run-up in price-dividend ratios. We prefer dividend volatility to other 
measures of macroeconomic risk because dividend volatility is an important 
feature of the underlying endowment process, which determines market 
volatility in equilibrium. More importantly, as in the data, stock returns are only 
weakly correlated with consumption, therefore, a model relying on 
consumption volatility will inevitably generate a high correlation between stock 
returns and consumption, contradicting our observation. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper proposes a model in which dividend volatility is used to represent 
fluctuating economic uncertainty, and investors are loss averse over 
fluctuations in their financial wealth. Experimental and psychological evidence 
supports the behavioral assumption of loss aversion. Our empirical analysis of 
the aggregate dividend (including all distributions) establishes that dividend 
volatility is highly persistent and has experienced a remarkable decline in the 
postwar period. 
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Our model-simulated data exhibit similar patterns to those observed in actual 
return data: stock returns have a high mean, high volatility and a low 
correlation with consumption; they are predicted by price-dividend ratios; the 
Sharpe ratios are time-varying. 
 
To address the dynamic evolution of equity premiums, we also calibrate the 
models according to postwar data, in which dividend volatility is shown to be 
substantially lower than in prewar data. Based on the new calibrated 
parameter values, the model can generate much lower equity premiums 
(higher price-dividend ratios) thanks to a more stable economic environment. 
 
In essence, this paper highlights the significant effect of dividend volatility on 
asset prices when investors are narrow-framing, i.e., they derive direct utility 
from their financial investments. In the face of an uncertain investment 
environment captured by dividend volatility, loss averse investors are fearful of 
holding risky assets; if this uncertainty is persistent, their fears are stronger. 
This mechanism can generate important asset price behaviors in financial 
markets. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1.A: Distribution of individual pricing errors 
 
Cai (2006) proves that for interior points, the distribution of individual pricing 
error ( )τα  is 
 
( ) ( ).)(,0 0 τντα Σ→NTh d  
The variance of ( )τα  is composed of two parts: 0ν  and ( )τΣ . duuK )(20 ∫=ν , 
which represents some kernel adjustments. 100
1
0 )()(
−− ΩΣΩ=Σ ττ , with 
( )′=Ω tt XXE0 , where ( )′= tt fX ,1  and 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ττεττετ −−∑=Σ +++∞−∞= kthktktthttt KXKX ,cov0 , which captures the possible 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
In implementation, we use the sample moment to estimate 0 . To estimate 
)(0 τΣ , we compute the residuals tεˆ , and then apply the method of moment to 
obtain a direct estimator as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) .ˆˆˆ
110
0
′
== ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∑⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −∑=Σ ττεττεντ thtt
T
t
thtt
T
t
KXKX
T
h  
 
See Cai and Chen (2005) for details about the asymptotic consistency of this 
estimator. 
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Appendix 1.B: Derivation of the asymptotic distribution of average pricing 
errors 
 
The average of conditional alpha is 
 
.ˆ1ˆ
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛= ∑
= T
t
T
T
t
αα  
Under the general assumption that the random error process { }Ttt 1=ε  is 
heteroskadastic, the asymptotic distribution of αˆ  is  
 
( ),,0ˆ VNT d→α  
where V  is the asymptotic variance and equals the (1,1) element of  
( ) 1010 −+′+∞−∞=− Ω∑Ω jttjttj XXE εε . 
 
 
Proof: 
Cai (2007) shows that ( )ταˆ  can be approximated as the (1,1) element of 
( )τ∗−Ω 0,10 nT , where thtTtn TtKXTT εττ )/()( 110, −∑= =−∗ . So ( )αˆVar  asymptotically 
approaches the (1,1) element of 
0−1 1T2 ∑1
T ∑
 ′1
T
Cov T−1 ∑
t1
T
XtKh t − T t,T
−1 ∑
s1
T
XsKh s − ′T s 0
−1
 0−1 1T4 ∑1
T ∑
 ′1
T ∑
j1−T
T−1
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T
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where ( ) ( )jttjtt XXEj +′+= εεγ . 
 
Note that the coefficient 
 
1
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∑
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T
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So ( )αˆVarT  approaches the ( )1,1  element of ( ) 1010 −+′+∞−∞=− Ω∑Ω jttjttj XXE εε .  
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Appendix 1.C: Goodness of fit for conditional models versus unconditional 
models 
 
Chen (2008) shows that  A   and  B  in (10) take different forms depending the 
specifications of the errors. We report the statistics based on i.i.d. errors, but 
the results are robust to more general error assumptions. Under i.i.d. errors, 
 
Ŝ  h SSR0 − SSR1  − Â
B̂
,
 
where the centering and scaling factors are 
 
Â  h−1/2 ̂2
2dk0 − 1
Th ∑j1−TT−1 1 − |j |T k 2 jTh Ĉj
h d − 1
Th ∑j−Th Th  1 − |j |T Ĉjk jTh −1
1 k j
Th
 2u du
,
 
 
and 
 
B̂  4̂4 1Th∑
j1
T−1
1 − jT Ĉj 2k
j
Th − −1
1
kuk u  jTh du
2
,
 
 
where  ( ) ( )( ) ,/ˆ/ˆˆ 2,112 ttiTtT fTtTtR βασ −−∑= =   and 
 
Ĉj  1T − |j | ∑
t|j |1
T
Xt−|j |
′ M̂−1XtXt′M̂−1Xt−|j |,
 
 
with ′=− ∑= ttTt XXTM 11ˆ . Intuitively, Aˆ  and Bˆ  are approximately the mean and 
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variance of ( )10 SSRSSRh − . The third term of Aˆ  involving the factor h  arises 
due to the use of the pseudodata in the reflection method to correct the 
boundary issue, but it is proportional to h  and will vanish to zero when ∞→T . 
It is a finite sample correction. Note that the residual variance estimator 2σˆ  
here is based on the nonparametric residuals and is consistent for ̂2  under 
both the null and alternative hypotheses. One could also use the OLS 
residuals to estimate 2σˆ , and the asymptotic distribution of Cˆ  remains 
unchanged. However, the OLS residuals will not give a consistent estimator 
for 2σˆ  under the alternative hypothesis. Thus, the use of the nonparametric 
residuals is expected to deliver better power. 
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Appendix 2.A.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We have mentioned that generations in our model should be understood as 
generations of trades, so that one period corresponds to six months to one 
year. So far in our analysis, we have taken one period to be one year. Table 
2.A1 analyzes the effect of changing this assumption, by assuming the 
decision interval of an investor to be six months. We recalibrate dividend 
parameters as 19.1=Hθ  and 83.0=Lθ , so that the time-aggregated annual 
growth rate of dividends has the same mean and volatility as the data. We 
also reset 1−fR  to be 91.1  percent to maintain a net annual risk-free rate of  
86.3   percent. The loss aversion parameter is still set at 25.2=λ , and the 
diminishing sensitivity parameter α  can take three values: 37.0 , 52.0 and 
88.0 . The variable 2WML  is the simulated average cumulative annualized 
momentum portfolio returns: 
 
( ).12 111 losertlosertwinnertwinnertTt RRRRTWML ++= −∑=  
 
Comparing Table 2.A1 with Table 2.4, where one period is assumed to be one 
year, we find that changing the length of the decision interval affects the 
momentum effect and the equity premium. When the decision interval 
becomes shorter, a typical investor will experience more losses in one year, 
and since he is averse to losses, he will demand a higher premium. The higher 
equilibrium equity premium or, equivalently, the lower price-dividend ratio, 
means that the disposition effect, i.e., age-2-1 investors' different behavior 
facing good news versus bad news, will have a higher impact on the stock 
return predictability, thereby generating higher returns to the winners-minus-
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losers portfolio. 
 
As described in Section 2.2, we suppose that investor i  uses ifWR ,1
2  as a 
reference level of wealth when calculating gains and losses. Odean (1998) 
and Genesove and Mayer (2001) assume that the investor uses the original 
purchase price as a reference point. That is, if an investor buys a stock at 
price BP  and sells at price SP , he calculates gains/losses X  as follows: if he 
holds the stock one period and receives a dividend D , then he perceives 
BS PDPX −+= ; if he holds the stock two periods and collects dividends D  
and D′ , then he perceives BS PDDPX −′++= . Table 2.A2 presents the 
results for this specification of gains/losses. We still take one period as one 
year, and the parameter values are fixed at 28.1=Hθ , 76.0=Lθ , 0386.1=fR  
and 25.2=λ .  Comparing Table 2.A2 with Table 2.4, we find that this 
alternative definition of gains/losses has virtually no effect on our results 
except to deliver a lower equity premium. The reason for the low equity 
premium is that stock returns don't need to beat the risk-free rate to be 
counted as gain, which in turn makes the investor more willing to purchase a 
stock. 
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Table 2.A1   Results for a Decision Interval of Six Months 
 
The decision interval of the investor is assumed to be six months. Dividend 
parameters are recalibrated as 1913.1=Hθ  and 8309.0=Lθ , so that the 
annualized dividend growth rate has a mean of %24.2  and a volatility of %97.25 . 
The risk-free rate is set as %91.11 =−fR . Loss aversion parameter λ  is set at 
25.2 . PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains realized and 
proportion of losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect = . 2WML is the simulated 
average cumulative annualized momentum portfolio return. ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+ 21 fRRRE tt  is 
the annualized equity premium. ( )121 ,tSHtQ −=  is the turnover, or aggregate 
selling, in period t. 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.40
PLR 0.18 0.24 0.37
DispEffect 2.15 1.68 1.07
(ii) Momentum Effect
WML2 10.33% 6.59% 0.78%
(iii) Turnover
Corr RtRt1 ,
QtQt1
2 0.87 0.88 0.89
(iv) Equity Premium
E RtRt1 − Rf2 11.27% 11.22% 9.69%
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When we extend our model to a multi-stock setting and construct the winners-
minus-losers portfolio, we have assumed that investors engage in narrow-
framing. Is it plausible that people frame individual stocks narrowly? As argued 
by Barberis and Huang (2007), narrow framing is related to non-consumption 
utility such as regret: if one of the investor's stocks performs poorly, he may 
regret the specific decision to buy that stock. So, from a theoretical 
perspective, gains and losses on individual stocks can affect the investor's 
decisions. In addition, the extensive empirical evidence on the disposition 
effect documents that investors, including institutional investors, are reluctant 
to take losses on the level of individual stocks, suggesting that investors 
engage in narrow framing in the real market. Of course, a framework that 
allows the investor to derive utility directly from trading profits on individual 
stocks, but also, as in traditional models, to derive utility from consumption, 
namely a framework that allows for both narrow and traditional broad framing 
at the same time, might fit the data better. Although to construct such a formal 
model poses significant technical challenges and is beyond the scope of our 
current analysis, we believe our intuition will carry over, and our main results 
will survive in this more general setting, so long as the investor's preference 
can be partially captured by narrow framing and prospect theory, which are the 
two main drivers of our results. 
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Table 2.A2   Results for Using Purchase Prices as Reference Points 
 
The investor uses the purchase price as the reference point when calculating 
capital gains or losses. PGR and PLR are the simulated proportion of gains 
realized and proportion of losses realized. We define PLRPGRDispEffect =  and ( ) ( )LREHREMomEffect tttt θθθθ =−== ++ || 11 . WML  is the simulated average 
momentum portfolio return in the multi-stock setting. ( )121 ,tSHtQ −=  is the 
turnover, or aggregate selling, in period t . Technology parameter values are 
fixed at their values in Table 2.1: 2821.1=Hθ , 7628.0=Lθ  and 0386.1=fR . Loss 
aversion parameter λ is set at 25.2 , the value estimated by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992). 
 
  0.37   0.52   0.88
(i) Disposition Effect
PGR 0.40 0.41 0.49
PLR 0.18 0.24 0.43
DispEffect 2.24 1.74 1.16
(ii) Momentum Effect
MomEffect 7.39% 4.91% 0.86%
WML 7.07% 4.65% 0.68%
(iii) Turnover
CorrRt,Qt  0.84 0.88 0.95
(iv) Equity Premium
ERt − Rf  3.86% 3.77% 2.76%
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Appendix 2.A.2 Heterogeneity, Aggregation and Price Impacts 
 
In our model, all investors have prospect theory preferences, the preference 
parameters (α  and λ ) are the same across investors, and the disposition 
investors (age-2-1 investors) frame gains/losses in the same way. In reality, 
investors are likely to be heterogeneous in a number of ways. First, some of 
them might be better described by traditional, risk-averse expected utility 
preferences, for example, the standard power utility representation, and these 
investors might take advantage of prospect theory investors and kill their 
effects on prices. Second, even prospect theory investors may differ in many 
dimensions, and this heterogeneity might somehow cause their aggregate 
behaviors to wash out. So recognizing these heterogeneities raises the 
question of whether the results of our model still hold in this more realistic 
world. 
 
A full analysis of this issue poses significant technical hurdles, but there is 
good reason to believe that a more general model might deliver similar results. 
On the one hand, as pointed out in the limits to arbitrage literature, there might 
be limits to the ability and willingness of traditional expected utility maximizers, 
or arbitrageurs, to offset the pricing effects of prospect theory investors, 
because by exploiting prospect theory investors, arbitrageurs face 
fundamental risk as well as noise trader risk, over and above the significant 
implementation costs they have to bear.53 As a result, arbitrageurs will trade 
                                                 
53See Barberis and Thaler (2003) Section 2.2, Barberis and Huang (2001) 
Section IV B, or Barberis and Huang (2008) Section III F for more detailed 
discussion of this point. 
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cautiously and only partially absorb the impact on prices of prospect theory 
investors, thereby allowing our results to persist. 
 
On the other hand, even though prospect theory investors might be 
heterogeneous in many ways, their disposition related tradings are likely to be 
systematic and have implications for stock prices. For example, empirical 
evidence documents that both institutional investors and individual investors 
exhibit a disposition effect, although the former do so to a smaller extent. This 
suggests that prospect theory can indeed capture the preferences of both type 
of investors, albeit differently. Formally, we can model their preferences as 
prospect theory utility with different parameters (α  and λ ), or as a 
combination of consumption utility and prospect theory utility with different 
weights. This kind of heterogeneity should not wash out in the aggregate, so 
that prospect theory preferences should have pricing implications. Actually, 
Coval and Shumway (2005) have provided strong evidence that prospect 
theory investors indeed move prices.  
 
Another heterogeneity of prospect theory investors relates to the framing of 
gains/losses. One may argue that different investors might buy into stocks at 
different prices, so that, in a given period, some investors face gains and 
others face losses, causing their disposition related tradings to cancel out in 
aggregate. However, this argument is flawed because it ignores the updating 
of reference points. When the investor has held a stock many periods, it is 
more reasonable for him to think of the reference point as some weighted 
average of the purchase price and other former prices. Once this updating 
process is taken into account, then in a rising (falling) market, most investors 
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holding the stock will accumulate gains (losses), regardless of when they 
bought into the stock or at what price, making their disposition related tradings 
systematic. This idea can be formalized in a setup with more than three 
generations. It will, however, exponentially increase the dimension of state 
vector, making the problem intractable. 
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APPENDIX 3: Constructing Dividend Time Series 
 
We follow Bansal, Khatchatrian and Yaron (2005) to impute the dividend time 
series from CRSP database. This appendix describes the details. The data 
covers quarterly sample from 1926.Q3 till 2006.Q3. In order to construct the 
quarterly dividend variable, the following series are used: 
• indxP  : Monthly stock price index on NYSE/AMEX. The price index for month 
j  is calculated as ( ) 1,, 1 −⋅+= jindxjjindx PVWRETXP , where VWRETX  is the 
value weighted return on NYSE/AMEX excluding dividends, taken from 
CRSP. 
• indxD : Monthly dividend index on NYSE/AMEX. The dividend for month j  is 
calculated as ( ) jindxVWRETXVWRETDjindx PD jj ,11, 1 ⋅−= ++ , where VWRETD  and VWRETX  are, 
correspondingly, the value weighted return on NYSE/AMEX including and 
excluding dividends, taken from CRSP. 
• indxD : Quarterly dividend index on NYSE/AMEX. The dividend for a quarter 
is the sum of the monthly dividend indices for the 3 months comprising the 
quarter. Then a four period backward moving average is taken to remove 
seasonality. That is, ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]jtindxjtindxjtindxjtindx DDDD −−−−−= ++∑= 3,13,23,3 041, , where 
t  indexes quarters. 
• Inflation : Quarterly inflation index. The inflation index for a quarter is the 
inflation index in the last month of the quarter, taken from CRSP. 
 
The resulting quarterly dividend series and dividend growth rate series are 
calculated as follows: 
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